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Abstract 
International diversification through exporting provides an opportunity for firms to broaden their 
market scope and improve performance. When venturing abroad, firms are increasingly attending to 
their channel strategies.  Practising multiple channel strategies has been found to be valuable for 
achieving a sustainable competitive advantage. Research that employs frameworks that reduce 
channel decisions to a binary one is limiting.  
This study incorporates jointly transaction costs and resources availability in assessing 
different export channel choice configurations and their performance, thus addressing calls in the 
literature for these considerations to be jointly evaluated. This thesis extends current research by 
simultaneously considering the choice between single indirect (SI), multiple indirect (MI), dual 
(DU) and direct-only (D-O) channels. Using a multinomial logit (MNML) model, this study 
comprehensively explains export channel configurations. It addresses limitations in the channel 
choice literature that has not advanced models and built theory to reflect the more complex channel 
decisions managers face today.  
The results presented here report that individual predictors of channel choice vary for 
different levels of each. With respect to efficiency, the findings show that asset specificity 
influences the choice of MI and D-O channels, behavioural uncertainty impacts the choice of SI, MI 
and D-O channels, volatility determines MI, DU and D-O choices and diversity determines DU and 
D-O channel choice. With respect to value creation, the findings indicate market orientation as 
determining SI, MI and DU channels and marketing capabilities determines SI and D-O channels. 
The performance effects of choosing export channels according to the transaction cost economics 
(TCE) and resource based (RBT) theories are also investigated. This study shows that asset 
specificity and diversity affect performance. Finally, this research shows that each predictor is 
significant for these channel choices only over particular ranges of each predictor variable.  
This research makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the TCE and RBT literatures 
by extending them to a multiple channel choice model. This approach looks beyond binary 
decisions to consider the varied channel choices that firms face. While this study integrates into one 
model efficiency aspects that explain these channel configurations, it also considers the value 
created by such decisions. As this approach demonstrates, when a channel configuration is chosen 
at different levels of the predictors, a more fine-grained analysis is made of the channel decisions 
firms face today. This study thereby offers a more refined understanding of the international 
channel choice phenomenon than is currently available in the literature. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research problem, the research questions, its significance and the method 
applied to test the theoretical model.  It also gives an overview of the organisation of this thesis and 
an explanation of the export channel types employed in this study.  
1.1 Research problem 
International diversification through exporting allows firms to broaden their market scope and 
improve performance (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). To succeed in international operations, 
firms must create and implement a strategy that includes the appropriate export channels (He, 
Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Today, the majority of industries are mature to the extent that 80 
per cent of all industries in the US, for example, are now mature (MCG, 2014). In most industries, 
crowding out prevails and an increase in a firm’s market share must come primarily at the expense 
of other firms’ shares (Parnell, 2013). In such industries, it is difficult to gain a competitive 
advantage based on product differences or price alone (Rosenbloom, 2007). As a result, some 
manufacturers pay more attention to channel strategy as a means of gaining a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Rosenbloom, 2007). Having a well-developed channel strategy based on 
long-standing or exclusive partnerships can help create entry barriers for new entrants and can 
constitute a key advantage in comparison to competitors (Parnell, 2013). Because it can provide 
significant cost and performance implications for a firm, the selection of the suitable export channel 
structure is one of its most important strategic marketing decisions in international firms (Li, He, & 
Sousa, 2016). 
However, the role of firms’ channel choices is often overlooked. Those of industrial 
companies often remain unnoticed as they are not as easily recognisable as an innovative product 
design or brand image. Moreover, while firms usually keep their distribution channel strategies 
confidential (Berndtson, 2012), they can form a major pillar of a firm’s success. For instance, 
Caterpillar, today’s leader in construction and mining equipment, was able to counter major cost 
advantages of its main competitor, Komatsu, by developing a strong international dealer network, 
which is something that cannot be copied or matched by others in a short period of time (Fites, 
1996, Rosenbloom, 2007). Similarly, by refining its distribution channel strategy, Cisco, the US 
manufacturer of network equipment, was able to increase its sales growth by 35 per cent within two 
years (Berndtson, 2012).  
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Today, firms often use a mix of channels, which are linked or interlinked (Kabadayi, 
Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Wilson & Daniel, 2007). Not only large but also small and medium-
sized firms (SMEs) can use complex channel structures (McNaughton, 2002). Multiple channel 
strategies, wherein the same product or product line is sold via different distribution channels in the 
same market, have become prevalent in business-to-business (B2B) markets (Sa Vinhas & 
Anderson, 2008, Vinhas & Anderson, 2005, Wallace, Johnson, & Umesh, 2009).  Scholars report a 
growing emergence of multiple export channels (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). For example, in the 
mechanical engineering industry, firms are using multiple channels when exporting their goods 
overseas. They use different channel combinations in each country to best reach their customers. 
Products are concurrently sold via direct exporting, distribution, and using sales agents and/or 
online web shops (Dwyer & Welsh, 1985). Many companies in the B2B sector augment their direct 
sales channels with one or more indirect channels (Cespedes & Corey, 1990). For instance, the 
stationary air compressor division of Ingersoll Rand, an Irish industrial MNE, uses a multiple 
channel strategy including direct sales, independent sales agents, distributors and the firm’s own 
sales subsidiaries (Cespedes & Corey, 1990). The strategic importance of distribution channels has 
already been recognised in the literature, yet research has only recently begun exploring strategic 
multiple channel management (Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Sharma & Mehrotra, 2007).  
The emerging channel literature suffers from a number of limitations, some of which are 
addressed in this study. First, channel research has mostly focused on an approach that compares 
two channel categories at a time. For instance, this binary approach often means choosing between 
market and hybrid channels (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013), or single and multiple channels 
(e.g. Easingwood & Coelho, 2003, McNaughton, 2002). Considering the wide array of channels 
from which firms can choose, the dearth of research models that allow for a multi-categorical 
dependent variable with more than two outcomes is surprising. The channel literature frequently 
notes that, because firms use more than one channel at a time to sell the same product or product 
line in the same market (e.g. Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995, Frazier, 1999, Kabadayi, 
Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990, Wallace, Johnson, & Umesh, 2009), 
research on multiple channel choice is needed (e.g. He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, LaPlaca, 
2007, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016, Rosenbloom, 2007, Vinhas, Chatterjee, Dutta, Fein, Lajos, Neslin, 
Scheer, Ross, & Wang, 2010). 
Using only a binary comparison of channel choices limits channel research as such decisions 
cannot always be reduced to a binary choice (Martin, 2013, Wulff, 2015). While the literature 
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acknowledges the existence of several channels, they often omit certain channels (e.g. dual channels 
in John & Weitz, 1988) or pool dissimilar channels to allow for a binary dependent variable (e.g. 
joint ventures and sales agents in Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990) (Martin, 2013). Even researchers 
who acknowledge a distinction between certain channels (e.g. sales agents and joint ventures in 
Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997) reduce the dependent variable to a binary one (Martin, 2013, Wulff, 2015). 
 Martin (2013) argues that researchers can avoid reducing empirical analyses to binary 
dependent variables by conducting a multinomial logit analysis (MNLM). Still, even those channel 
studies that have used a MNLM approach suffer from shortcomings in implementing and 
interpreting their results (e.g. Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Campa & Guillén, 1999, John & Weitz, 
1988, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). By limiting their analysis of the MNLM, researchers might 
have missed important variations across the range of predictors that could lead them to infer falsely, 
thus creating uncertainty about the conclusions drawn from past research findings (Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2015). Hence, this study contributes to the current literature by extending the 
theory behind channel choices and by addressing calls in the literature for providing a more fine-
grained analysis of the drivers and consequences of export channel selection (e.g. Li, He, & Sousa, 
2016). Specifically, this study explains why firms use different single and multiple export channel 
configurations. In addition, this study addresses methodological limitations in the literature by 
coherently analysing the MNLM model using current guidelines for implementing and interpreting 
limited dependent variable models (e.g. Bowen & Wiersema, 2004, Long & Freese, 2014, 
Wiersema & Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2015).  
In addition, while transaction cost research indicates how firms can make the most efficient 
channel choice, this research ignores the value creation potential of exporting ventures (He, 
Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). Firms choose their organisational 
structures, such as channels, not only determined by their efficiency but also their resources and 
capability potential (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Even though resource-based theory 
(RBT) has become a prevalent approach in marketing (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014), 
its application to the multiple channel context has so far been limited. Channel choice research is 
largely dominated by transaction cost theory (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). In my study, I add a resource-
based view of multiple channel choice by examining the value-creation potential of leveraging 
marketing capabilities (MCs) and market orientation (MO) capabilities through export channel 
choice. Because both capabilities are complementary assets that are expected to contribute to 
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superior firm performance (Morgan, Vorhies, & Mason, 2009), I answer calls to extend resource-
based view inquiries in the export channel choice field (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). 
Finally, few studies have considered the influence of channel choice on performance (Li, 
He, & Sousa, 2016), particularly multiple channel choice (Kabadayi, 2011). I test the notion that 
firms that align their multiple channel choice with transaction cost factors will enjoy higher export 
performance. In addition, I compare these TCE predictions with RBT predictions to assess the 
explanatory power of both theories. In RBT, I also test whether firms that align their multiple 
channel choice with their capabilities achieve improved export performance. 
1.2 Research questions 
This thesis addresses the research gaps discussed in the previous sections by exploring the role of 
different channel choice configurations in solving governance problems and value creation demands 
when venturing abroad. Therefore, I address the following central research puzzle: 
Why do firms choose different export channel configurations in the same market? 
To do so, I pose three research questions: 
RQ 1: How do transaction cost factors affect multiple export channel choice?  
RQ 2: How do capability-based factors affect multiple export channel choice? 
RQ 3: What are the performance implications of multiple export channel choice?  
These questions are examined using quantitative survey data. A primary dataset of qualified major 
informants comprising chief executive officers (CEOs), sales managers and employees was 
assembled for this research project from a sample of 254 industrial German firms in the mechanical 
engineering industry. 
1.3 Methodology  
The research questions were framed into a questionnaire that was put to this sample for the sole 
purpose of collecting the primary data for this study. To ensure a high level of response and to 
minimise missing data, the majority of the survey was conducted personally by directly contacting 
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sales managers and employees who are most suitable to answer the survey questions. For analysis, 
multinomial and binary logistic regression techniques were employed. 
To my knowledge, this is the first reported study to thoroughly apply the techniques of 
multinomial logistic regression analysis based on recent recommendations as to how the analysis 
should be conducted  (e.g. Long & Freese, 2014, Wiersema & Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2015). In other 
words, no other studies have calculated predicted probabilities and marginal effects as well as 
graphically interpreted the outcome variables. This is important as some of our current knowledge 
about firms’ channel choices is based on research studies that have omitted these important parts of 
their analyses (e.g. Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990), and have thus reported 
incomplete study results.  
Further, to assess the performance outcome of firms’ channel choices, a two-step technique 
is employed that distinguishes between firms that adhere to the theoretical predictions (“the fit 
group”) and those who deviate from the theoretical predictions of the research model (“the non-fit 
group”). In the first step, firms are separated into two groups, the fit and the non-fit group. In a 
second step, a binary logistic regression analysis is employed to assess how the fit affects the 
performance outcome, that is, how the groups correspond with theoretical predictions. This two-
step technique is necessary to account for firms’ selection of channel strategy (Shaver, 1998).  
1.4 Significance  
I contribute to the literature by addressing the limitations mentioned above. First, I extend previous 
channel research by simultaneously considering the choice of single export channels and two types 
of multiple channels, multiple indirect (MI) and dual export (DU) channels. This approach takes a 
more comprehensive view than previous studies, which have reduced channel choices to a binary 
decision. While previous studies have been limited, this study examines the cause and effect within 
various channel decisions in one integrated model. As such decisions are intricately linked to one 
another, they should be assessed more thoroughly to fulfil a robust methodological and theoretical 
approach. Moreover, this research contributes to the literature methodologically by ensuring a 
thorough analysis by using a multinomial regression model. Because previous studies are limited, 
they have hindered the theoretical and methodological advancement of channel research.  
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Second, this is one of the few studies to employ resource-based explanations to explain 
multiple channel choices. I achieve this by investigating multiple channel choice decisions and the 
impact of MCs and MO upon them. In doing so, this study addresses the call to explore how firms 
might be able to use their multiple export channels to exploit or supplement resource-based 
advantages in foreign markets (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). 
Moreover, this study addresses the calls in the literature to contrast transaction cost and resource-
based theory (Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 
2013, Seggie, 2012). Therefore, this research contributes to an understanding of these theories by 
extending their tenets into the field of multiple channel choice.  
Third, I examine the performance implications of multiple channel choice and compare the 
theoretical predictions of TCE channel choice to those of RBT channel choice. This allows me to 
compare the performance implications of channel decisions that are based on a cost-minimisation 
strategy (TCE) to those that favour a value-enhancing strategy (RBT). This study’s findings will 
thus help managers to make better decisions about channel structures for export markets from a 
more thorough understanding of what motivates channel choice and how it can be more valuable 
and efficient in foreign markets. In addition, this research has implications for public policy makers 
when they need to consider ways to facilitate direct foreign investment that benefits the local 
economy. They need to support the internationalisation of foreign firms by minimising bureaucratic 
regulations and allowing firms to realise individual export structures which benefit each company 
structure. 
1.5 Organisation of the research 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. A description of the content of each chapter is provided 
below. 
 This chapter has introduced the thesis, described the research problem, the research 
questions and the methodology, and has summarised the significance of this study. In the next 
section, this chapter also explains the channel categories employed. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
in three parts: the first overviewing the basic assumptions, logic and key determinants of the two 
theories that this thesis is built upon, namely, TCE and RBT. Therefore, the first part of Chapter 2 
presents both theories; the second part reviews the channel choice literature based on the 
independent variables used in this thesis, and the third part outlines the limitations and research 
gaps of the current channel choice literature that motivated this study. Chapter 3 comprises a 
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definition of the key constructs of the research model as well as the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses. The theoretical model upon which the quantitative study is developed and hypothesised 
is then tested in the following chapters. In Chapter 4, I present my methodology by explaining the 
data collection procedures involving the questionnaire design and pretest, sample selection, the 
measurement and operationalisation of variables as well as the analytical methods, which are 
multinomial and binary logistic regression. The data analysis and results are reported in Chapter 5 
including the steps involved to test the proposed research model. Also included are the preliminary 
data analyses, assessment of the measures using confirmatory factor analysis, and the findings of 
the data analyses using predicted probabilities, marginal effects and graphical interpretation of 
results. Chapter 6 discusses how the findings of this study relate to theory and previous channel 
choice studies. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this study by outlining the theoretical and managerial 
implications, its limitations, and the implications for future research.  
 This chapter concludes after the following section that provides an explanation of the export 
channels employed in this study. 
1.6 Explanation of channels 
While distribution channels in B2B markets can take various forms, they are usually classified into 
two depending on their degree of forward integration (John & Weitz, 1988), the direct or indirect 
channels. In a direct channel, the manufacturer does not employ independent resellers and owns the 
product until it is passed on to the end-user. This category corresponds to ‘full vertical integration’ 
in the TCE framework. Indirect channels can include various independent entities and 
intermediaries such as distributors, value-added resellers or competitors who purchase the product 
and resell it. Indirect channels correspond to ‘no vertical integration’ in the TCE framework.1 
Independent entities have additional claim to the profit and thus reduce the manufacturer’s profit 
margin (John & Weitz, 1988). In Table 1, these two categories show that indirect channels 
correspond to the ‘market mode’ and direct channels to the ‘integrated (hierarchical)’ governance 
mode in the TCE framework (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984).  
 
                                                 
1 The third categorisation of ‘hybrid’ channels is not covered in this study. Hybrid channels are for example franchising 
or joint ventures (Sa Vinhas, 2002).  
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Table 1: Channel types 
Channel type Definition Operationalisation
Direct 
channel 
('integrated/
hierarchical 
mode')
The distribution channel is fully 
controlled by the manufacturer. 
Only the manufacturer has a 
claim to the residual profit from 
the sale via a direct channel 
(Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990).
1. Direct exporting from the home market by the 
manufacturer.
Indirect 
channel 
('market 
mode')
Indirect distribution channels are 
owned and controlled by an 
independent entity and not by 
the manufacturer. The 
independent entity has a claim 
to the residual profit from the 
sale via the indirect channel.
2. Company – sales agent – end user
3. Company – distributor – end user
4. Company – value added reseller – end user
5. Company – competitor – end user
6. Company – sales agent – distributor – end user
7. Company – sales agent – value added reseller - end user
 
Firms do not adhere to a discrete choice between direct and indirect channels when 
designing channel strategy (John & Weitz, 1988, Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Osborne, 
1996), choosing rather to employ mixes of direct and indirect channels simultaneously. Multiple 
channels are defined as a “multichannel arrangement characterised by the sharing of various 
distribution tasks performed by a combination of distinct channels, indirect and/or direct” (Webb & 
Didow, 1997, p.40). Two different forms of multiple channels are considered in this study, multiple 
indirect (MI) channels, (where several indirect channels are used simultaneously) and dual channels 
(DU), (where both direct and indirect channels are used simultaneously) (Gabrielsson, Kirpalani, & 
Luostarinen, 2002, Kabadayi, 2011). Thus, MI channels refer to a channel configuration that 
consists of two or more indirect channels and DU channels refers to a channel configuration when 
at least one direct and indirect channel is used by a firm for the same product in the same country. 
Examples of a MI channel are when a firm uses sales agents and distributors or when a firm uses 
sales agents, distributors and value added resellers. Examples of a DU channel are when a firm uses 
its own employees and distributors or when a firm has a sales subsidiary and uses sales agents and 
distributors. Moreover, this study examines multiple channels only when they are used to sell the 
same product or product line in the same country, which is in line with the definition used in 
previous studies (Sa Vinhas & Anderson, 2008).  
While the occurrence of multiple channels is frequently noted in the literature, research has 
only recently begun to focus on multiple channel choice decisions (Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & 
Thomas, 2007, Rosenbloom, 2007). For instance, Osborne (1996) notes that SME manufacturing 
exporters show a high rate of multiple channels across different markets. Similarly, John and Weitz 
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(1988) notice that the majority of their sampled firms employed a mix of both direct and indirect 
channels. Some time ago, Frazier (1999) even stated that the use of multiple channels is now 
becoming the rule rather than the exception. Because of the growing significance of multiple 
channels, the Industrial Marketing Management journal has recently devoted a special issue to 
multiple channel strategies in B2B markets (LaPlaca, 2007), which has led to an emerging strand of 
research studies (Kabadayi, 2011, Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Wilson & Daniel, 2007).  
Based on the literature (Kabadayi, 2011, Sa Vinhas, 2002), this study distinguishes four 
channel categories: (1) single indirect (SI) channel, (2) multiple indirect (MI) channels (3) dual 
(DU) channels and (4) direct-only (D-O) channel. These four categories are based on field 
observations as well as the channel choice and entry mode literature. Further, the channel categories 
were confirmed in a pre-study to ensure that this classification corresponds to the realities of 
industrial exporters (see 4.2 Pre-study). These categories are described in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Channel categories 
Description
1 Single indirect channel (SI)
Includes one type of indirect export channel, for example 
distributor.
2 Multiple indirect channels (MI)
Includes two or more indirect export channels, for example 
distributor and sales agents.
3 Dual channels (DU)
Concurrently employs one or more direct channels and one or 
more indirect channels. For example exporting directly from 
home by using own employees and using a distributor.
4 Direct-only (D-O)
Direct exporting from the home market by using own employees 
and/or using a sales subsidiary.
Channel category
 
This chapter introduced the research problem, the research questions, the significance of this 
research and the methods used in this study. It also gave an overview of the organisation of this 
thesis and provided an explanation of the channel types employed. The next chapter presents the 
theoretical background of this research as well as the state of the current literature on channel 
choice. This review is followed by a discussion of the limitations of this literature which form the 
motivation of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction  
The following chapter is organised as follows. First, I introduce the basic assumptions, logic and 
key determinants of the two theories employed in this study, namely transaction cost and resource-
based theory. Then, an overview of the current state of the channel choice literature is given. 
Specifically, the findings of the impact of asset specificity (AS), and behavioural uncertainty (BU) 
and environmental uncertainty (EU) on channel choice, which form the majority of current channel 
choice research, are presented. In addition, the shortcomings of this literature are assessed, 
particularly three that form the motivation of this thesis and are thus addressed in this study.  
2.2 Theoretical background: Transaction cost economics and resource-based theory 
2.2.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
TCE explains how economic activity, such as an exchange of goods or services, should be governed 
in the most efficient way to minimise costs and maximise performance. As such, TCE focuses on 
transactions as its unit of analysis rather than commodities (Williamson, 1981). It views the firm as 
a governance structure (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) rather than a production unit. Williamson 
(1975) provided the seminal work on TCE after being influenced by several authors’ research into 
markets and hierarchies. One of them was Commons (1934) who determined transactions as the 
central unit of analysis. Transactions describe the transfer of goods or services between different 
economic actors where one stage of economic activity begins and another ends. Later, Coase (1937) 
explained why firms exist when markets are thought to be optimally efficient. Coase proposed that 
markets and hierarchies possess different capacities to organise an economic exchange. Hierarchies 
(i.e., firms) would be chosen in instances where they are able to reduce the transaction costs of 
using the market such as when negotiating prices and carrying out contracts.  
According to Smith (1937) classical economic theory, competitive markets are the most 
efficient way to organise transactions. This view led researchers to wonder why firms exist, given 
that markets are the most efficient organisational form of exchange (Hodgson, 2002). They asked 
why some transactions are organised within firms when it is more efficient to organise transactions 
through competitive markets. Coase (1937) explained that market transactions involve certain costs 
that can be reduced when a transaction is organised within a firm. Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) 
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specified which attributes of a transaction give rise to those costs and lead firms to internalise 
transactions. These attributes are AS, BU and EU. 
TCE has been applied broadly to a number of different disciplines (Shervani, Frazier, & 
Challagalla, 2007), especially to strategic management (e.g. Carter & Hodgson, 2006, David & 
Han, 2004) and marketing (e.g. Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997, Seggie, 2012). It has been applied to 
various governance arrangements such as make-or-buy decisions (e.g. Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 
1986, Hoetker, 2005, Monteverde & Teece, 1982), inter-organisational relationships (e.g. Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002, Stump & Heide, 1996), international market entry (e.g. Brouthers, Brouthers, & 
Werner, 2003, Brouthers & Nakos, 2004) and forward integration into distribution (e.g. Anderson & 
Coughlan, 1987, John & Weitz, 1988). This thesis falls within the field of forward integration into 
distribution (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997), where manufacturing firms have to decide between 
different distribution channels.  
TCE posits markets and hierarchies as the main alternatives to organise transactions and 
assigns them different abilities to economise on the costs incurred during a transaction (Williamson, 
1981). Transaction costs include direct costs such as finding an exchange partner and negotiating 
contracts as well as the opportunity costs such as maladaptation costs to changing circumstances of 
a contract (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). TCE maintains that the characteristics of a transaction 
determine how that transaction should be managed. These characteristics are AS, BU, EU and how 
frequently the transaction occurs. Because this thesis focuses on regularly occurring transactions, 
the factor “frequency” is omitted. This is in line with Williamson (1975), who focuses on ongoing, 
arms-lengths transactions.  
According to TCE, there are three modes by which a transaction can be managed:  
1) markets, 2) hierarchy and 3) hybrids.  
1) Markets are transactions between buyers and sellers on the basis of formal, negotiated 
contracts. 
2) Hierarchy describes transactions occurring within a firm. 
3) Hybrids are a mix of markets and hierarchy such as joint ventures, alliances and franchising. 
While, in hybrids, buyers and sellers cooperate more closely than in markets, they remain 
legally distinct (Williamson, 1981). Hybrid modes commonly involve higher commitments 
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than market modes, such as long-term contracts or equity investments (Crook, Combs, 
Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). However, it should be noted that the literature disagrees as to 
what exactly hybrid relationships are and whether or not TCE is adequate in explaining them 
(Carter & Hodgson, 2006, Hodgson, 2002). 
Each mode has different advantages and disadvantages in reducing transaction costs, depending on 
the type and circumstances of the transaction. TCE maintains that, to reduce costs and maximise 
performance, each transaction should be matched with the appropriate governance mode 
(Williamson, 1981). 
 Degree of integration — the three governance mechanisms, market, hybrid and hierarchy, 
differ in their degree of integration. Markets and hierarchies represent the two polar modes: low 
levels of integration for the market mode and high for hierarchies. Hybrid modes are situated in-
between and represent intermediate levels of integration (Williamson, 1985). TCE posits that each 
mode differs in its ability to manage transaction costs. This assertion rests on two behavioural 
assumptions, opportunism and bounded rationality, as well as assumptions about the mechanisms 
present in market and hierarchy modes.   
2.2.2 Behavioural assumptions 
TCE rests on two main behavioural assumptions of human nature: bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Williamson, 1975). TCE assumes that economic actors have bounded rationality, in 
that they cannot foresee all possible circumstances of an exchange. Nor can they predict how future 
transaction contingencies might change and thus they cannot write perfect contract claims for an 
exchange that prepare them for such instances. The assumption of opportunism means that, given 
the opportunity, decision makers may seek to serve their self-interest (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & 
Aguinis, 2013). As such, if the economic circumstances of an exchange change, economic actors 
might take advantage of their contract partners to put themselves in a better position (Williamson, 
1975).  
If not for their bounded rationality, economic actors would have the information needed to 
specify all contingencies and sources of potential future conflict (Williamson, 1985). Moreover, if 
not for their opportunism, exchange partners would willingly adjust to changing circumstances 
without needing to renegotiate contracts, so there would be no need to renegotiate, communicate 
and adjust (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). However, even when exchange partners 
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would be perfectly trustworthy and willing to adjust, they might be incapable of doing so and 
managers would still need to search for new partners and negotiate new contracts to adjust to 
changing circumstances and thus avoid maladaptation (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). 
2.2.3 Assumptions about the market mode 
TCE posits that markets should be used as the default governance mode in competitive markets. 
One reason is that markets can aggregate demand and thereby realise economics of scale and scope. 
For instance, economies of scale will be realised when the average unit costs to produce an output 
decline with increasing output. Therefore, specialised market actors can aggregate demands and 
perform certain functions more efficiently. In that case, a firm is better off to outsource such 
functions to external contractors to avoid the need to build up unnecessary bureaucracy within the 
firm (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006, Williamson, 1991). However, the conditions of 
competitive markets and efficiency benefits through competition do not always hold. Exchange 
hazards can occur (owing to bounded rationality and opportunism), which creates transaction costs 
that might be better managed by using an internal governance structure (Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986). 
2.2.4 Assumptions about the internal organisation (hierarchy) mode 
TCE assumes that the hierarchical structure of a firm has certain advantages in adapting and 
detecting opportunism. One advantage is that a hierarchy allows superiors to exert tighter control 
over subordinates. Working together in a hierarchy enables executive managers to more closely 
monitor behaviour and the output of employees and, as such, detect possible opportunistic 
behaviour early on (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Disputes within an organisation can be resolved 
more easily whereas in markets, contracts have to be cancelled or renegotiated (Crook, Combs, 
Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013, Foss, 1996). In addition, hierarchies can offer long-term benefits to 
employees such as promotion or other non-monetary incentives which mitigates the possible 
benefits of opportunistic behaviour. Similarly, firms can create an organisational culture that aligns 
goals among parties within a firm and makes opportunistic behaviour within the firm less likely 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  
The higher the degree of integration, from markets over hybrids to hierarchies, the higher 
managers’ abilities to exert control and improve possibilities to resolve potential conflicts. In 
contrast, a higher degree of integration is thought to provide lower incentives for market actors as 
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such integration typically separates compensation and performance (Williamson, 1991). In other 
words, whereas market actors’ compensation is directly linked to their performance (i.e., the quality 
of their product or service), company employees commonly receive the majority of their 
compensation on a constant basis that is less connected to their performance. Overall, less 
integrated modes are typically thought to be suited for simpler transactions where not as much 
coordination among the exchange parties is required. In that case the supply and demand 
mechanisms work well to adjust to changing circumstances (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 
2013, Williamson, 1991). 
2.3 Transaction characteristics and exchange hazards 
2.3.1 Asset specificity (AS) 
AS describes the extent to which specialised investments are needed to support an exchange 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986, Williamson, 1975). Asset specific investments are unique to a 
particular transaction and are thus difficult to redeploy otherwise (Williamson, 1991). Asset specific 
investments typically anticipate an exchange and are thus specific to a location, customer or use 
(Williamson, 1996). Because of their specificity, such investments create exchange hazards and 
adaptation problems.  
Specific investments can take on various forms. Williamson (1996) notes four types of specific 
assets: site specificity, physical AS, and dedicated assets and human AS. Site specificity occurs 
when assets are specific to a geographic location; physical assets refer to tangible items such as 
machines being used for a specific purpose; dedicated assets occur when a capacity is made 
available for designated customers; and human assets represent specific skills, training or 
knowledge of employees. Later on, two additional types of asset specificity were added: Temporal 
specificity and brand capital specificity (De Vita, Tekaya, & Wang, 2011). Temporal specificity 
refers to when transactions are coordinated and require a timely response (Crook, 2006). Brand 
capital specificity relates to a firm’s reputational assets which can be harmed by a transactional 
relationship. This occurs, when a supplier delivers poor quality products and therefore causes 
damage to the buyer’s reputation (De Vita, Tekaya, & Wang, 2011). 
Specialised human assets are exemplified in training provided by a firm to its distributor so 
that the distributor’s salespeople can sell the firm’s products better. However, this investment has 
no value outside of this relationship and makes it more difficult for the firm to replace this 
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distributor with a new one without losing the value of this investment (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
With such specialised training, the distributor is uniquely qualified to fulfil the suppliers’ needs thus 
reducing or eliminating competitive pressure in the market (Anderson, 1985) insofar as the 
distributor gains advantage over its competitors in fulfilling the suppliers’ needs. This puts the 
distributor in a better position which s/he might exploit by demanding concessions from the firm 
(threat of opportunistic behaviour) (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Here, market competition no 
longer serves to constrain opportunism. Thus, specialised investments create a safeguarding 
problem of this investment for the firm.  
An example of a specific asset is an oil pipeline that connects an oil well to a refinery 
(Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). The pipeline needs to be built in advance or concurrently with 
the oil well and at a specific place between the oil-well and the refinery. Additionally, the pipeline 
has a single use of transporting oil from the well-head to the refinery. Therefore, to build the 
pipeline, a specific investment is needed with a particular customer (i.e., the refinery) and a 
particular supplier (i.e., the well-head). After having invested in the pipeline, the investor faces the 
threat of opportunistic behaviour by the supplier and/or the customer. For instance, the oil-well 
owner could incur transport fees for the oil that reduce or even diminish the investors’ return on 
investment in transporting the oil. Similarly, the refinery could lower the price offered for the oil 
coming through the pipeline. When AS is absent, market competition and low switching costs 
typically constrain opportunistic behaviour. For instance, if the pipeline could serve several well-
owners, the threat of a single well-owner would have no consequence as the pipeline owner could 
replace the well-owner with another. Similarly, if the pipeline would be connected to several 
refineries, no single refinery could put price pressure on the pipeline owner. The problem of the 
firm investing in its distributor and the oil-pipeline investor illustrates the threat of exchange 
hazards caused by bounded rationality and opportunism. As economic actors have bounded 
rationality, they write incomplete contracts and do not know ex ante if their exchange partner will 
act opportunistically and take advantage of written and unwritten agreements (Williamson, 1985).  
Because of these exchange hazards, transaction costs and adaptation requirements, TCE 
predicts that firms choose hierarchical governance over market transactions or hybrids to avoid 
these transaction costs and improve their adaptive abilities (Williamson, 1981). In sum, TCE 
predicts that AS increases the likelihood that firms will choose vertical integration, which involves 
choosing hierarchies over hybrids and markets.  
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2.3.2 Environmental uncertainty (EU) 
Besides the safeguarding problem that is created by AS, firms face an adaptation problem because 
of uncertainty associated with market contracts (Pisano, 1990). Owing to bounded rationality, 
managers cannot foresee all the circumstances of an exchange and thus cannot ex ante write 
complete contracts that specify all contingencies of changing environmental circumstances 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997, Williamson, 1985). This leads to maladaptation or renegotiating costs 
that can be better dealt with internally in hierarchical organisations (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  
Environmental uncertainty refers to fast changing and/or complex environmental conditions 
(Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). It is often defined as volatility or unpredictability such as 
changing market conditions (i.e., demand or supply uncertainty), or changing rates of technological 
advancements or customer preferences (Heide & John, 1990, John & Weitz, 1988). According to 
TCE, these changing environmental conditions demand adaptations that can be better dealt with 
internally than in market contracts. As internal disagreements can be managed more easily through 
discussion or directives, or they can be delegated to a superior without the need to use legal 
measures (David & Han, 2004). In contrast, although market transactions are based on contractual 
agreements, writing complete contracts becomes more and more difficult the higher the uncertainty 
about future states of the environment. Later adjustments to the contractual conditions might not be 
possible at worst or difficult to achieve at best. Therefore, TCE predicts that, as EU increases, the 
likelihood to choose hierarchical governance increases (Williamson, 1985).  
There is a disagreement in the literature whether EU itself raises transaction costs or if this 
effect is conditional upon the existence of a nontrivial degree of AS (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & 
Aguinis, 2013). Williamson (1985) noted: “The effect of uncertainty on the choice of governance 
form, however, is conditional. When asset specificity is low, market governance should be preferred 
whatever the degree of uncertainty, since continuity matters little and new transaction arrangements 
can easily be arranged by both parties if necessary.” However, only a few studies test for this 
interaction effect, producing mixed results. Of the 37 channel choice studies in my review, only 7 
test for such an interaction effect between AS and EU. Three only find support for a significant 
positive effect (Anderson, 1985, Li & Ng, 2002, Majumdar & Ramaswamy, 1994), 3 find a non-
significant effect (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984, McNaughton, 1996, Parente, Choi, Slangen, & 
Ketkar, 2010) and one finds a significant negative effect (Krafft, Albers, & Lal, 2004). Therefore, I 
have followed the practice by a different set of authors (e.g. Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 
2013, John & Weitz, 1988, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990, Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007) 
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“that the main effect of external uncertainty is important to examine in its own right (Shervani, 
Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). Williamson (1991) also noted that exchange hazards increase with 
higher level of AS, BU and EU which raises transaction costs, and that the appropriate response to 
reduce the resulting transaction costs is to move toward hybrid and hierarchy (Crook, Combs, 
Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). 
 
2.3.3 Behavioural uncertainty (BU) 
Another source of uncertainty is that related to the performance of contract partners in that it creates 
a performance evaluation problem. With higher levels of BU, managers face increasing difficulties 
to assess whether contract partners comply with specified agreements or not (Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997). Managers have difficulties in measuring the input and output of contract partners, because of 
their opportunism, shirking problems may arise (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Hierarchical 
organisations have more possibilities to monitor and control the efforts provided by their 
employees. Thus, such hierarchies are thought to be capable of better monitoring and assessing 
performance and therefore are better suited to manage transaction costs arising from BU.  
Performance measurement problems may arise when more than one person are responsible 
for the sale of an item or when the quality of the output is difficult to measure (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972, Anderson, 1985). In such circumstances, contract partners might act opportunistically by 
reducing their effort and productivity. This might cause firms to sell lower quality products at high 
costs. Owing to the measurement problems, such shirking behaviour is difficult to detect within a 
firm that slows its adaptive capabilities (Williamson, 1985). Thus, BU causes exchange hazards and 
subsequent adaptation problems. TCE predicts that, as BU increases, firms are more likely to 
choose hierarchical governance as hierarchies better minimise opportunism by resolving disputes 
when performance is difficult to assess (Williamson, 1991). 
Table 3 depicts the three sources of transaction costs in TCE (AS, BU, and EU) and both the 
direct and opportunity costs caused by each source. A safeguarding problem is caused by investing 
in specific assets that have no value outside of a specific transaction. Firms might incur either direct 
costs when their transaction partner opportunistically exploits their situation or indirect costs when 
they fail to invest in alternative productive assets. Adaptation problem might be caused by changing 
environmental circumstances. Therefore, to adapt to these circumstances, firms need to incur 
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communication, negotiation and coordination costs with their transaction partner to find a new 
agreement based on these changed circumstances; a failure to do so represents maladaptation. BU 
might be caused by an incapability to assess the performance of a transaction partner. A firm might 
need to incur screening and selection costs to choose the right such partner to prevent productivity 
losses.  
Table 3: Sources and Types of Transaction Costs. 
Adapted from Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), p.46. 
Asset Specificity
Environmental 
Uncertainty
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
A. Sources of Transaction Costs
Nature of Governance 
Problem
Safeguarding Adaption
Performance 
Evaluation
B. Type of Transaction Costs
Direct Costs
Costs of crafting 
safeguards
Communication, 
negotiation, and 
coordination costs
Screening and 
selection costs (ex 
ante)
Opportunity Costs
Falure to invest in 
productive assets
Maladaption; Failure 
to adapt
Failure to identify 
appropriate partners 
(ex ante)
Productivity losses 
through effort 
adjustments (ex post)
 
2.4 Resource-based theory (RBT) 
Resource-based theory (RBT) views the firm as a system to create value by using its specific 
resources and capabilities. This contrasts with transaction cost theory that considers the firm as a 
governance structure to efficiently organise transactions. In RBT, the central tenet is that firms 
should perform those actions where they have unique resource advantages (Wernerfelt, 2014). 
Thus, RBT takes a resource-based view of the firm and offers a framework to explain a firm’s 
competitive advantage and performance (Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011, Vorhies & Morgan, 
2005).  
RBT attributes firms’ performance differences to their resource heterogeneity, in that they 
aim to deploy their strategic resources to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (SCA). A 
firm can achieve a competitive advantage when it can generate “more economic value than the 
marginal (breakeven) competitor in its product market” (Peteraf & Barney, 2003, p.314). Besides 
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creating more value than such a competitor, a firm can achieve an SCA “when other firms are 
unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (Barney & Clark, 2007, p.52) .  
In 1959, Penrose first identified the importance of resources for the growth of a firm and its 
competitive position because it is comprised of “a collection of productive resources” (Penrose, 
1959, p.24) that have the potential to provide value to the firm. However, these resources need to be 
exploited in a way that enhances a firm’s competitive position (Newbert, 2007). RBT uses 
Penrose’s (1959) notions as important determinants of a firm’s success with Wernerfelt (1984) 
seminal work on RBT (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004) holding resources and products to be “two sides 
of the same coin” (p. 171). That is, products would influence firm performance directly whereas 
resources indirectly impact upon performance by being used in such production (Newbert, 2007).  
However, as Wernerfelt’s (1984) contribution was still abstract, the resource-based view 
gained momentum only after the publication of two other influential papers (Newbert, 2007). Even 
though the first, by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), was directed more towards practitioners, it found 
that a firm’s core task is to create new products by using core capabilities. The second, by Barney 
(1991) was the first to formalise a coherent, testable framework of the resource-based literature 
(Newbert, 2007). Barney introduced two assumptions of the RBT: that resources and capabilities 
differ among firms, and that they are immobile. 
2.4.1 Main assumptions of resource-based theory: Resource heterogeneity and immobility 
RBT rests on two assumptions that are distinct to RBT because they indicate how firms can 
generate a SCA. First, resource heterogeneity assumes that firms possess different bundles of 
resources, even when they operate in the same industry (Barney, 1991, Peteraf, 1993). Each firm is 
unique in its resources depending on how they are deployed within the firm (Hopf, 1978). Second, 
resources are immobile; they cannot easily be transferred from one firm to another, which explains 
why resource heterogeneity among firms can persist over time. Yet, even when these two 
assumptions apply, not all resources can generate an SCA (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 
2014). Four conditions determine whether a resource can generate a SCA. These conditions are 
known as the VRIO (valuable, rare, inimitable, organisation) framework and determine that 
resources must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and exploitable by the organisation.  
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2.4.2 Resource-based theory logic: The VRIO framework 
The RBT logic within the VRIO framework is that firm resources have four characteristics:  
1) They are valuable if they enable a firm to take advantage of external opportunities or 
neutralise threats to the firm (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014); 
2) They must be rare, that is, only a small number of firms should possess these resources 
(Barney & Hesterly, 2008); 
3) They must be imperfectly imitable to allow an SCA to be generated (Madhok, 1997). 
Resources are imperfectly imitable if they are embedded in a firm’s historical paths, routines 
and experiences. Some scholars argue that the tacitness of resources makes them difficult to 
transfer (Teece, 1998); resources that are less codifiable and less teachable, and are difficult 
to transfer beyond organisational boundaries (Erramilli, Agarwal, & Dev, 2002, Kogut & 
Zander, 1993). If a resource is valuable and rare, but not perfectly imitable, competing firms 
will be able to replicate it in the long run, and the firm can only enjoy a temporary 
competitive advantage (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014); and  
4) They need to be exploitable by the organisation, which can be ensured if organisational 
processes and routines are efficient and thus allow the firm to fully realise the benefits of its 
resources in the form of an SCA. While resources and capabilities are two core constructs 
used in this theory, some confusion exists because they are defined differently in the 
literature (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). Therefore, I now define them clearly 
using Kozlenkova, Samaha, and Palmatier (2014). 
 Resources and capabilities — resources are defined as “(…) the tangible and intangible 
assets firms use to conceive of and implement their strategies” (Barney & Arikan, 2001, p.138). 
Resources are used by firms to accomplish their goals (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). 
They can also be categorised in different ways, one of which is provided by Barney and Hesterly 
(2008): physical, financial, and human and organisational resources. Capabilities are defined as a 
subset of resources, which represent an “organizationally embedded non-transferable firm-specific 
resource whose purpose is to improve the productivity of other resources possessed by the firm” 
(Makadok, 2001, p.389). They are understood as processes that enhance a firm’s ability to use its 
other resources (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014).  
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) introduce a third construct, dynamic capabilities, which are 
dynamic because they “[continually] create, extend, upgrade, protect, and keep relevant the 
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enterprise’s unique asset base in changing environments” (Teece, 2007, p.1319). Like capabilities, 
dynamic capabilities “can be used to modify other resources and create value” (Kozlenkova, 
Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014, p.5). They are especially important in turbulent markets because they 
involve knowledge creation, transfer processes or product development routines (Kozlenkova, 
Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). 
Two different points of view are found in the literature as they relate to whether or not the 
concept of dynamic capabilities is consistent with Barney’s VRIO framework or whether they form 
a new and different theoretical approach (Newbert, 2007). Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) say that 
dynamic capabilities are theoretically separate because they focus specifically on the dynamic 
aspect of exploiting resources regarding how they “can be developed, deployed and protected” 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, p.510). The other point of view considers dynamic capabilities to 
be consistent with RBT because they are another type of resource (Peteraf & Barney, 2003). With 
RBT using different definitions and frameworks, Kozlenkova, Samaha, and Palmatier (2014) 
comprehensively define the important RBT terms on which this thesis is based (see Table 4). 
22 
 
Table 4: Definitions of RBT terminology (see Kozlenkova, Samaha & Palmatier, 2014, p. 4) 
Terminology Definition Source
Resources "Tangible and intangible assets firms use to conceive of and implement their strategies" (p. 138) Barney & Arikan (2001)
Capabilities
A subset of resources, which represent an "organizationally embedded non-transferable firm-
specific resource whose purpose is to improve the productivity of the other resources possessed 
by the firm" (p.389).
Makadok (2001)
Dynamic Capabilities
Capabilities that can "continuously create, extend, upgrade, protect, and keep relevant the 
enterprise's unique asset base" in a changing environment (p.1, 319).
Teece (2007)
Market-Based Resources
A subset of the firm's assets and capabilities that are related to marketing activities such as 
building brands, relationships, innovation, and knowledge.
Srivastava, Shervani & Fahey (1998)
Complementary Resources
Resources are considered compelementary "when returns to  one [resource] are affected by the 
presence of another" (p.286).
Morgan, Slotegraaf & Vorhies (2009) 
Resource Heterogeneity Assumption
"Strategic resources are distributed unevenly across firms," or "different firms possess different 
bundles of strategically relevant resources" (p.317).
Peteraf & Barney (2003)
Resource Immobility Assumption
Difficulty of trading resources across firms, which allows the benefits of heterogeneous 
resources to persist over time.
Barney & Hesterley (2012)
VRIO Framework
A tool for internal analyses of the different resources and capabilities a firm possesses and the 
potential of each of these to generate competitive advantages. Stands for Value, Rarity, 
Imperfectly imitability, and Organization.
Barney & Hesterley (2012)
Valuable Resources
Resources that "enable a firm to develop and implement strategies that have the effect of 
lowering a firm's net costs and/or increase a firm's net revenues beyond what would have been 
the case" without these strategies (p.138).
Barney & Arikan (2001)
Rare Resources Resource is controlled by a small number of competing firms. Barney & Hesterley (2012)
Imperfectly Imitable Resoures A resource that is substantially costly to obtain or develop for competing firms. Barney & Hesterley (2012)
Organnization
A firm's policies and procedures "oprganized to exploit the full competitive potential of its 
resources and capabilities" (p.94).
Barney & Hesterley (2012)
Competitive Advantage
Creation of "more economic value than the marginal (breakeven) competitor in its product 
market" (p.314).
Peteraf & Barney (2003)
Sustained Competitive Advantage
A firm has SCA "when it is creating more economic value than the marginal firm in its industry 
and when other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy" (p.52).
Barney & Clark (2007)
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2.4.3 Marketing perspective of resource-based theory 
RBT has been increasingly applied in the marketing field over the past decade. While according to 
Kozlenkova, Samaha, and Palmatier (2014) in the 1990s, only 19 marketing articles used RBT, in 
the 2000s, 104 articles have already explicitly referred to RBT (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 
2014). This considerable increase shows the growing importance of RBT for marketing. This 
prominence applies to the traditional four Ps of marketing: product, price, promotion and place 
(Wernerfelt, 2014). RBT states that firms should focus on the tasks they can do best, that is, in 
which they have the necessary resources and capabilities to generate advantage. Central to RBT is 
firms concentrating on those tasks that they perform convincingly. Regarding promotion and price 
for instance, a firm should pursue a low-price strategy only if it has unique cost advantages. 
Similarly, each task along the supply chain should be performed by the person or firm who does it 
best (Wernerfelt, 2014).  
The three core domains where RBT has been applied in the marketing field are marketing 
strategy (e.g. Fang, Palmatier, & Grewal, 2011, Vorhies & Morgan, 2005), international marketing 
(e.g. Kaleka, 2011, Luo, Griffith, Liu, & Shi, 2004), and marketing innovation (Atuahene-Gima, 
2005, Harmancioglu, Droge, & Calantone, 2009). RBT provides knowledge about the impacts of 
market-based resources on firm performance across the three domains of marketing mentioned 
above (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014).  
In the marketing strategy domain, scholars typically focus on not just one, but multiple 
resources and their impact on firm performance. RBT is valuable to strategy research as it provides 
a framework to study multiple resources or marketing functions simultaneously to explain their 
effect on performance (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). In international marketing, 
because scholars are concerned about trading with international partners, they focus mostly on 
extending a firm’s current market. Therefore, management research focuses on expanding their 
market based on existing resources as well as generating new resources (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & 
Palmatier, 2014). In the marketing innovation domain, studies analyse the effect of market-based 
resources on innovation associated with developing new products (Harmancioglu, Droge, & 
Calantone, 2009). Moreover, RBT in marketing focuses on market-based resources such as market 
orientation (MO), branding or building relationships that are typically of a tacit, intangible nature, 
and are therefore viewed as having a greater potential to offer sustainable competitive advantages 
compared to tangible resources (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). 
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This study is situated in the international marketing domain as it focuses on doing business 
with international partners. Moreover, it draws on two market-based resources, MO and marketing 
capabilities (MCs) as they relate to their impact on firm channel choice and subsequent performance 
outcomes.  
2.4.4 Resource-based theory and transaction cost theory 
Marketing and strategy scholars sometimes couple RBT with other theories such as resource 
advantage (RA) theory, agency theory or transaction cost theory. They potentially offer knowledge 
about how firms exploit resources that are valuable, rare and non-imitable (VRI). As such, 
extending or complementing RBT with other theories usually intends to shed light on the “O” of the 
VRIO framework (i.e., organisational processes) (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014).  
RBT has been criticised for not explaining how VRI resources are leveraged by firms to 
create a sustainable competitive advantage (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). This critical link 
between possessing resources and value creation has been describe as a “black box” (Sirmon, Hitt, 
& Ireland, 2007). This is because the theory itself is inadequate to explain how firms can realise the 
potential of their resources. Studies investigating the direct effect between resources and 
performance outcome face the risk of being tautological in that they influence each other (Priem & 
Butler, 2001). One way to overcome this problem is to investigate the organisational processes 
where firms have the potential to create value (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). In 
response, this studies focuses on the organisational process of export channel choice where firms 
have the potential to leverage their resource-based capabilities overseas to increase sales and 
performance outcomes.  
 Complementarities between TCE and RBT — TCE focuses on the organisation of economic 
activity and thus complements RBT by offering knowledge about the efficiency of organisational 
processes (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). TCE introduces the concept of opportunism 
as a potential negative effect of valuable resources that needs to be avoided or minimised. As such, 
it might not always be possible to realise the potential of valuable resources in situations where the 
threat of opportunism needs to be managed.  
Differences between TCE and RBT — an important difference between TCE and RBT is 
how they view ownership decisions (i.e., degree of integration, make or buy, internalisation vs 
externalisation). TCE views minimising transaction and production costs as the means of deciding 
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whether or not firms should use market exchanges or integrate processes for certain transactions. In 
contrast, for RBT, it matters most which organisational form offers the best mechanism to maximise 
their resource potential. Firms should choose the one that allows them to realise the full value from 
their resources (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). Moreover, RBT only considers the 
value-creating potential of transaction-specific investments without regarding potential exchange 
hazards (through opportunism) created by such investments (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 
2014).  
In sum, TCE and RBT offer partly contrasting and partly complementary perspectives on the 
organisation of economic activity. While TCE stresses the need to consider efficiency in managing 
transactions, RBT focuses on creating value by leveraging important resource-based capabilities. 
This discussion is continued later in section 2.8.2. of  this thesis. After outlining the theoretical 
basis of this thesis, the second part of this chapter reviews the current channel choice research. 
Then, the final sections outline the limitations of the literature that have motivated this thesis.  
2.5 Transaction cost theory in the channel choice literature 
Most channel choice studies employ a transaction cost point-of-view while only a few assess 
channel choice from other theoretical perspectives. Therefore, this section outlines the determinants 
of channel choice found in the literature from a transaction cost perspective. Channel choice studies 
can be divided into three main categories, depending on how they conceptualise channel choice as 
the dependent variable: (1) binary studies, (2) degree of integration studies and (3) ordered and 
multinomial logit studies. What follows reviews the research into the effect of AS, BU and EU on 
channel choice.  
Methodology 
In order to conduct a comprehensive review of the TCE channel choice literature, I searched 
electronic databases (e.g. ProQuest, Business Source Complete) and reference lists of previous 
review articles to determine all channel articles between 1984 and 2014. I collected all channel 
articles from 1984 onwards as in this year The Rand Journal of Economics published Anderson and 
Schmittlein (1984)’s article on a specific type of channel choice, personal selling. Anderson and 
colleagues (Anderson, 1985, Anderson & Coughlan, 1987, Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984, Weiss & 
Anderson, 1992) were the first to apply the TCE framework to the channel choice context, with a 
specific focus on the choice between an employee salesforce and manufacturer representatives 
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(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Their studies have led the groundwork for the empirical analyses of 
most of the channel choice literature.  
Further, a keyword search was conducted with terms such as ‘channel choice’, ‘vertical integration’, 
‘marketing channel’, ‘export channel’ and ‘transaction cost economics’. In addition, the reference 
lists of the leading marketing, management and international business journals were analysed. 
These included e.g. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing, Marketing 
Science, Journal of International Business Studies, International Business Review, Academy of 
Management Journal, Management Science, Strategic Management Journal, International 
Marketing Review, Journal of Business Research, and Journal of Marketing Management. In order 
to be included in the review the studies had to focus on channel choice, they had to be empirical and 
published between 1984 and 2014. Also excluded were conceptual articles as well as working 
papers, books, conference articles or dissertations as these works usually undergo a less rigorous 
review. Also excluded were studies focusing on consumer channel choice and/or franchising. Both 
are specific types of distribution channels that merit separate enquiry.  
This process led to a total of 37 articles to be included in this review. Table 5 represents an 
overview of these articles with their publication dates. These articles were analysed with regard to 
their contextual dimensions, and theoretical framework, focusing on the degree of support for TCE 
propositions. This allows me to determine the current state of knowledge of TCE in the channel 
choice context as well as identify gaps in the literature.
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2.5.1 Asset specificity (AS) and channel choice 
Binary studies — I identified 30 studies investigating the effect of AS on channel choice. Of these, 
21 employ a binary logistic regression analysis, 18 of which investigate some form of the choice 
between direct and indirect channels. Of these 18, eight compare channel choice difference between 
an internal employee and an independent sales agent (Anderson, 1985, Anderson & Coughlan, 
1987, Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984). Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Anderson and 
Coughlan (1987) both find that asset specificity positively affects choosing company employees, 
and both employ a measure of human asset specificity such as learning or training requirements by 
a salesperson to sell products effectively.  
Anderson’s (1985) research offers contrasting findings. She uses seven different AS 
measures but finds a positive effect on the choice of company employees for only two of them. 
Contrary to expectations, an opposite effect is found for customer loyalty, meaning that the more 
likely it is for customers to develop loyalty towards the salesperson, the more likely firms are to use 
sales agents instead of company employees. No effect was found for the remaining AS measures. 
Besides Anderson and colleagues, three other studies focus on this choice set between an internal 
employee and a sales agent (Krafft, Albers, & Lal, 2004, Regan, 1997, Stapleton & Hanna, 2002). 
The results are mixed, while Krafft, Albers, and Lal (2004) confirm the positive effect of human AS 
on firms choosing their own employees, Stapleton and Hanna (2002) find a non-significant effect 
for both human and physical AS on firms choosing their own employees. Regan (1997) could not 
find a significant effect for physical AS. In sum, the literature’s results for the effect of AS on the 
choice between internal employees and sales agents are mixed. Others have studied its effect on the 
choice both between single and dual channels, and single and multiple channels. (Dutta, Bergen, 
Heide, & John, 1995, McNaughton, 2002). Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995) find that AS 
positively affects choosing dual channels (i.e., company employees and sales representatives) rather 
than using a sales representative alone. Using the same sample in both studies, McNaughton (2002) 
finds no effect for human AS, but a negative effect for physical AS (McNaughton, 1996) on 
choosing dual channels compared to a direct channel, which he puts as the default mode.  
 Degree of integration studies — Seven studies fall into this category (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, Brettel, Engelen, & Müller, 2010, Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 
2007), they have in common that they measure channel choice on a scale instead of distinguishing 
individual channels. For instance, Shervani, Frazier, and Challagalla (2007) measure channel 
integration as the percentage of sales going through all direct channels. However, this method does 
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not assess whether firms use a single or multiple channels and does not evaluate the transaction 
costs incurred by the different channel options. Therefore, this approach cannot explain the relative 
effectiveness of different channels or different channel configurations in managing governance 
problems. Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) employ a scale with the anchors of ‘exclusively 
direct distribution’ and ‘exclusively indirect distribution’ while Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and 
Schilke (2011) used both of these scales. No effect for (human) asset specificity was found by 
Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) who had to reject their hypothesis that greater asset specificity 
leads to greater channel integration. In contrast, Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and Schilke (2011) find a 
significant positive effect of (human) asset specificity on channel integration; that is, the choice of a 
direct salesforce. 
Ordered and multinomial logit studies — Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) and Aulakh and 
Kotabe (1997) both employ a multinomial logit regression analysis and the latter scholars add an 
ordered logit regression analysis. Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) report mixed results for the effect 
of AS on channel choice. They employ a measure of human and physical asset specificity and find a 
significant effect for the choice between a market channel (i.e. distributors) and using domestic 
sales employees and for the choice between a market channel and using a sales subsidiary. No 
effect was found for choosing between a market channel and an intermediate channel option (i.e., 
joint ventures). Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) ordered logit regression finds that (physical) AS does not 
affect channel integration. In addition, they use a multinomial logit regression through which their 
coefficient of AS also does not support their prediction that AS is positively related to the degree of 
channel integration in foreign markets. While their coefficient for the hierarchical option is positive, 
it is not statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient for the hybrid option is statistically 
significant in the opposite (negative) direction. Their finding suggests that firms are more likely to 
prefer market channels instead of hybrid options with increasing AS. Thus, their finding is contrary 
to what TCE would expect. In sum, the studies on the effect of AS on channel integration are mixed 
as they are inconclusive. 
2.5.2 Behavioural uncertainty (BU) and channel choice 
BU refers to the difficulty of assessing the performance of a salesperson (John & Weitz, 1989) . 
However, in this thesis, BU is measured by the difficulty to measure the performance of an internal 
salesperson (i.e., an employee), such as, how to assess the effort a salesperson exerts and the 
number of salespeople involved in a sale.   
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 Binary studies — eight studies that employ a binary logistic regression investigate the effect 
of BU on channel choice. Five of them assess the choice between internal employees and sales 
agents. All five support a positive effect on the probability of using a direct sales force when it is 
more difficult to assess performance (Anderson, 1985, Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984, Krafft, 
Albers, & Lal, 2004, Stapleton & Hanna, 2002, Weiss & Anderson, 1992). This finding is also 
confirmed by Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995) who find that, when performance is more 
difficult to assess, manufacturing firms prefer to use a DU channel (i.e., independent sales agents 
and company employees) rather than independent sales agents alone. The positive effect of BU on 
channel integration is confirmed by Kabadayi (2008), Kabadayi (2011) who finds that firms prefer 
to use dual (DU) rather than multiple indirect (MI) channels when BU is high.  
 Degree of integration studies — John and Weitz (1988), Shervani, Frazier, and Challagalla 
(2007) and Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) also find a significant positive effect of BU on 
channel integration. Shervani, Frazier, and Challagalla (2007) further show that BU is positively 
related to channel integration only when the firm market power is low, but is unrelated to channel 
integration when the firm’s market power is high. Firms with high market power seem to be able to 
handle internal uncertainty by monitoring intermediary behaviour because of a greater influence 
than firms with low market power (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, and Schilke (2011) nonetheless find no support for a positive effect of BU on channel 
integration. In sum, the majority of degree of integration studies support a positive effect of 
behavioural uncertainty on channel integration. 
2.5.3 Environmental uncertainty (EU) and channel choice 
Binary studies — of the 25 studies testing the effect of EU identified for this thesis, 13 employ a 
binary logistic regression model. Five studies compare the choice between an internal employee and 
a sales agent. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) find a non-significant effect with a negative 
coefficient, contrary to their expectation that higher EU (measured by the deviation of expected 
sales forecast) would lead to a higher likelihood of integration. Anderson (1985) finds that EU 
(unpredictability) alone does not lead to higher integration as stated by Williamson (1981). Contrary 
to Williamson’s TCE, Regan (1997) finds in her sample of property-liability insurance firms that 
firms prefer to use independent sales agents instead of company employees in uncertain and 
complex environments. Similarly, Stapleton and Hanna (2002) find a significant negative 
relationship, contrary to their expectations. Moreover, Krafft, Albers, and Lal (2004) do not find a 
significant effect for EU. Using the same sample in both of his studies, McNaughton (1996) finds 
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no effect for EU on the choice between exporting from home and using a joint venture, although he 
finds a significant negative effect for choosing a market mode compared to exporting from home. In 
his later study, McNaughton (2002) finds that multiple channel choice is less likely in the presence 
of environmental volatility compared to exporting from home, and more likely in the presence of 
environmental diversity. After looking at the effect of environmental volatility and diversity on 
choosing multiple channels, Coelho and Easingwood (2005) distinguish between intermediary 
volatility (e.g., heterogeneity among intermediary firms), competitor volatility (e.g., heterogeneity 
between price and product strategy) and customer volatility (e.g., heterogeneity between customer 
needs and price sensitivity). Even though they find that only customer volatility increases the 
likelihood to choose multiple channels instead of a single channel, a significant negative effect is 
found for intermediary volatility and no effect for competitor volatility. However, as Coelho and 
Easingwood (2005) do not acknowledge the extent of directness of channels (i.e. they do not 
distinguish between more direct or indirect channels), their study does not necessarily test the extent 
of hierarchical integration within Williamson’s TCE. Finally, Kabadayi (2008, 2011) finds that high 
EU leads firms to prefer a DU system rather than an MI system.  
 Degree of integration studies — four studies analysing EU fall into this category. Majumdar 
and Ramaswamy (1995) find a small positive impact of technological uncertainty on channel 
integration, whereas Shervani, Frazier, and Challagalla (2007) report a contrasting negative effect 
between EU (i.e., volatility) and channel integration. Further, Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) 
distinguish between technological uncertainty and volume uncertainty and find a significant 
negative effect for the former and a significant positive effect for the latter on channel integration. 
They explain the previous contrasting findings between technological uncertainty and market 
volatility. They state that technological uncertainty is best managed by indirect distribution as this 
allows firms to stay flexible and change their channel partners if required in their strategy on 
technological development. In contrast, market volatility would be best managed by direct 
distribution as uncertainty about future outputs creates difficulties to provide appropriate incentives 
for indirect channels and would need to be continually adjusted. Interestingly, Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, and Schilke (2011) hypothesise a positive effect for both technological and market-related 
uncertainty in their later study. However, they find no support for a positive effect of either these 
uncertainty dimensions, which is surprising as a similar sample is used in both studies.  
 Ordered and multinomial logit studies — one study assesses EU by employing a 
multinomial logit model (MNLM). Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) find mixed support among the 
relationships of volatility, diversity and channel integration. Higher volatility increases the 
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likelihood to choose a sales subsidiary compared to indirect channels, but no effect was found for 
using company employees domestically. Further, while higher diversity is negatively related to 
choosing company employees as predicted, no effect can be found for sales subsidiaries. In 
addition, using a probit regression model, Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994) find a positive 
significant effect on the choice between technological uncertainty and channel integration. Overall, 
both studies indicate a positive effect for volatility on channel integration, but only for some and not 
all choice sets. In sum, the effect of environmental uncertainty on channel integration is mixed and 
inconclusive among reviewed studies. 
2.5.4 Channel choice and performance 
Performance refers to how the channel system contributes to firm performance (Kabadayi, 2011, 
Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007). It is measured by how much the channel system contributes 
to a firm’s sales, profit, growth and overall performance (see Appendix A.2). Only four TCE-based 
channel choice studies investigate the performance effect of adhering to TCE’s predictions when 
choosing channels compared to other choices. While we know little about the consequences of 
channel choice, for managers, it is critically important to be aware of the performance consequences 
of such choices. To make research more relevant to managerial practice, it is necessary to link 
decision models to measurable performance outcomes and thereby provide guidance to optimise 
managerial practice (Brouthers, 2013).  
One of the reasons why researchers might have avoided testing performance outcome is that 
such endeavours can suffer from an endogeneity issue (Martin, 2013, Shaver, 1998, Venkatraman, 
1989). Strategic management research is interested in strategic decisions of managers and their 
performance outcomes. An assumption of the field is that managers do not decide randomly, but by 
what they expect will be the outcome of their decisions. Therefore, strategic management research 
assumes that management decisions are endogenous to their expected performance outcomes 
(Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Managers make choices based on certain characteristics, such as 
firm attributes and industry conditions, which they expect to influence performance. However, these 
characteristics are partly unobservable for researchers. In that case, endogeneity is caused by 
omitted variables (rather than mutual causality or variable errors that could also be at issue) (Bascle, 
2008, Martin, 2013). Endogeneity affects the statistical analysis of such decisions because it can 
lead to biased coefficient estimates if researchers do not account for manager’s expectations of the 
performance outcomes of their choices (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Statistical methods to 
account for endogeneity have long been available when both variables, strategic choices and 
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performance outcomes are continual. However, that has not been the case when strategic choices 
are discrete while performance outcomes continual (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). To account for 
endogeneity, more and more researchers have begun to employ a two-stage method (e.g. Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 2008, He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Katsikeas, Samiee, & Theodosiou, 
2006, Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002) (see Martin, 2013). This method allows to test whether 
firms that align their choices with the predictions of a theoretical model perform better than firms 
that do not.  
 Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) were the first to test the performance outcome of channel choice. 
Using a MANOVA analysis, they found strong support for their hypothesis that firms that conform 
to the theoretical prescriptions of their model outperform firms that do not. However, their study 
includes several variables other than TCE variables and as such it is not possible to determine how 
much prescriptive value is provided by TCE-based variables alone or when compared to other 
variables. Similar support for the normative value of transaction cost-based channel choices is 
found by Kabadayi (2011) who studies the impact of the misfit among three TCE variables on the 
choice between two multiple channel configurations using a profile deviation approach. He 
conceptualises ‘fit’ as the degree to which a company’s profile deviates from the profile of an ideal 
organisation relating to the specified variables. As such, it assesses how much a given company 
deviates from a company with the highest performance and with the same type of multiple channel 
system. A larger deviation from the ideal profile represents a greater misfit. The results support the 
importance of TCE-based recommendations when making channel choice decisions. Firms with a 
better fit among TCE variables and the type of multiple channel system perform better than firms 
without a fit among TCE variables and their type of multiple channel system.  
In contrast, Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) and Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and Schilke 
(2011) find a more mixed picture. Both study domestic channel choices of young German firms and 
receive partial support for their transaction cost models. Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) study 
domestic distribution channel decisions of new entrepreneurial ventures. Their findings on 
performance are divided with half supportive and half not supportive of the TCE model. Supported 
is that a misalignment resulting from AS leads to lower performance, while volume uncertainty and 
transaction frequency are partially supported and a misalignment resulting from technological 
uncertainty as well as BU has no impact on performance. Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and Schilke 
(2011) also study domestic channel choice and similarly receive mixed results. While their findings 
above about misalignment are similar, they find that market-related uncertainty and BU produce no 
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effect. However, both test only the performance impact of adhering to one TCE-variable at a time, 
instead of the full model. Research is lacking into the performance outcome of two or more TCE 
factors in combination such as high AS, high behavioural and EU (Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & 
Schilke, 2011, Williamson, 1991).  
2.6 Resource-based theory in the channel choice literature  
Because studies that take an alternative theoretical view of channel choice to TCE are scarce in the 
management literature, I note five that take a resource perspective. The first by Ekeledo and 
Sivakumar (2004) examines a number of firm-specific capabilities (proprietary technology, tacit 
knowledge and international experience) as it relates to choosing between a full-control export 
mode (sole ownership and wholly-owned subsidiary) and a shared-control mode (joint venture, 
licensing, franchising and management contract). They find a significant effect for the variables, 
proprietary knowledge and international experience. In other words, as the level of these 
capabilities increases, firms are more likely to opt for a full-control mode. In contrast, no effect was 
found for tacit knowledge on mode choice.  
 The second study by Hessels and Terjesen (2010) employs resource dependency and 
institutional theory to investigate the choice between direct (i.e., using own employees and/or sales 
subsidiaries) and indirect channels (i.e., using intermediaries such as distributors). Resource 
dependency theory focuses on a firm’s capability to access resources from the environment such as 
from other firms. It is consistent with the RBT in that it views firms as bundles of unique resources 
that are used to achieve competitive advantage. For example, Hessels and Terjesen (2010) 
hypothesise that small firms are more likely to export directly when the home market environment 
is perceived as favourable. However, contrary to these authors’ expectations, firms are likely to 
export more indirectly when access to banks and investors in the home market is perceived as 
favourable. The third study by He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) takes a resource-based point 
of view in studying the choice between direct (i.e., using own employees and/or a sales subsidiary) 
and hybrid export (i.e., using joint ventures or sales agents) channels from an MO perspective. The 
fourth and fifth study by Fernández‐Olmos and Díez‐Vial (2014) and Fernández-Olmos and Díez-
Vial (2015) look at the choice between a direct and an indirect channel. Fernández‐Olmos and 
Díez‐Vial (2014) investigate the direct (i.e., selling through a company-owned salesforce) versus 
indirect (i.e., selling to a middle-man, agent or distributor in a foreign market) export channel 
decision of wineries in Spain. They also note that some firms make us of both channels, however 
their sample size of these firms was too small for further inquiries. They find that larger firms and 
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firms with more international experience are more likely to export directly rather than indirectly and 
that the product quality of the wine does not affect the export channel decision. They find partial 
support for their hypothesis that firms with more intangible resources (i.e., technological, 
reputational and human resources) are more likely to export directly. The fifth study by Fernández-
Olmos and Díez-Vial (2015) hypothesises that firms with higher intangible resources are more 
likely to export directly. They find that human resource is the most important factor in their model, 
whereas they could not find support for a relationship between R&D and advertising intensity as 
well as international experience on direct exporting. This is also one of the few studies that 
investigates whether a performance effect of firms exists when they choose their export channels 
based on their resources. They find that firms with human resources perform better when they 
establish a direct export channel, that is, a fit between their level of human resources and a higher 
performance outcome is supported in their study. In contrast, no such support could be found for 
other intangible resources in their model.  
2.6.1 Market orientation (MO) and channel choice 
Two main perspectives on market orientation (MO) exist in the literature (Van Raaij & Stoelhorst, 
2008): a behavioural perspective (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990) and a cultural perspective (Narver & 
Slater, 1990). This study adopts the behavioural perspective of MO because it emphasises the 
generation and use of market information. Market-oriented firms are well informed about the 
market and are able to use that knowledge to create superior value for their customers (Van Raaij & 
Stoelhorst, 2008). Based on Kohli and Jaworski (1990) MO is “composed of three sets of activities: 
(1) organisation-wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and future customer 
needs, (2) dissemination of the intelligence across departments, and (3) organisation-wide 
responsiveness to it” (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993, p.54). These three components are sub-dimensions 
of a higher-order construct, MO (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993, Vorhies & Morgan, 2005). 
Previous studies have found that firms that can leverage learning resources are able to create 
greater value when venturing abroad than firms that do not align their export channel with their 
level of MO (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Because MO capabilities enhance learning 
(Kohli & Jaworski, 1990), He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) test the impact of such capabilities 
on export channel choice. They find that firms with stronger MO capabilities prefer hierarchical 
export channels compared to hybrid channels, confirming their hypothesis that firms with a strong 
MO prefer hierarchical export channels instead of hybrid ones as this export channel structure 
would allow firms to realise the full benefit of their MO capabilities in the export market. While 
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firms with a weak MO prefer hybrid channels such as joint ventures as partnering with other firms 
allows them to gain more knowledge about the export market (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013).  
 Moreover, they find that firms achieve higher performance when they align their export 
channel choice with the level of MO and the institutional distance between their home and export 
market. He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) stress the need to study the value creation potential 
of other resource-based advantages besides MO. In addition, their sample was limited to firms 
which use only a single export channel when exporting, thus, they call for future research to 
investigate how multiple channels influence firms’ abilities to realise resource-based advantages in 
export markets.  
2.6.2 Marketing capabilities (MCs) and channel choice 
He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) were the first to assess the value-creation potential of MO on 
channel choice. Very few articles investigate the impact of capabilities on firms’ channel choices 
(Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) investigate the effect of organisational 
resources such as proprietary technology on the choice between a full and a shared control mode; 
and Fernández‐Olmos and Díez‐Vial (2014) and Fernández-Olmos and Díez-Vial (2015) examine 
the effect of resources such as R&D and advertising intensity, as well as technological and 
reputational resources, on the choice between a direct and an indirect channel. 
The RBT considers the different resources and capabilities of firms in an industry as the 
sources of a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991, Peteraf & Barney, 2003). RBT assumes 
that resources are heterogeneous and immobile among firms in an industry, which allows these 
differences to continue (Barney, 2002). However, not all resources and capabilities potentially 
create a sustainable competitive advantage. They need to meet the four conditions of the VRIO 
framework (see earlier explanation): they need to be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and 
exploitable by the firm (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). When these conditions are met, 
a resource or capability can potentially create a sustainable competitive advantage, and thus higher 
performance. 
 One of the resources which has been linked to higher performance is a firms’ MCs (Zou, 
Fang, & Zhao, 2003). They involve integrative processes wherein the collective knowledge, skills, 
and resources of the firm are applied to the market-related needs of the business, enabling the 
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business to add value to its goods and services and to meet demands competitively (Crook, Ketchen 
Jr, Combs, & Todd, 2008, Harmancioglu, Droge, & Calantone, 2009). However, the way that MCs 
can lead to a higher performance has remained a black box.  
 Research has directly linked capabilities, such as MCs with export performance (e.g. Zou, 
Fang, & Zhao, 2003). This has been criticised as tautological in RBV research (Kozlenkova, 
Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). When resources and capabilities that potentially create a sustainable 
competitive advantage (when they fulfil the VRIO criteria) are identified by their capability to lead 
to higher performance, we face a tautology as the independent variable is defined by the outcome 
variable (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). To avoid such tautology, researchers need to 
define resources and capabilities as exogenous variables that are different from the dependent 
variable (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014) and “decouple the direct link between VRI 
resources and outcomes by describing the organisational processes used to exploit resources” 
(Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014, p.5). 
 One of the processes that bears the potential to exploit resources is a firm’s exporting 
strategy that is implemented using its export channel (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). One 
way that firms might be able to benefit from their MCs is through their sales system, specifically 
their export channel structure. Further studies are needed to investigate the impact and value 
creation potential of resources and capabilities on export channel choice. For this purpose, Li, He, 
and Sousa (2016) call for further research to investigate the impact of MCs on export channel 
choice. Thus, to address the limitations of a lack of resource-based enquiries in export channel 
research and the need to improve the tautological research practices prevalent in RBV research, I 
investigate the value creation potential of MCs through firms’ multiple export channel systems. 
2.7 Other perspectives on channel choice 
A different approach to study channel choice decisions is taken by Dung and Janssen (2015) who 
employ a Psychic Distance (PD) perspective and the Theory of Planned Behaviour on the choice 
between a direct and an indirect channel. One of their main findings is that PD does not influence 
export channel choice. This means that differences between the home and host country are not 
determining factors for the choice of channel mode. They could also not find an influence of the 
international experience of firms on channel choice. As both of these effects were insignificant, they 
could not find support for the key propositions of PD theory (i.e., PD having a negative effect on 
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mode choice and a mediating effect of international experience) (Dung & Janssen, 2015). 
Moreover, they also could neither find an influence of social ties of the entrepreneur on channel 
choice nor a mediating effect of entrepreneur’s actual behaviour controls on the relationship 
between PD and channel choice. Another approach was taken by Eriksson, Hohenthal, and 
Lindbergh (2006) and Arranz and De Arroyabe (2009) who employ internationalisation process (IP) 
theory in their models. Eriksson, Hohenthal, and Lindbergh (2006) test which antecedents related to 
the internationalisation process have an influence on channel choice in a foreign market. They find 
that more market experience and expected market growth lead to a higher likelihood of choosing 
integrated channels. No significant relationship on channel choice was found for customer and 
competitor knowledge, international experience, size and age of the firm. They conclude that some 
IP-related factors can be used to explain channel choice, however they could not find support for 
the development postulated in the internationalisation process theory, i.e. in their study the stage 
model (see e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1990, 2003). Arranz and De Arroyabe (2009) test the effect of 
proactive and reactive internationalisation strategies on choosing either market or cooperative 
channels. A proactive internationalisation strategy was found to be related to choosing cooperative 
channel agreements (e.g. licencing, joint manufacturing) and a reactive one with choosing market 
arrangements (e.g. market contracts, distributors).  
 Further, Carazo and Lumiste (2010) employ an eclectic model to study direct and indirect 
channel decisions. They include organisational characteristics, strategic considerations, 
management characteristics as well as transaction cost and environmental factors. They find that 
larger SMEs are more likely to export directly than smaller ones, lack of experience of managers 
reduces the probability to export directly, whereas higher education of managers was, contrary to 
expectations, inversely related to channel integration. Specificity of assets had a positive impact on 
channel integration, a greater geographic diversity of the firm was linked to choosing more indirect 
channels, however age of the firm did not have an impact on channel choice. Other influential 
factors on channel choice were perceived barriers to exports in the foreign country. This factor 
unexpectedly was associated with exporting more directly rather than indirectly as hypothesised. 
However, a stimulus for exporting by the foreign government and through business policies also 
lead to a higher likelihood of exporting directly.  
 The tables below give an overview of the channel choice literature. As can be seen in Table 
5, most TCE channel choice studies focus on investigating the effect of AS and EU, while BU was 
tested only in 15 studies compared to 30 studies for AS and 25 for EU. While the performance 
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outcome of channel choice has been neglected in most of the literature, recently the interest in 
assessing the performance effect of such choices has gained increasing momentum. The different 
channel typologies employed in the channel literature are illustrated in Table 6, with the large 
majority employing a binary dependent variable. Most common was the distinction between using a 
sales agent or a sales employee as well as using a direct or an indirect channel. Table 7 shows that 
the published channel studies are evenly spread from 1984 to 2015, with approximately one study 
being published each year except a peak of six and five studies in 2002 and 2010 respectively. 
Moreover, studies have been published in a number of different journals such as the Journal of 
Marketing Research, the Journal of Marketing or Strategic Management Journal. Table 8 provides 
a summary of the research questions and major findings of the reviewed channel literature.  
The sections above presented the theoretical background of this thesis, that is, the 
assumptions and characteristics of TCE and RBT. In addition, the review outlined the current state 
of the export channel choice literature with regards to its three core constructs, AS, BU and EU as 
well as performance outcomes and resource-based perspectives on channel choice. In the following 
sections some of the limitations of this literature are outlined which form the motivation for this 
thesis.
39 
 
 Table 5: TCE channel choice studies 
Study Year DV AS BU EU Frequency Performance
Anderson & Schmittlein 1984 Internal sales force vs. sales agent x x x x
Anderson 1985 Internal sales force vs. sales agent x x x x
Dwyer & Welsh 1985 Channel configuration x
Anderson & Coughlan 1987 Internal sales force vs. sales agent x
John & Weitz 1988 Degree of channel integration x x x
Klein, Frazier & Roth 1990 Degree of channel integration x x
Kim & Daniels 1991 Direct vs. indirect channel x
Weiss & Anderson 1992 Internal sales force vs.  sales agent x x
Klein & Roth 1993 Channel satisfaction x x x x
Majumdar & Ramaswamy 1994 Degree of channel integration x x x x
Ramaseshan & Patton 1994 Direct vs. Indirect channel x
Majumdar & Ramaswamy 1995 Degree of channel integration x
Bello & Lohtia 1995 Foreign sales agent vs. Foreign distributor x x
Dutta, Bergen, Heide & John 1995
Single vs. dual channel (sales agents vs. 
sales agents & employees)
x x
McNaughton 1996
Market mode, commercial alliances vs. 
wholly owned distribution
x
Aulakh & Kotabe 1997 Degree of channel integration x x x
Regan 1997
Direct vs. indirect channel (independent 
sales agent or not)
x x
Campa & Guillén 1999 Vertical integration into distribution
Rialp 2000 Direct  vs. Indirect x x
Kim 2001 Direct vs. Indirect channel x
Li & Ng 2002 Hybrid vs. direct/indirect x
McNaughton 2002 Single vs. multiple channels
Stapleton & Hanna 2002 Internal sales force vs. sales agent x x x x
Rialp, Axinn & Thach 2002
Proprietary forms vs. commercial alliances 
vs. independent channels
x x
Merino & Salas 2002 Direct vs. Indirect channel x
Li & Li 2003 Degree of channel integration x
Krafft, Albers & Lal 2004 Internal sales force vs. sales agent x x x x
Coelho & Easingwood 2005 Single vs. multiple channels x
Vinhas & Anderson 2005 Concurrence (degree of dual) x
Shervani, Frazier & Challagalla 2007 Degree of channel integration x x x
Kabadayi 2008 Dual channels vs. multiple indirect channels x x x
Brettel, Engelen & Müller 2010 Degree of channel integration x x x x x
Parente et al. 2010 Internal sales force vs. sales agent x
Khemakhem 2010 Direct vs. Indirect channel x x
Kabadayi 2011 Dual channels vs. multiple indirect channels x x x x x
Brettel, Engelen, Müller & Schilke 2011 Degree of channel integration x x x x
He, Brouthers & Filatotchev (RBT) 2013 Direct-only vs. hybrid channels x x x
n = 37 30 15 25 7 5
TCE variables
Note: LR = Logistic Regression, MR = Multiple Regression, MNML = Multinomial Logit, PLS = Partial least squares, MDA = multiple 
discriminant analysis, PR = Probit Regression  
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Table 6: Channel typologies in the literature 
Dependent variable Measurement Reference
Internal sales force
vs.
Sales agent
Sales employee vs. sales agent
Anderson & Schmittlein (1984), Anderson (1985), 
Anderson & Coughlan (1987), Weiss & Anderson (1992), 
Regan (1997), Stapleton & Hanna (2002), Krafft, Albers & 
Lal (2004), Parente et al. (2010)
Direct
vs.
Indirect channel*
1 (if more than 50% of the product is distributed 
through an integrated channel) vs. 0 (otherwise), 
distributor vs. direct exporting
Kim & Daniels (1991), Ramaseshan & Patton (1994), Burgel 
& Murray (2000), Rialp (2000), Kim (2001), Merino & Salas 
(2002), Eriksson, Hohenthal & Lindbergh (2006), 
Khemakhem (2010), Carazo & Lumiste (2010), Dung & 
Janssen (2015)
Choice between two 
non-integrated modes
Foreign based sales agent
vs.
Foreign distributor
Bello & Lohtia (1995)
Hybrid
vs.
Direct-only
Commercial alliances vs. WOS; joint ventures 
and/or sales agents vs. direct-only (exporting from 
home or WOS)
Campa & Guillén (1999), He et al. (2013)
Indirect
vs.
Hybrid
Market transactions vs. Cooperative transactions Arranz & De Arroyabe (2009)
Indirect vs. hybrid vs. 
Direct
Indirect export channel vs. Commercial alliances 
with a foreign partner vs. WOS
McNaughton (1996), Campa & Guillén (1999), Li & Ng 
(2002), Rialp, Axinn & Thach (2002)
Degree of channel 
integration
Percentage of sales going through a direct channel; 
likert scale measuring the degree of direct/indirect 
distribution
John & Weitz (1988), Klein et al. (1990), Majumdar & 
Ramaswamy (1994, 1995), Aulalh & Kotabe (1997), Shervani 
et al. (2007), Brettel et al. (2010), Brettel et al. (2011)
Single indirect
vs.
Dual channels
Sales agent vs. sales agent and sales employee Dutta et al. (1995)
Direct-only
vs.
Dual channels
Sales employees vs. sales employees and on or 
more indirect channels
McNaughton (2002)
Single channel
vs.
Multiple channels
Single vs. multiple channels, with a min. sales 
volume of 10% for a channel
Coelho & Easingwood (2005)
Dual channels
vs.
Multiple indirect 
channels
Direct and indirect channels vs. only indirect 
channels
Kabadayi (2008, 2011)
Channel configuration
4 different channel configurations (corporate 
system, producer-to-retailer, producer-to-
wholesaler-to-retailer, producer through multiple 
wholesalers to retailer)
Dwyer & Welsh (1985)
*Also called integrated vs. non-integrated channel, hierarchical vs. market mode, proprietary vs. non-proprietary channel, WOS = wholly-
owned subsidiary
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Table 7: Channel studies by publication source and date 1984-2015  
Year A BS APJM DMIJ EJM ET&P IBR IJBEP IMDS IMM IMR IJRM ISBJ JAMS JBEM JDE JIBS JIM JITE JLEO JIM JM JMC JMM JMR JOM JRI JSM ManSci MIR MktSci RJE SBE SMJ SER TIBR TJ TOT
1984 1 1
1985 1 1 2
1986 0
1987 1 1
1988 1 1
1989 0
1990 1 1
1991 1 1
1992 1 1
1993 1 1
1994 1 1 2
1995 1 1 1 3
1996 1 1 2
1997 1 1 2
1998 0
1999 1 1
2000 1 1 2
2001 1 1
2002 1 1 2 1 1 6
2003 1 1
2004 1 1 2
2005 1 1 2
2006 1 1
2007 1 1 1 3
2008 1 1
2009 1 1
2010 1 1 1 1 1 5
2011 1 1 1 3
2012 0
2013 1 1 2
2014 1 1
2015 1 1 2
TOT 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 52
A = Agribusiness, APJM = Asia Pacific Journal of Management, BS = Book Series: Advances in International Marketing, DMIJ = Direct Marketing an International Journal, EJM = European Journal of Marketing, ET&P =
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, IBR = International Business Review, IJBEP = International Journal of Business and Economics Perspectives, IMDS = Industrial Management and Data Systems, IMM = Industrial
Marketing Management, IMR = International Marketing Review, IJRM = International Journal of Research in Marketing, ISBS = International Small Business Journal, JAMS = Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, JBEM 
= Journal of Business, Economics and Management, JDE = Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, JIBS = Journal of International Business Studies, JIM = Journal of International Marketing, JITE = Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics, JLEO = Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, JM = Journal of Marketing, JMC = Journal of Marketing Channels, JMM = Journal of Marketing Management, JMR = Journal of Marketing Research,
JOM = Journal of Management, JRI = The Journal of Risk and Insurance, JSM = Journal of Services Marketing, ManSci = Management Science, MIR = Management International Review, MktSci = Marketing Science, RJE = The
Rand Journal of Economics, SBE = Small Business Economics, SMJ = Strategic Management Journal, SER = Spanish Economic Review, TIBR = Thunderbird International Business Review, TJ = Transportation Journal.
 
42 
 
Study Year Research question/Research focus Major findings
Anderson & 
Schmittlein 
1984 Integration of the marketing function, personal selling.
Integration is positively associated with increasing levels of asset specificity, difficulty of performance evaluation and the combination of both. 
Contrary to the TCE model, neither frequency nor interaction of AS and EU is significantly related to integration.
Anderson 1985
What are the reasons for integrating the personal selling 
function? I.e. the use of sales employees rather than 
manufacturer representatives. I.e. what is the probability 
of 'going direct'?
Integration is postively associated with AS, i.e. when the product requires considerable learning or when the salespeople can acquire damaging 
information, districts are served by company employees. But, contrary to expectations, the greater the possibility of the customer developing loyalty 
towards the salesperson, the greater the likelihoof of using a rep. The study also confirms the relation of BU and integration of sales function and the 
interaction effect of AS and EU. Moreover, they state that as expected the EU dimension (unpredictability) alone has no effect on integration. The 
term does not contribute significantly to the fit of the model.
Dwyer & Welsh 1985
Explain interorganisational responses to uncertainty and 
dependence constraints in the channel environment.
EU (heterogeneity) alone does not influence channel configuration, but output sector variability (the environment as a resource) influences channel 
configuration in that they tend to comprise fewer intermediaries. Heterogeneity in combination with variability of the output sector reflects 
significant differences across channel configurations. Fully integrated and direct-to-retailer channels exhibit significantly higher heterogeneity x 
variability scores than three-level configurations (producer-to-wholesaler-to-retailer, producer-to-multiple wholesalers-to retailers).
Anderson & 
Coughlan 
1987
International market entry and expansion via 
independent or integrated channels. I.e. should the 
products be marketed primarily by captive agents 
(company salesforce and company distribution division) 
or by independent intermediaries (outside sales agents 
and distributors)?
AS is positively related to integration of the selling function, indicating that products requiring the development of specialized skills and working 
relationships in order to be distributed are more likely to be sold via direct channels. Also assocciated with product differentiation. Moreover there is 
evidence that the product will be sold through whatever channel is already in place (direct or indirect), if any. Also, U.S. firms seem more likely to 
integrated the distribution channel in highly developed industrialized countries (Western Europe) than in Japan and Southeast Asia, which are more 
culturally dissimilar. Products that are more differentiated tend to go more through integrated channels. 
John & Weitz 1988
Klein, Frazier & 
Roth
1990
What degree of forward integration should firms choose 
in foreign markets and why?
Support is found for AS in relation to channel integration. Support for the relation between volatility and channel integration is mixed. Support is 
found for using the hierarchy-subsidiary option rather than the market option as volatility increases. Yet, the results are insignificant for the other 
hierarchy option (direct export from home). Mixed support is also found for diversity. AS expected, diversity is inversely related to the hierarchy-
domestic option. However, it is not related to the hierachy-subsidiary option. These results offer some support for the opposing EU effects on 
channel integration. 
Kim & Daniels 1991
Which home or host country factors influence the 
distribution decisions of foreign manufacturing 
subsidiaries in the U.S.? Why do they choose integrated 
vs. independent channels, which marketing decisions are 
made at home or in the U.S., do their channel practices 
differ from those of U.S. firms in the same industry?
Host, rather than home country factors are most important for foreign investors when choosing marketing channels for their industrial products in the 
U.S. AS is positively related to channel integration. Consistent with Anderson & Coughlan's (1987) finding that products requiring specialized 
knowledge and experience are more likely sold via integrated rather than independent channels. Other factors that positively affect channel 
integration are product sales volume and country experience. In contrast, the older the product, the less likely it is sold via integrated channels.
Classified as inconclusive by Carter & Hodgson (2006) as the 'direct channel' includes internal sales force as well as independent sales agents. This classification is different from Williamson's model and other
studies. The latter should be placed outside a hierarchical governance mechanism (Carter & Hodgson, 2006).
Table 8: Literature review research questions and major findings 
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Table 8: Literature review research questions and major findings (continued) 
Study Year Research question/Research focus Major findings
Weiss & Anderson 1992
When and why might manufacturers convert from an 
independent salesforce to a direct salesforce? 
Conversion from one structural form to another, i.e. the 
phenomenon of changing channel arrangements. 
Sales agents’ investment in transaction specific assets such as knowledge of the manufacturer has no direct effect on the manufacturer's intention to 
convert. However, those investments increase the manufacturer's satisfaction with the sales agent and thus insulate the agent from being replaced 
with company personnel. Manufacturers who found performance of their sales agents difficult to assess were more likely to reverse their initial 
decision of using sales agents. Even though these manufacturers were not more dissatisfied with their sales agents than other manufacturers. Thus, 
manufacturers who are satisfied with the agents’ performance may still elect to convert in order to gain control over the selling task, i.e. reduce 
behavioural uncertainty. Manufacturers’ ability to integrate the salesforce did not impact the intention of going direct per se. Larger firms were not 
more likely to go direct than smaller firms. Also, a higher willingness to invest in the product and market in question did not influence integration. 
Thus, the mere capacity of going direct does not motivate to integrate. This is consistent with Anderson (1985) who found that larger firms were no 
more likely to use a direct salesforce than smaller firms. Results indicate that manufacturers usually stick with their sales agent and have a low 
tendency to terminate their sales agents in order to replace them with a direct salesforce. 
Klein & Roth 1993
What factors lead to a firm's satisfaction with its 
marketing channels? (international context)
No channel structure is universally best, all three channel modes resulted in similar levels of satisfaction.
Majumdar & 
Ramaswamy
1994
What is the role of social asset specificity in influencing 
channel integration decisions?
Social asset specificity (SAS) is the strongest predictor of downstream channel integration, suggesting that SAS is the most important explanatory 
dimension. Technical uncertainty and purchase frequency exhibit smaller effects, but are significant. Unlike Anderson & Schmittlein (1984) who did 
not observe a significant effect of purchase frequency, they found a positive effect as suggested by TCE. 
Ramaseshan & 
Patton
1994
Selection of optimal channel structure, direct or indirect, 
for small firms.
They found only total sales volume and service requirements of a product significantly distinguish between direct and indirect channels. Sales 
volume was found to be negatively correlated to integration, i.e. firms with a higher volume preferred independent rather than integrated channels. 
Service requirements were positively associated with integration, in this case small firms preferred direct channels to ensure the performance of the 
service. 
Majumdar & 
Ramaswamy 
1995
What are the strategic determinants of going direct to 
market?
Product criticality, product customization and auxiliary services have the strongest impact on channel integration. From a TCE perspective, 
customized products and auxiliary services entail high asset specificity. Technological change (EU) (dummy variable) has a small, positive impact on 
channel integration. 
Dutta, Bergen, 
Heide & John
1995
When will firms supplement sales agents with their own 
internal salesforce? Surveys sales agents, not firms. First 
study that applies TCE to dual channel choice.
An internal sales force is employed to prevent lock-in and to establish a credible alternative to independent sales agents. This ensures individual 
sales representatives remain motivated and do no exploit their position to an advantage. TCE provides an adequate framework to study multiple 
channel choice.
Bello & Lohtia 
(1995)
When do firms choose a foreign sales agent vs. a foreign 
distributor?
Tested AS (human an physical) and EU (volatility and diversity) on the choice between sales agents and foreign distributors. High Product AS and 
human AS is associated with agent use instead of distributor. High Physical AS is associated with distributor use (opposite of H). VOL does not 
influence channel (but VOL was low in the whole sample). High DIV is associated with distributor use.
McNaughton 1996
Understanding of the foreign market channel integration 
decision of high technology, knoweldge intensive firms. 
What modes are used and what factors are associated 
with the use of particular modes? Contrary to TCE, 
McNaughton assumes a hierarchical channel mode as the 
default choice for high technology software firms. 
Data collected on 5 channel categories, however hypotheses distinguish only among the two hierarchical channels and ‘shared control mode’ 
(includes both, JV and market mode). Channel volume, asset specificity were found to be positively associated with the use of foreign sales 
subsidiaries and negatively associated with the use of shared control modes relative to the default option of serving the foreign market directly from 
Canada. Within the AS dimension, only physical AS was found to have a significant effect on channel choice in contrast to knowledge AS. Volatility 
was found to be negatively related to a market channel, but had no relationship to the use of JVs. Volatility is positively related to the use of a 
foreign sales subsidiary. Diversity had no significant effect on channel choice. Among the control modes, only product customization was significantly 
related to channel choice, having a positive effect on the use of foreign sales subsidiaries and the use of JVs, no relationship was found with the use 
of a market mode. The ability to sell other products through the same channel had no effect on integration. 
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Table 8: Literature review research questions and major findings (continued) 
Study Year Research question/Research focus Major findings
Aulakh & Kotabe 1997 Which factors affect channel choice in foreign markets?
Country risk (volatility) is negatively associated to channel integration. Asset specificity, firm size and market positioning strategy were not found to 
be related to channel integration. International experience, global integration strategy and differentiation strategy were found to be positively 
related to channel integration. Most coefficients are similar for the OL and MNL model, however the coefficients for asset specificity do not point 
towards an ordered effect. The results suggest that the seven independent variables predict the choice between market and hierarchical levels 
better than between market and intermediate levels. Strong support was found for the assertion that firms that adhere to the theoretical 
prescriptions of the TCE model in their channel choice perform better than misclassified firms.
Regan 1997
The use of hybrid channels, evolution of channels from 
direct to indirect and vice versa.
TCE provides a useful interpretative framework, but its original articulation needs to be broadened. Managers' views of uncertainty are an important 
moderating variable, channel investments can be made to erect entry-barriers.
Campa & Guillén 1999
When do firms internalise their exports and which mode 
of internalisation (commercial alliances or wholly owned 
distribution) do they choose?
Intangible assets have a positive effect on channel integration. It also increases the probability of using a commercial alliance. 
Rialp 2000 Channel integration decision of Spanish exporters
Finds a weak influence of production costs (in terms of scale and scope economies) on export channel choice. The channel is likely to be internalised 
for highly standardised products for non-Catalan firms, but not for Catalan firms. There is a higher propensity to internalise when specialised 
knowledge in the manufacturer-distributor relationship exists. There is also a higher likelihood to internalise operations with higher R&D 
expenditure for non-Catalan firms. Product differentiation, performance of promotional activities abroad, the degree of export commitment, the 
geographic destination of exports also influence channel choice.
Burgel & Murray 2000 When do firms use direct vs. indirect channels?
They try to measure transaction costs directly, rather than indirectly. They also employ OC (organisational capability theory) and SM (stage model). 
Firm experience did not have a significant impact on the commitment of the chosen entry mode. The international experience of managers had a 
significant impact on the choice of entry mode, but in the opposite direction as hypothesised. This result suggests that managers who have lived 
abroad are more likely to sell internationally without the assistance of intermediaries. Products that require a high level of client-specific adaptation 
are more likely to be sold directly by the manufacturer. The level of required pre- and after-sales support did not affect the choice of entry mode 
significantly. Transactions involving products that incorporated more innovative technology (i.e. higher degree of tacit knowledge) had a higher 
chance of being dealt with through collaborative arrangements than being exported. The existing, domestic sales mode of the firm was the strongest 
predictor in the model.
Kim 2001 Channel choice of foreign firms in the Korean market.
Transaction specific assets and sales value have a positive effect on choosing a direct channel. Experience in the Korean market did not have an 
influence on channel choice. Channel integration was thought to be negatively related to a distributor's ability to perform distribution functions 
(product assortment/contact efficiency function and service/information providing function), but only the first one had a negative influence on 
channel integration.
Li 2002
Which paradigm (relational exchange or transaction cost 
paradigm) is more powerful in emerging markets? Which 
channel structure is optimal for western exporting 
manufacturers?
This study finds that the relational exchange paradigm is valid when partners possess superior capability and build up mutual trust. These are the two 
conditions for partnership channel structures. The TCE paradigm is valid when markets grow fast and partners act opportunistically. However, neither 
of the paradigms is sufficient to explain transactions between channel members. Under certain conditons firms prefer neither relational nor 
hierarchical channels, but independent distributors. 
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Table 8: Literature review research questions and major findings (continued) 
Study Year Research question/Research focus Major findings
Li & Ng 2002
Choice between market, hierarchical and relational 
exchanges in export channels in emerging markets.
The authors employ the relational contracting, transaction cost and internationalization process paradigm to evaluate market, hierarchical and 
relational exchanges between Western manufacturers and their foreign intermediaries in emerging markets. The study suggests that choices of 
exchange governance be determined by various factors in combination, including experiential knowledge, market conditions, activity 
complementarity, brand power, and trust. Choices of exchange governance depend on the interaction among these factors. 
Merino & Salas 2002
Effects of organizational capabilities versus scale 
economies on the vertical integration decision.
Scale economies are more important than organizational capabilities when deciding about channel integration. The export mode does not influence 
the level of exports.
Rialp, Axinn & 
Thach
2002
Selecting the optimal level of channel integration in a 
foreign market.
They find that firm size, perceived resource needs are associated with the degree of integration chosen by firms. Firms that receive foreign 
investments make greater use of proprietary forms of export channels. Having internalised structures that support export activities such as an export 
department makes internalisation of channels more likely. Higher R&D investments are also associated with a higher likelihood to internalise export 
activities. Marketing strategy was also found to influence channel choice, whereas a differentiation strategy was associated with commercial 
alliances or proprietary channels and a standardisation strategy was more associated with indirect channels. 
Li & Li 2003 Channel integration decisions in new product exports.
AS increases chanel integration and new product competitive advantage. Country risk does not influence channel choice, but a negative impact on 
product competitive advantage. Firm size enhances channel integration and new product market performance. 
McNaughton 2002
When do knowledge-intensive SMEs use multiple export 
channels as opposed to a direct channel to serve a 
foreign market? Differentiates between direct export 
channels (direct to market, foreign sales office) and 
indirect export (use of intermediaries, e.g. distributors, 
value-added-resellers, licensing). Assumes direct 
channel as the default choice for SMEs (opposite of TCE 
assumption).
Postulates that SME managers generally prefer integrated modes, multiple channels are used in relatively mature markets, as a response to 
environmental diversity and when knowledge-assets can be protected otherwise. The prediction that the use of MCs is associated with larger 
channel volumes is not supported. This suggests that MCs arise due to the need to increase sales volumes. Environmental volatility is negatively 
related to MCs which suggests that they are not well suited to markets where customer behaviour is unpredictable.
Stapleton & 
Hanna
2002
How do steamship lines treat the salesforce function? 
How does a technological innovation (the advent of the 
stack train) affect a steamship line's decision to use an 
internal or third-party sales force?
No effect of asset specificity (human & physical) was found on the decision of sales force governance mode. Mixed results were found for 
environmental uncertainty, while it was significantly different from zero, it was not in the expected direction (negative as opposed to positive). 
Behavioural uncertainty was found to be significantly related to the likelihood of using an integrated salesforce, supporting TCE’s predictions. 
Transaction frequency was found to be positively related to the use of an integrated salesforce. 
Krafft, Albers & 
Lal 
2004
Which factors affect the choice among an internal 
salesforce and the use of sales agents?
Findings are consistent with Anderson (1985) with respect to asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty. In contrast to Anderson (1985), they 
observe a significant, contrary relationship of the interaction effect among asset specificity and environmental uncertainty. 
Coelho & 
Easingwood
2005
Investigate the antecedents of multiple channel use in 
the financial services industry. Channels studied: Branch 
network, salesforce, direct mail, telephone, 
intermediaries.
The results indicate that customer heterogeneity, customer volatility and environmental conflict positively influence MC choice. In contrast, 
intermediary heterogeneity and volatility are negatively related to the use of MCs. 
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Table 8: Literature review research questions and major findings (continued) 
Study Year Research question/Research focus Major findings
Vinhas & 
Anderson
2005
When do firms use concurrent (direct and indirect) 
channels? How does potential channel conflict drive 
channel structure?
Firms reduce the use of concurrent channels when they frequently contact the same customer or the customer sets them in competition against each 
other. In contrast to McNaughton (2002) they assert that MCs are used less in small markets and markets with low growth as the channel types have 
less opportunities to make their sales and compete more fiercly. 
Kabadayi et al. 2007
Performance implications of designing multiple channels 
to fit with strategy and environment.
They employ a configuration-theoretic approach to study multiple channels. The channel design (organic and specialised vs. bureaucratic and 
unspecialised) made the highest contribution to performance when it was aligned with firm strategy (differentiation or standardisation) and the 
environment (more or less uncertain, munificient).
Lau 2007 How do firms in NIE make export channel decisions?
There are two active integrated channels: the buying offices of firms from developed economies which are located in Hong Kong and regular visiting 
buyers of firms from developed economies. Both are not found in the export distribution structure of developed economies. Larger firms were found 
to have the required resources to support their sales personnel to station in the major markets. Firm age was positively correlated with the number 
of channels used by the firm.
Shervani, Frazier 
& Challagalla 
2007
The moderating influence of firm market power on 
channel integration.
Consistent with TCE, asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty have a positive relationship to integration. Contrary to TCE, environmental 
uncertainty has a negative effect on channel integration. Firm market power moderates channel integration such that asset specificity is significantly 
related to channel integration only when firm market power is low. The same is true for behavioural uncertainty. Contrary to TCE, external 
uncertainty is negatively related to channel integration when firm power is low and is unrelated to channel integration when firm power is high. 
Distribution costs are strongly related to forward integration for firms with high power, no effect was found for firms with low power. 
Kabadayi 2008
When can firms add direct or independent channels to 
their single channel system and switch to a multiple 
channel systems?
Differentiates between a combination of direct and indirect channels (I-D) and a combination of several independent channels (I-I). Under high-
specific asset investments, high-environmental uncertainty and high-internal uncertainty firms add direct channels and adopt an I-D MC system. 
Under low levels of these varaibles, firms adopt and I-I MC system.
Khemakhem 2010
Examines transaction costs, export behaviour and 
channel environment on channel integration of Tunisian 
exporting firms.
Only two transaction cost and one export behaviour variable were found to be significant. None of the environmental variables had a direct impact 
on channel integration, however they had a moderating influence. Complexitiy of products was not found to influence channel choice. Physical AS 
was found to have a negative effect on channel integration. If a product requires adaption to the foreign market, firms are more likely to integrate 
channels. Management's attitude towards exporting did not influence channel choice. EU (volatility) did not have an impact on channel integration 
for Tunisian firms.
Kabadayi 2011
Can firms use the transaction cost approach to make 
multiple channel system design related decisions?
Differentiates between direct and indirect multiple channels (I-D) and several independent channels (I-I). Finds that when when all three transaction 
cost variables match with the type of multiple channel system used, firms can minimize their transaction costs and eventually increase their channel 
system performance.
Brettel, Engelen & 
Muller 
2011 Channel integration decision of young firms.
Both, transaction-specific assets and market-related uncertainty are positively related to the degree of channel integration, i.e. the choice of direct 
sales force. In contrast to TCE, in case of high technological uncertainty, firms decide to use sales agents as opposed to internal sales employees. A 
high degree of behavioural uncertainty does not lead to a stronger level of direct distribution channel use. Also, the expected positive relationship 
between frequency and direct sales force is not supported, showing a negative relationship. The results for the performance implications of an 
alignment with TCE’s predictions are mixed. Misalignments in terms of transaction-specific assets, technological uncertainty and transaction 
frequency lead to negative performance consequences. The performance-relationship in terms of market-related uncertainty and behavioural 
uncertainty is not supported. 
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Table 8: Literature Review Research Questions and Major Findings (continued) 
Study Year Research question/Research focus Major findings
Brettel, Engelen, 
Müller & Schilke 
2011
What factors influence the distribution channel choice of 
entrepreneurial new ventures (NEV)?
TCE variables explain a large part of the variance in channel choice. Technological uncertainty is found to have a negative effect on channel 
integration, whereas volume uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty were found to have a positive effect on channel integration as hypothesised. 
Asset specificity and transaction frequency were not found to be related to channel integration, thus rejecting TCE based hypotheses. Product 
customisation was found to be positively related to channel integration while the complexity of a product had no effect on channel integration. 
Results for performance implications are mixed, NEVs had a significantly higher performance when channels used were in line with predictions 
based on asset specificity, volume uncertainty, transaction frequency, product complexity, product synergies and customer retention.
Gabrielsson & 
Gabrielsson
2011
Internet-based sales channel strategies of born global 
firms.
They study the development from single towards multiple sales channels. The framework developed included three independent factors: (1) the 
globalization process, (2) market structure and Internet suitability, and (3) long-term channel relations. The framework was examined in a multiple 
case study with 35 cases. Born globals with a higher globalization degree made more use of internet-based multiple sales channels. However, for 
firms with an internet sales channel, the relationships with small local channels and MNCs still remained important.
Cho & Tansuhaj 2013 When do SMEs use e-intermediaries? 
Explores the relationships between e-intermediary use, transaction costs, and transaction characteristics in the context of Korean SMEs. SMES prefer 
e-intermediaries that can reduce searching, bargaining and monitoring costs. There is also a positive relationship with e-intermediary use the more a 
product is standardised and the higher the EU. The institutional environment did not have an impact on e-intermediary use. 
He, Brouthers & 
Filatotchev
2013
Influence of MO and institutional distance on the choice 
between hybrid and hierarchical export channels of 
Chinese exporters.
Firms can improve export performance by aligning export channels with their level of MO and ID. Firms with strong MO prefer hierarchical export 
channels and firms with weak MO prefer hybrid ones. This relationship is moderated by the ID between China and the respective export market. 
Fernández-Olmos 
& Diez-Vial
2014
The direct and indirect export channel decision of agri-
food firms in Spain.
They investigate the effect of intangible resources, product quality, firms size and international experience on channel choice. Larger firms were 
found to be more likely to export directly. The effects  of intangible resources on chanel choice were mixed, with reputational resources and having 
highly educated workers showed no impact on channel choice. The more international experience firms had, the more likely they were to export 
directly. 
Fernández-Olmos 
& Diez-Vial
2015
The influence of ntangible resources on export channel 
choice and performance of Spanish wineries.
Study the impact of intangible resources (R&D intensity, advertising intensity, education of workers, international experience) on channel choice. 
Firms lacking human resources were more likely to prefer indirect channels. Contrary to expectations, &D intensity, advertising intensity and 
international experience were not significantly related to a firm's export channel choice. Channel fit was found to be significant with export 
performance, i.e. firms with human resources choosing a direct export channel outperformed firms with human resources choosing an indirect 
channel. 
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2.8 Shortcomings of the channel choice literature 
The need for additional research on channel choice is driven by the following theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings in the literature. I propose three theoretical critiques of the channel 
choice literature: 
1) It is limited in explaining why firms choose multiple channels, that is, most studies 
investigate a binary choice set. However, in practice, because strategic choices are rarely 
binary, managers have to choose more broadly when deciding about their channels. 
Employing a restricted choice set limits knowledge about the relative effectiveness of 
different channel configurations in managing governance problems (Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997). In addition, the studies that have employed a broader choice set suffer from 
methodological limitations as they have overlooked important analyses. This creates 
uncertainty about previous findings whether an incomplete analysis might have led to 
invalid findings (Wulff, 2015); 
2) It is strongly dominated by a single theoretical framework, that is, transaction cost theory 
(Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). That is surprising as the support for this theory’s predictions has 
been mixed. Moreover, several authors have recently noted that transaction cost arguments 
are based on an economising calculus that provides a one-sided perspective on managers’ 
channel choice decisions. There have been calls to expand or contrast TCE with other 
theoretical perspectives, especially RBT (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). This 
limitation will be addressed in this study by combining TCE’s economising calculus with a 
value creation perspective that is proposed by RBT considerations.  
3) There is a lack of studies that assess whether or not choosing channels in accordance with 
transaction cost theory does lead to improved efficiency and higher performance. The 
literature fails to tests the effects of an adherence to transaction cost considerations on 
performance outcomes (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016) (see below in this study).  
2.8.1 A restricted choice set  
Channel choice literature is limited by a restricted binary choice set — The majority of channel 
choice research restricts the choice set to a limited range. Its dominant practice is to restrict channel 
choice to a binary one, that is, either a single indirect (SI) to a direct-only (D-O) channel. Of the 30 
relevant studies reviewed, only a few go beyond a binary comparison and attempt to explain the 
choice between more than two channel categories (e.g. Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Campa & Guillén, 
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1999, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990) by employing a multinomial logistic regression. However, even 
those studies attempting to explain more than a binary choice set have provided an inadequate 
assessment as they have omitted important parts of the analyses, that is, to assess predicted 
probabilities and marginal effects and possibly a graphical interpretation of results (Wulff, 2015). 
Recently, Wulff (2015) analysed the necessary steps required to properly apply the multinomial 
logistic method when studying a broader choice set (i.e., more than two choices). The need for a 
proper application and analysis of this method has been noted previously (Bowen & Wiersema, 
2004), but has not been followed in the few channel choice studies attempting to broaden the choice 
set. Similar to the general strategic literature (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004) and the entry mode 
literature (Wulff, 2015), the channel choice literature shows systematic issues in applying and 
interpreting results from multinomial logistic regression models. 
For example, two out of the three studies that have employed this method have restricted 
their analysis to interpreting coefficients (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). 
Yet, in multiple outcome models, such as the multinomial logistic model, “(…) the sign and size of 
the coefficient indicate[s] neither the direction nor the size of the marginal effect on the probability 
that an alternative is chosen” (Wulff, 2015, p.302). The analysis of this model needs to be 
supplemented with important additional computations, such as predicted probabilities and marginal 
effects to be able to state whether or not support for a hypothesis in the multiple choice context is 
given. These kinds of problems are concerning as they create uncertainties about previous findings 
and might have led to invalid findings (Martin, 2013, Wiersema & Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2014). 
Besides coming to misleading conclusions, previous studies might have missed important findings 
about theoretical relationships that they were not able to discover with the application of an 
incomplete analysis (Wulff, 2015).  
Reasons might exist as to why the choice set has been limited, such as convenience of 
modeling (Wulff, 2014). For instance, some studies have modelled the various channel choices 
merely as some form of direct sales channel percentage instead of using a binary approach (e.g. 
Majumdar & Ramaswamy, 1994, Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). However, this approach 
cannot explain why firms use channel combinations and limits the focus of channel choice studies 
to a single unit of analysis (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995, Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
Recent studies have called for an expansion of mode choice sets (Martin, 2013, Wulff, 2014). That 
is because a restricted choice set leaves theory depending on the aggregation of dissimilar mode 
choices and/or the elimination of some mode forms (Martin, 2013, Wulff, 2015). Limiting the 
choice set foregoes the chance to explain variations in channel choices that were observed to be 
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present in managerial practice, but could be explained by allowing a broader choice set. Such a 
study might allow us to better understand managerial practice and what they have to consider when 
deciding about their export channels. As noted by Wulff (2014), Martin (2013), and Shaver (2013), 
assuming that managers stand before a binary choice set might be too simplistic and restrict our 
understanding of mode choice practices.  
Channel choice literature is limited as multiple channel choices remain poorly understood — 
Further, Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) note that one limitation of TCE is that it solely focuses on 
individual transactions as its unit of analysis. TCE ignores that different governance forms can be 
combined and that firms can combine several channels to sell a product. The literature indicates that 
firms do not adhere to a discrete choice between direct and indirect channels when designing 
channel strategy (e.g. John & Weitz, 1988, Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Osborne, 1996). 
Rather, they can combine direct and indirect channels simultaneously. In fact, most governance 
structures can be classified as a mix, situated along the continuum of the two poles of ‘market’ and 
‘hierarchy’ (Hennart, 1993). Even though using multiple channels is common (Frazier, 1999, 
Rosenbloom, 2007), only a few researchers examined aspects of multiple channel choice to the 
extent that it remains poorly understood (LaPlaca, 2007, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016, Vinhas & 
Anderson, 2005).  
Moreover, the limited multiple channel research also merely employs a binary choice 
comparison (e.g., D-O vs DU channels). The dominant application of a simple binary channel 
choice set has limited the knowledge about why firms choose multiple channels. Most importantly, 
the relative effectiveness of different channel configurations in addressing governance problems has 
not been explored sufficiently (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Several questions remain unanswered, 
some of which are now outlined.   
For example, the literature does not explain why some firms choose to employ more than 
one indirect channel (i.e., MI channels) instead of just one SI channel. It is not clear whether 
governance problems associated with a single channel (e.g., performance evaluation problems) can 
either be mitigated by MI channels (i.e., several indirect channels) or DU channels (combining one 
or more direct and indirect channels).  
That DU channels can mitigate governance problems associated with a SI channel was 
illustrated by Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995). They found that DU allow manufacturers to 
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minimise the shortcomings of a single indirect channel (e.g., risk of opportunistic behaviour) while 
enjoying the benefits of market governance such as economy-of-scale benefits or higher incentives 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Specifically, Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995) suggest that the 
problem of evaluating the performance of an indirect sales agent (BU) can be mitigated by 
augmenting an indirect sales agent with a direct sales channel (i.e., own employee) (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997). In the terminology of agency theory, the proposed solution to the problem involves 
using one ‘agent’ to manage another, namely, a DU channel choice approach (Heide, 2003).  
However, DU channel choice involves using a particular type of agent (i.e., an internal one, 
a company employee) to reduce information asymmetry in relation to another type of agent (i.e., an 
external one, e.g., a sales agent) because of the nature of the information that becomes available 
through integration (i.e., through a direct channel). However, in the absence of relevant expertise in 
the firm, monitoring provides limited information or simply produces information that cannot be 
properly interpreted (Jacobides & Croson, 2001). Monitoring under such conditions may produce 
substantial but unnecessary governance costs (Heide, 2003). The key (for the firm) is the capability 
to evaluate information about the external party (Parnell, 2013). This aids monitoring and serves to 
protect the firm against opportunism (Kabadayi, 2011). Theoretically, this could be achieved either 
way: by employing DU channels or MI channels.  
Therefore, it is not clear whether governance problems associated with a SI channel may 
also be mitigated by employing several indirect channels rather than just DU channels as in the 
example by Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995). That means that it is not clear whether the 
opportunism of individual channel partners can be reduced by having several independent entities 
performing the selling function or only by supplementing the indirect channel with a direct channel 
owned by the firm. That is, can one ‘agent’ be used to manage another (Varian, 1989), regardless of 
the type of agent (an internal one or an external one) (Heide, 2003)? Can BU be managed by 
establishing MI channels or only by establishing a DU channel system? Is it possible to mitigate 
contractual hazards (which give rise to transaction costs) by combining several entities of the same 
governance structure (i.e., several indirect channels) or only by combining two different governance 
structures (i.e., a direct and an indirect channel)?  
Moreover, it is not clear whether multiple channels provide a solution for only an 
intermediate level of transaction costs or whether multiple channels can also mitigate high levels of 
governance problems. In that case, a multiple channel system (either MI or DU channels) can 
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provide an alternative to full vertical integration (D-O). These questions illustrate that the relative 
effectiveness of different channel configurations in managing governance problems (e.g., 
safeguarding, adaptation and performance assessment issues) remains poorly understood. To 
address these shortcomings, this study investigates what type of export channel configuration firms 
employ at different levels of the predictors. This means that I analyse the relative effectiveness of 
these channel configurations as well as their relative value-creation potential.  
Assessing the governance advantages of different channel configurations represents an 
especially important area for future applications of TCE (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Doing so 
helps us to understand why firms choose specific types of export channel configurations and 
whether these configurations help firms to achieve superior performance. In doing so, the dependent 
variable needs to be expanded beyond a binary one to allow a more realistic choice set to be present 
in managerial practice. This approach is in line with a recent marketing channel review by Vinhas, 
Chatterjee, Dutta, Fein, Lajos, Neslin, Scheer, Ross, and Wang (2010), which encourages further 
exploration of the optimal channel mix, specifically with regard to the multiple channel context. 
Thus, I state the following overarching research puzzle: 
Why do firms choose different export channel configurations? 
This overarching puzzle will be addressed in three separate research questions which are presented 
in the following sections. First, while it has been frequently noted that firms employ multiple 
channels, there is a lack of information about what types of channel configurations firms employ 
under which conditions. To investigate this issue, the following research question is posed: 
 RQ 1: How do transaction cost factors affect multiple export channel choice?  
 
As previously discussed, only few studies explore channel choice decisions in general and 
specifically multiple channel choice decisions based on theoretical frameworks other than TCE. For 
instance, Wilson and Daniel (2007) use the dynamic capability approach in a case study to identify 
capabilities for multiple channel transformation, while Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, and Thomas (2007) 
employ a configuration-theoretic approach to assess two different multiple channel configurations 
to fit with firm strategy and environmental conditions. However, this thesis steps beyond this 
limited approach by exploring the potential of RBT to explain multiple channel choice in contrast to 
TCE. 
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2.8.2 A single theory (TCE) 
Channel choice literature is mainly dominated by a single theory, namely transaction cost theory. 
Considering its wide use in explaining channel choice decisions, one would expect that strong 
support can be found for its predictions among channel choice studies. However, my literature 
review paints a much more mixed picture. 
Mixed support for transaction cost predictions in the channel choice literature — Of the 30 
relevant studies reviewed, only six apply a theoretical approach different to TCE, which is 
surprising as the support for TCE in explaining channel choice has been mixed. Notably, most 
support is found for the effect of BU on channel choice. Of the 12 studies testing that effect, 11 
support its claim. When firms have difficulties to assess the performance of salespeople, they seem 
to prefer vertical integration by employing their own sales staff to perform sales and distribution 
activities (e.g. Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984, Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). Only one 
study concludes differently, namely, concerning young, entrepreneurial firms (Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, & Schilke, 2011). They find that high internal uncertainty does not lead to the use of a 
direct distribution channel. One explanation could be that new ventures have not yet built up 
sufficient experience to assess the performance of salesforce. They may also not yet have built up 
the required internal control mechanisms that would prefer direct distribution to indirect (Brettel, 
Engelen, & Müller, 2010). Nevertheless, TCE’s prediction that difficulties in assessing the 
performance of a salesforce is positively related to channel integration is mostly supported in the 
channel choice literature.  
However, a much more mixed picture applies to the effects of external uncertainty 
(volatility), AS, and performance on channel integration. AS is the most frequently considered TCE 
variable, appearing in 20 of the 24 transaction cost channel choice studies. This might be attributed 
to the notion that AS is the most important determinant of governance choice (Williamson, 1985). 
Of the 20 studies testing this construct, 12 support its effect, five report mixed findings, and three 
studies offer no support.  
All studies that tested the effect of EU did so in the form of market volatility (i.e., a 
dynamic, fast-changing industry environment) (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). That is, 
except for Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990), who added another dimension to the construct, namely, 
market diversity (e.g., existence of a large number of market players or customers). Of the 17 
studies that tested the effect of EU, seven support it, five report mixed results and four find a 
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negative effect, contrary to TCE’s predictions. Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) conclude that their 
study “raises more questions than it answers” and call for more fine-grained analysis in future 
research. Nevertheless, later studies also frequently report mixed findings (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, & 
Müller, 2010, Coelho & Easingwood, 2005, Stapleton & Hanna, 2002), and Shervani, Frazier, and 
Challagalla (2007) who find a strong negative relationship between external uncertainty and 
channel integration call for the need to pay closer attention to this construct in future studies. 
Limited focus on mere efficiency considerations in the channel choice literature — The literature 
review finds only mixed support for TCE’s predictions on channel integration, and the effects it 
finds that do accord with TCE do not necessarily support it. For example, the positive findings of 
the effect of AS might as well be interpreted from a capability perspective. If so, this effect would 
support resource-based theory arguments, especially when measured as human AS (e.g. Carter & 
Hodgson, 2006, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013, Monteverde, 1995). One such case 
would be the effect of AS in that it could also be explained by a resource-based point of view 
because more value could be created by integrating certain strategic assets into the hierarchy of the 
firm. That is because these assets can be best used when they are integrated within the firm and are 
hard to imitate when the firm tries to source these assets from outside. In that case, firms would 
integrate vertically to make the best use of their strategic assets, even when there are no transaction 
cost hazards (Conner & Prahalad, 1996, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013).  
Both factors, value creation and cost minimisation, likely play a role for firms’ governance 
decisions (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). Some attempts to test other theoretical 
explanations have been made in the channel choice literature (e.g. Campa & Guillén, 1999, Hessels 
& Terjesen, 2010) and a recent study has taken a resource-based view perspective on channel 
choice (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). However, no channel choice studies concurrently test 
both transaction cost and resource-based explanations. There is a lack of testing either channel 
choices from different theoretical perspectives, or testing TCE jointly with rival or complementary 
theoretical views (Carter & Hodgson, 2006, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). Yet, recent studies call for a 
joint test of both theories (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, Brouthers, 2013, Crook, 
Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013), and argue for contrasting or combining resource-based and 
transaction cost perspectives to account for the value creation aspect of a firm (e.g. Brouthers, 2013, 
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007, Combs & Ketchen, 1999, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016, Seggie, 2012).  
TCE allows only for an indirect test of transaction costs and we do not know whether or not 
the chosen governance mode actually leads to a reduced transaction costs, even when the particular 
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governance choice accords with TCE (Carter & Hodgson, 2006, Heide & John, 1990). That means 
that non-transaction cost explanations of governance choice might as well be viable (Masten, 1996). 
One example is human AS that could represent a special capability of the firm that rather reduces its 
internal organisation costs making a hierarchical governance choice (i.e., direct channels) the 
preferred option. Instead of raising the market transaction costs and therefore leading to the 
preference of integration (i.e., hierarchical governance choices) (Carter & Hodgson, 2006, 
Monteverde, 1995). Carter and Hodgson (2006) note that an integration of TCE and capability or 
resource-based explanations represents perhaps the most productive area for development. These 
authors thus call for a more thorough joint testing of these theories as the best approach. Similarly, 
Seggie (2012) proposes combining TCE and RBT to help explain a greater proportion of the 
variance of governance decisions. Combining the economising calculus with a strategic calculus 
would be a modification that still remains within the core tenets of theory testing and extension 
(Seggie, 2012).  
Most recently, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, and Aguinis (2013) and Brouthers (2013) also call 
for joint testing of TCE and RBV. Brouthers (2013) proposes that future studies test this joint 
impact to explain mode choices. That is because assessing only the impact of RBV factors on mode 
choice and performance is not sufficient. He states that one of the weaknesses of RBV in this task is 
that it merely focuses on internal resource accumulation and use, but does not account for external 
factors that might influence firms’ abilities to use and create value from their resources. That is, 
where TCE comes into play, it accounts for external and behavioural uncertainties that might 
influence firms’ abilities to capture value from their resources. This is especially important in 
international business because it naturally represents a more uncertain environment for firms than 
the home market (Brouthers, 2013). A resource-based advantage alone might not be enough to 
influence mode choices if external uncertainties do not allow the firm to create value from their 
resources or when behavioural uncertainties impede the transfer and use of such resources 
(Brouthers, 2013).  
In a recent meta-analytic review of TCE, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, and Aguinis (2013) 
conclude that TCE must be augmented with other perspectives to explain how firms organise 
economic activity. They conclude that TCE and RBV-based factors reinforce one another when 
making vertical integration decisions. With TCE, higher AS leads to greater exchange hazards for 
firms and causes them to integrate in order to protect themselves from such hazards (Williamson, 
1985). In contrast, with RBV, strategic assets make integration more attractive as it allows firms to 
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better use these assets (Leiblein, 2003). Exchange hazards and strategic factors for value creation 
are both important when making organisational governance decisions (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & 
Aguinis, 2013, Williamson, 1999). These authors conclude further exploring the theoretical 
boundaries of TCE and how it can be integrated with other theories such as the resource-based 
theory represents a promising direction for future research.  
In channel choice research, He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) investigate RBT 
explanations on export channel choice. They call for more research of other resource-based 
capabilities on export channel choice. Moreover, they stress the need to go beyond studying single 
exporting channels to explain multiple export channels. They argue for research into how multiple 
channels influence firms’ abilities to exploit their resource-based advantages in foreign markets 
(He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Therefore, this study follows these calls and extends current 
research by asking the following research question: 
 RQ 2: How do capability-based factors affect multiple export channel choice? 
Therefore, using the potential of capabilities to influence governance decisions (e.g. Crook, Combs, 
Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013, He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Jaworski & Kohli, 1993, Long, 
2015, Pisano, 1990), this thesis considers the influence of two resource-based factors (MO and 
MCs) on firms’ channel choice decisions. To do so, I test how these resources might affect firms 
channel choices made in the export mode. Furthermore, to assess the predictive power of both 
theories in explaining channel choice, I contrast these resource-based predictions with transaction 
cost factors by closely attending to the EU construct that I found had mixed support in the literature. 
This means testing the impact of two EU dimensions (volatility and diversity) that affect channel 
integration in different ways (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990).  
2.8.3 Knowledge about performance implications 
Given the prominence of TCE in channel choice studies, only a small number has surprisingly 
tested the theory thoroughly by testing whether or not the channel choices aligning with its 
predictions lead to higher performance (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). This means considering that TCE 
has a normative character, that is, a notable limitation in the literature. Among the few channel 
studies that have assessed performance outcomes, two studies support TCE and two report mixed 
results. For example, Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) note that firms that act in accordance with a 
number of considerations, one about transaction costs, do perform better than firms that do not align 
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their channels with these considerations (such as AS and country risk for transaction cost 
considerations, international experience, firm size and strategic factors). In contrast, Brettel, 
Engelen, and Müller (2010) report mixed findings for the performance outcome. While they find 
that not aligning channel choices with AS and technological uncertainty leads to lower 
performance, no relationship is found between market-related uncertainty (volatility) and BU. 
Therefore, what we know about the performance implications of transaction cost-based channel 
choices is inconclusive and needs much more empirical scrutiny that justifies making claims that 
encourage managers to consider transaction cost factors when making channel choice decisions. 
Therefore, I put the following research question:  
RQ 3: What are the performance implications of multiple export channel choice?  
 
2.9 Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature related to the main constructs of this thesis. First, the 
theoretical background of this study was introduced and the two theories that underlie this thesis, 
transaction cost theory and resource-based theory, were outlined. Then, the constructs were defined 
and the current knowledge that exists in the literature about the relationship of each construct with 
channel choice was summarised. I then highlighted the limitations of the current literature because 
they represent the motivation for this thesis and thus the research questions of my research which 
are summarised in Table 9. In the next chapter, the conceptual model is presented and hypotheses 
are developed.  
Table 9: Summary of research questions 
Overarching research puzzle:
Why do firms choose different export channel configurations?
Research Question 1:
How do transaction cost factors affect multiple export  channel choice?
Research Question 2:
How do capability-based factors affect multiple export  channel choice?
Research Question 3:
What are the performance implications of multiple export channel choice? 
Research Questions
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter depicts the theoretical model of this study and presents several testable hypotheses to 
address the previously posed research questions. Despite the rising popularity of multiple channels, 
not only in the B-to-C, but also in the B-to-B sector, the effectiveness of such channel structures, as 
well as their potential to exploit resource-based advantages, is yet to be explored (Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Therefore, the performance 
implications of such choices are analysed, in this chapter, in which I also develop a conceptual 
model to investigate these relationships. In Sub-sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4, I hypothesise about the 
effect of transaction cost factors on firms’ channel configurations, while, in Sub-sections 3.3.5 and 
3.3.6, I theorise about how market orientation (MO) and marketing capabilities (MCs) affect such 
channel choices. In Sub-sections 3.3.7 and 3.3.8, I examine the performance implications of 
adhering to the theoretical predictions of transaction cost and resource-based theory when choosing 
export channel configurations. Figure 1 represents the conceptual framework that I mentioned 
above. 
3.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
The conceptual model is developed as follows. First, channel choice is explained from a TCE 
perspective. The influence of the three contractual hazards: behavioural uncertainty (BU), asset 
specificity (AS), and environmental uncertainty (EU) on channel choice is hypothesised. Then, I 
explain channel choice from a RBT perspective by concentrating on the influence of MCs and MO 
on channel choice. Then, the performance implications of TCE and RBT-based predictions are  
hypothesised. For a summary of hypotheses, see Table 11, for a graphical illustration of the 
conceptual model see Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of theoretical framework 
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The table below defines the TCE variables: AS, BU and EU; and the RBT variables: MO 
capabilities, MCs, while also defining performance as the outcome variable.  
Table 10: Definition of TCE and RBT variables 
Variable Definition
Asset specificity
"The degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses by alternative 
users without sacrifice of productive value" (Williamson, 1985, p. 95). 
Behavioral 
uncertainty
Is defined as the difficulty of a channel manager to evaluate the performance of sales 
personnel (Kabadayi, 2011; Williamson, 1985)
Environmental 
uncertainty
Is defined as “an individual’s perceived inability to predict something accurately" 
(Milliken, 1987, p. 136). It refers to frequent changes in the environment (volatility) 
and the extent of the number of sources of uncertainty (diversity). A highly diverse 
market is a market with several different customers, endusers or competitors (S. Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth, 1990).
Market orientation 
capabilities
Based on Kohli and Jaworski (1990) market orientation is “defined as composed of 
three sets of activities: (1) organization-wide generation  of market intelligence 
pertaining to current and future customer needs, (2) dissemination  of the intelligence 
across departments, and (3) organization-wide responsiveness  to it" (Jaworski & 
Kohli, 1993, p. 54).
Marketing 
capabilities
Are defined as integrative processess in which the collective knowledge, skills, and 
resources of the firm are applied to the market-related needs of the business, enabling 
the business to add value to its goods and services and meet competitive demands 
(Day, 1994; Weerawardena, 2003). Six distinct marketing capabilities are measured in 
this study (Pricing, product, marketing communication, selling, marketing planning, 
marketing implementation capabilities) (Morgan, Vorhies & Mason, 2009).
Performance
Refers to the channel system’s contribution to firm performance (Kabadayi, 2011; 
Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007).
 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
3.3.1 Asset specificity (AS) 
Transaction-specific investments are either human or physical assets that are dedicated to a specific 
transaction or salesperson. These assets have lower or no value when used outside a transaction, 
thus enhancing manufacturers’ switching costs (Kabadayi, 2011, Williamson, 1985). Specific 
human investments create a problem of lock-in for manufacturers with the salespeople for whom 
they have trained to sell their products. Then manufacturers are more vulnerable to opportunistic 
actions by these salespeople, which weakens their bargaining position. The specific investments 
drive manufacturers to incur additional safeguarding costs to reduce the potential of a salespersons’ 
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opportunistic actions. These safeguarding costs may include additional control and monitoring 
measures to guarantee contractual fulfilment by salespeople. TCE asserts that manufacturers solve 
this problem by switching to direct channels (Anderson, 1985). This study argues that 
manufacturers choose among a single indirect (SI), multiple indirect (MI), dual (DU), or direct-only 
(D-O) channels depending on the level of AS. 
At low levels of AS, there is no risk of becoming locked-in with the salespeople. There is no 
incentive for a salesperson to behave opportunistically, and manufacturers can rely on a SI channel 
such as using a sales agent or distributor without incurring monitoring costs. As the level of 
transaction-specific investments increases, a MI channel system reduces manufacturers’ 
vulnerability to channel members’ opportunism. This is because having several indirect channels 
frees manufacturers to change their channels when a channel partner does not adhere to contractual 
obligations. This puts manufacturers in a better position when bargaining with individual 
salespeople. However, the MI channel system is feasible only as long as investments are relatively 
low. By investing in more than one channel, manufacturers can mitigate the threat of opportunism 
and monitor costs of individual channel members. 
As AS rises, it is more efficient for manufacturers to adopt DU channel systems. A firm 
having its own direct channel introduces terminating the indirect channel as a credible sanction 
(Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995), which further reduces the potential of opportunistic 
behaviour by indirect channel partners (thereby reducing overall transaction costs) (Sa Vinhas, 
2002). For example, Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995) indicate that a direct presence of the 
manufacturer in the territory of an independent sales agent puts the manufacturer in a better position 
because it is clear to the sales agent that he can be replaced. The possibility of replacement gives 
manufacturers an additional bargaining advantage. This safeguard allows manufacturers to continue 
enjoying the cost and motivation benefits of indirect channels (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 
1995). 
At very high levels of asset investment, it is not efficient to invest in indirect channels 
because the danger of losing this investment becomes too high. It is more feasible for manufacturers 
to secure their investments by fully integrating their sales activities and exporting directly. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H1: The higher the firm’s asset specificity, the more direct its channel choice. (Single Indirect  
Multiple Indirect  Dual Channels  Direct-only). 
3.3.2 Behavioural uncertainty (BU) 
BU refers to firms’ incapability to accurately judge whether a salesperson has carried out 
contractual obligations and followed pre-specified agreements (Kabadayi, 2011, Williamson, 1985). 
It arises from the difficulties of monitoring the performance of salespeople, difficulties that 
motivate undetected opportunistic behaviour by them (Heide, 2003, Kabadayi, 2011). In this thesis, 
BU refers to the difficulty of firms to assess the performance of their own sales personnel. This 
concept directly measures how well channel managers can evaluate the performance of their own 
sales employees. Thereby, this construct is reversed and firms are expected to prefer fewer 
integrated channels as the BU of their own sales personnel increases. 
For low levels of BU, TCE suggests using the most efficient channel exclusively (Sa 
Vinhas, 2002). At low levels of BU, having a D-O channel is feasible, as its performance can 
clearly be evaluated so that manufacturers incur the lowest internal organisation costs when using a 
D-O channel. The salesperson’s efforts to sell manufacturers’ products are transparent and can be 
rewarded accordingly. However, as BU increases, the information provided by the direct channel is 
not sufficient to judge the performance of sales employees. An added indirect channel gives 
manufacturers further knowledge about the marketing activities of their sales employees (Kabadayi, 
2011). Having an additional indirect channel further enhances manufacturers’ ability to monitor and 
judge the performance of their own salespeople (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995) because it 
increases market transparency. Manufacturers can then receive unfiltered information and thus 
understand on-site market conditions. With a DU channel system, manufacturers have greater 
control over their distribution channels and can mitigate the increased BU.  
As BU further increases, so do the transaction costs associated with the direct channel. In 
adopting a MI channel system, the manufacturer uses several indirect channels and can benchmark 
the performance of one indirect channel against the performance of another. This benchmarking can 
thus save transaction costs. Several indirect channels provide more sources of information and 
increase market transparency. This reduces information asymmetry among the independent 
channels and the manufacturer. The possibility of benchmarking individual channel performance 
and the increased level of information improves the manufacturer’s ability to evaluate the 
performance of its independent channels (Anderson, 1985, Kabadayi, 2011). At high levels of BU, 
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the monitoring costs of several indirect channels become too high leaving manufacturers to use a SI 
channel exclusively. At high levels of BU, the benefits of using a SI channel prevail. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is advanced: 
H2: The higher the firm’s behavioural uncertainty, the more indirect its channel choice. (Direct-
only  Dual Channels  Multiple Indirect  Single Indirect). 
3.3.3 Environmental uncertainty (EU - volatility)  
EU refers to the extent of rapid change in the environment and can cause firms to be caught by 
surprise (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). Manufacturers feel uncertain when they lack important 
information (Argote, 1982) or when changes are rapid and unpredictable (Barney & Arikan, 2001, 
Kabadayi, 2011). This inability to foresee changes in the environment makes it difficult to specify 
contracts that include all relevant contingencies, thus creating an adaptation problem. Agreements 
with indirect channel partners might need to be adapted, which raises transaction costs (e.g., direct 
costs of communicating new information or the need to renegotiate agreements or coordinating 
activities to reflect new circumstances) (Kabadayi, 2011). In highly uncertain environments, 
indirect channel partners have an information advantage that allows them to behave 
opportunistically (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). When unforeseen changes arise, firms’ 
relationships with indirect channel partners are strained, as they can try to take advantage of the 
unspecified contract agreements and reinterpret the unspecific clauses to their advantage (Kabadayi, 
2011). The difficulties of renegotiating agreements when unforeseen changes arise is a significant 
drawback of using indirect channels (Anderson & Weitz, 1986, John & Weitz, 1988). This thesis 
argues that manufacturers choose from a SI, MI, DU channels, or a D-O channel depending on the 
level of volatility. 
At low levels of volatility, manufacturers can specify all contingencies in a contract and thus 
do not face adaptation costs with their channel partners. Manufacturers can fully specify their sales 
and distribution demands without having to adapt the negotiated agreement in the future. As 
volatility increases, MI channels are better suited to fulfil manufacturers’ interests. With MI 
channels, manufacturers can more easily choose among their indirect channels. Manufacturers are 
free to change their channels, putting them in a better position in light of unforeseen changes. 
Because they do not depend only on one channel, their position in a contract renegotiation is 
stronger. In addition, MI channels reduce information asymmetry between manufacturers and 
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indirect channel members, as manufacturers have more sources of information about changes in the 
foreign market.  
When faced with increased EU, manufacturers choose DU channels. With DU channels, 
they can gain more control over the uncertain market and solve problems that arise from 
interpreting evolving circumstances more quickly (Kabadayi, 2011). With a DU channel system, the 
information flow via the direct channel is increased. This enables manufacturers to react more 
quickly and adjust to changing contingencies. When volatility becomes very high, using indirect 
channels becomes too costly, and manufacturers fully internalise their sales activities by adopting a 
direct export channel exclusively. When external transaction costs based on volatility become 
prevalent and outweigh the advantages of market governance, manufacturers will adopt a D-O 
channel. Based on this information, I advance the following hypothesis: 
H3: The higher the firm’s volatility, the more direct its channel choice. (Single Indirect  Multiple 
Indirect  Dual Channels  Direct-only). 
3.3.4 Environmental uncertainty (EU - diversity) 
With an international context comes a second dimension of the EU construct (Klein, Frazier, & 
Roth, 1990). The diversity of many different customers, end-users, and competitors affects vertical 
integration decisions in foreign markets negatively (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). Such a market 
environment makes it challenging for a firm in two ways: first, it is difficult to gather information 
about the other entities involved; and second, different strategies need to be devised to address the 
multiplicity of demands and constraints (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990, McNaughton, 2002).  
Consequently, manufacturers prefer a multiple, to a single, channel strategy to better serve 
each segment of the market (McNaughton, 2002). Having several channels allows them to address 
different end-users’ diverse demands. As well, specialised independent channel members who focus 
on these segments’ demands are better able to cope with such diversity (Keegan, 1974). When 
facing this situation, manufacturers desire to maintain flexibility (that is less integration) while 
having the ability to serve different customer segments and increase market coverage (Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth, 1990). Manufacturers address these opposing demands of flexibility and 
specialisation by adopting a multiple channel strategy. For instance, different market segments may 
have different purchasing behaviours and preferences, and while each independent channel may be 
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specialised to serve the needs of these diverse customer segments, a SI channel is unlikely to meet 
all the demands in the market. Hence, the following hypothesis is advanced: 
H4: The higher the firm’s diversity, the more likely the adoption of a multiple channel system as 
opposed to a single export channel. (Single Indirect/Direct-only  Dual Channels/Multiple 
Indirect). 
3.3.5 Market orientation (MO) 
Although exporting firms manufacture their products in their home market, information about 
foreign markets is necessary to generate sales in foreign countries. These firms should know the 
needs and wants of customers abroad to identify market trends and implement adequate marketing 
strategies (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Manufacturers with strong MO will also better 
understand the strategies and capabilities of their competitors and be better than their rivals at 
scanning changes in the market environment (Morgan, Vorhies, & Mason, 2009). Like marketing 
capability, MO is also a knowledge-based capability with a tacit component (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997). Because such capabilities cannot be fully transferred to channel partners abroad, a 
firm will lose value when marketing tasks are undertaken by indirect channel partners (Crook, 
Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). Therefore, manufacturers with strong MO capabilities prefer 
internalisation (i.e., direct export channels), which more efficiently generate value from their 
resources.  
In contrast, manufacturers with weak MO must rely on intermediaries to gain market 
information because they find difficulty in generating their own information about the market 
abroad and benefit from information they derive from channel partners. Although this method is not 
as efficient as direct channels, the information from independent channel members adds value to 
manufacturers that have a weak MO and therefore cannot rely on their own capabilities. 
As MO increases, manufacturers strive to gain information from more than one independent 
channel member and may not want to rely on a single source of information. By using more than 
one channel (e.g., distributors and sales agents), firms can tap into a greater diversity of information 
and reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour. With MI channels, managers can benchmark the 
information provided by one channel against the information provided by the other. When 
managers’ MO further increases, they strive to augment the information provided by their indirect 
channels with a direct channel to generate their own information. A direct channel provides 
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unfiltered information from the market that is more valuable to the firm than information provided 
by indirect channels alone. With stronger MO, manufacturers seek direct contact with end-users in 
the foreign market to gain information directly from them. By collecting their contacts and 
information, manufacturers can build their own resources and capabilities, which can help build a 
competitive advantage. Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
H5: The stronger a firm’s market orientation, the more direct its channel choice. (Single Indirect 
 Multiple Indirect  Dual Channels  Direct-only) 
3.3.6 Marketing capabilities (MCs) 
Marketing capabilities (MCs) are especially salient for the international activities of firms because 
they importantly drive market effectiveness regarding growth in market share and sales (Vorhies, 
Morgan, & Autry, 2009). These capabilities entail a firm being capable “to create value for foreign 
customers through effective segmentation and targeting, and through integrated international 
marketing activities by planning, controlling, and evaluating how marketing tools are organised to 
differentiate offerings from those of competitors” (Knight & Kim, 2009, p.260)  
In other words, MCs have the potential to produce sustainable competitive advantages; they 
may be rare, valuable, non-substitutable and inimitable by competitors (Morgan, Vorhies, & Mason, 
2009). According to the RBT, a firm should internalise those resources/capabilities that are 
imperfectly imitable (Madhok, 1997). This is because intermediaries such as distributors or sales 
agents cannot fully absorb or replicate those resources or capabilities without a substantial loss in 
value (i.e., loss in competitive advantage). An internal transfer of those resources/capabilities 
through direct exporting activities can ensure their value is preserved in the foreign market 
(Erramilli, Agarwal, & Dev, 2002). In addition, MCs have a tacit component, which makes them 
difficult to transfer, as tacit knowledge is deeply embedded within the routines of the organisation 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Such knowledge is less codifiable and often acquired through 
experience and trial and error that continually evolves through feedback and observation (Hu, 1995, 
Kogut & Zander, 1993).  
Manufacturers with strong MCs can effectively segment and target their customers abroad. 
They can offer effective marketing strategies and adapt their sales strategy to local demands. They 
can also monitor competitors’ behaviour abroad and respond accordingly by providing alternative 
offerings to customers. Strong MCs mean that manufacturers can establish a brand image abroad. 
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They thus train internal sales staff to provide effective sales support to overseas customers. These 
manufacturers are less likely to use indirect channels to transfer their MCs to external entities (such 
as distributors or sales agents) because this would make these capabilities less valuable. Capabilities 
with a tacit component help to make them inimitable by other organisations. Also, a transfer of 
knowledge is less efficient across organisations than within them, because a firm’s learning 
capacity depends on information being shared by individuals within an organisation (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998).  
In contrast, manufacturers lacking MCs must rely on third parties (i.e., indirect channels) to 
effectively market their products overseas. Manufacturers with weak MCs must rely on SI channel 
members to handle the selling and distribution of their products. They depend on SI channel 
members because they cannot successfully launch their products overseas. Weak MCs lead to 
ineffective market segmentation and targeting as well as poor marketing strategies. When they have 
weak MCs, manufacturers must rely on a channel partner that they can easily identify in the foreign 
market. 
An increase in MCs affects manufacturers in two ways: first, they are better able to identify 
the appropriate marketing partners for their firm so they can generate more partnership 
opportunities; and second, they can use more than one indirect channel, allowing them to exploit the 
resource base of more than one channel partner (e.g., distributors, sales agents or value-added 
resellers). As a result, they can target a broader customer base because networking activities with 
various partners facilitate information transfer from these partners (Larson, 1991). 
When manufacturers have medium-level MCs, they serve some end-users directly, as they 
are able to target and communicate with these customers. However, their MCs are not strong 
enough to fully internalise their foreign sales activities. These firms must still rely in part on 
indirect channel members to serve some segments of their target markets or assume some marketing 
responsibilities and tasks in the foreign market, which leads them to adopt a dual distribution 
channel strategy.  
Manufacturers with high internal MCs are so adept at addressing and responding to the 
needs of their foreign customers that they are able to fully internalise their international sales 
activities through direct exporting. Through direct exporting, they gain more control over their firm-
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specific resources and reduce the risk of value erosion. This discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H6: The stronger the firm’s marketing capabilities, the more direct its channel choice.  
(Single Indirect  Multiple Indirect  Dual Channels  Direct-only). 
3.3.7 Transaction cost factors and channel performance 
The efficiency of an export channel depends on individual firms’ circumstances and how well this 
export channel fulfils the firm’s transaction needs. As every firm meets individual circumstances 
and needs, no particular export channel is universally superior for all firms. Therefore, no direct 
relationship between export channel choice and performance is to be expected (Kabadayi, 2011). 
When direct effects of channel choice are used to assess performance, firms’ individual situations 
are ignored; this is called an ‘endogeneity problem’. Shaver (1998) introduced a (now standard) 
two-step technique to assess the performance consequences of governance choices such as channel 
choice or entry mode choice (e.g. He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Williamson, 1999). The 
theoretical rationale follows. 
Costs that accompany every transaction lower firm performance; transaction cost theory 
suggests that firms need to structure their export channels in a way to minimise transaction costs. 
According to TCE, firms should structure their export channels according to transaction cost 
determinants (i.e., AS, BU and EU). Firms that align their export channels with transaction cost 
determinants will economise on transaction costs, which should increase efficiency, thus translating 
into better performance compared to firms that do not structure their export channels this way (He, 
Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Kabadayi, 2011, Williamson, 1991). That is because, when 
structuring a transaction based on AS, BU and EU, the firm compares the costs of conducting an 
exchange through the market with the costs of conducting an exchange internally within the firm 
(Brouthers & Nakos, 2004). In the instance of export channels, the firm compares the costs of 
choosing an indirect channel with the costs of choosing a direct channel.  
The model used in this thesis compares the costs of choosing SI, MI, DU channels, or a D-O 
export channel. Profit-seeking firms will choose the export channel structure that will minimise 
their transaction costs (Kabadayi, 2011). Firms that align their export channels with transaction cost 
variables will lower their channel-related transaction costs and improve their channel performance 
(Kabadayi, 2011). Based on this discussion, the following hypotheses are advanced: 
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H7: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of asset specificity have higher 
performance. 
H8: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of behavioural uncertainty have 
higher performance. 
H9: Firms that align their export channel choice to the level of volatility in an export country have 
higher performance. 
H10: A fit between diversity and export channel choice will result in higher performance.  
3.3.8 Capabilities and channel performance 
The RBT-based argument parallels the above. Firms that align organisational structures (i.e., 
channel choice) with their resources and capabilities will achieve superior performance (Brouthers, 
Brouthers, & Werner, 2008, Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). The alignment of the organisational structure 
is important in RBT because organisational structures can facilitate or impede the exploitation of 
firm-specific resources and capabilities (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Kohli & Jaworski, 
1990). Therefore, firms need to align their channel choice with their level of MCs and MO.  
Manufacturers’ channel choice determines whether they can take advantage of their 
capabilities when venturing abroad. Choosing channels that facilitate information generation, 
dissemination, responsiveness, and the adoption of appropriate marketing strategies should result in 
superior market performance (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Long & Freese, 2006). A failure 
to adjust to these contingencies will lower the value potential of their resources and their 
capabilities in foreign markets (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). Hence, it can be hypothesised 
that: 
H11: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of market orientation have higher 
performance. 
H12: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of marketing capabilities have 
higher performance. 
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3.4 Summary 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a theoretical model and hypotheses to address the 
research questions RQ1-3, previously introduced in Chapter 2. The full model is depicted in Figure 
2 below. A summary of the hypotheses can be seen in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Hypotheses 
Hypotheses
H1: The higher the firm's asset specificity, the more direct its channel choice. 
(Single Indirect → Multiple Indirect → Dual Channels → Direct-only).
H7: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of asset specificity have higher performance.
H2: The higher the firm's behavioral uncertainty, the more indirect its channel choice. (Direct-only → Dual Channels → 
Multiple Indirect → Single Indirect).
H8: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of behavioural uncertainty have higher performance.
H3: The higher the fim's volatility, the more direct its channel choice. 
(Single Indirect → Multiple Indirect → Dual channels → Direct-only).
H9: Firms that align their export channel choice to the level of volatility in an export country have higher performance.
H4: The higher the firm's diversity, the more likely the adoption of a multiple channel system as opposed to a single 
export channel. (Single Indirect/Direct-only→ Dual Channels/Multiple Indirect)
H10: A fit between diversity and export channel choice will result in higher performance.
H5: The stronger the firm's market orientation, the more direct its channel choice. (Single Indirect → Multiple Indirect 
→ Dual Channels → Direct-only).
H11: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of market orientation have higher performance.
H6: The stronger the firm's marketing capabilities, the more direct its channel choice. (Single indirect → Multiple 
Indirect → Dual Channels → Direct-only).
H12: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of marketing capabilities have higher performance.
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Figure 2: Conceptual model 
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Chapter 4: Method 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodology employed in this study. It involves a quantitative analysis 
with primary data collected from a sample of industrial firms in Germany. This chapter then 
describes my research design, sampling, questionnaire, data collection, my measurement approach, 
and finally my data analysis techniques. 
4.2 Pre-study: Preliminary fieldwork 
Purpose — after the literature review was completed, a pre-study in the form of several semi-
structured interviews of managers in one company was conducted to inform the main study. The 
pre-study serves two purposes: (1) to assess the types of channels the case firm uses. This is 
necessary to ensure that the channel categories employed in the model realistically represent the 
channel design of exporters; and (2) to investigate the theoretical arguments in the model 
qualitatively. 
 Sample and data collection — the pre-study was conducted on a typical medium-sized 
German manufacturer in the mechanical engineering industry. The firm is 100 per cent family-
owned, was founded 80-years ago, operates in 42 countries and employs 240 employees and is a 
member of the industry association called the German Engineering Federation, VDMA.  
 The semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the CEO and four senior managers of 
the company, who were chosen because of their direct and longitudinal experience with the firm’s 
domestic and international operations. In total, six interviews were recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. In addition, several shorter interviews averaging 30 minutes, were conducted to clarify 
details. In total, five data sources were used: (1) interviews, (2) emails and phone calls, (3) firm 
internal sales and profit datasets, (4) firm internal documents (e.g., meeting reports related to the 
firm’s distributors and sales agent contracts), and (5) evidence from data gathered from a trade fair 
at which some of the company’s distributors and sales agents were present.  
 To begin the interviews, the managers were asked to overview the firm’s domestic and 
international operations. I used probing questions such as “What do you mean by…? Or “Can you 
give an example?” to follow up on individual responses. The interviews were devised to foster an 
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independent narrative by the interviewees and to learn new aspects to meet the research goal (Hopf, 
1978). 
 Method of analysis — to analyse the data, I used thematic analysis to identify common 
themes across the interviews (Yin, 2009). The interview excerpts were coded and sorted according 
to themes and concepts mentioned across the interviews (Ghauri, 2004). Coding was done by hand 
as the data volume was still manageable without the need of coding software. First, I assessed 
which channels were used in the most important export markets using the interviews and secondary 
data. Thereafter, important determinants and influential factors responsible for these choices were 
analysed during the interviews to help me refine the research questions and the research model. 
 Pre-study findings: Channel types — the distribution system of the firm comprises nine 
different channel types (see Table 12 below). The manufacturer either sells directly to end-users or 
uses distributors or sales agents, or sells to competitors and value-added resellers (channels 1, 2, 3, 
5 & 7). Moreover, distributors can also ‘act as sales agents’ and receive commission for providing 
customer contact information to the manufacturer (channel 8). Sales agents sell not only to end-
users but also, in some cases, to value-added resellers (channel 6) or distributors (channel 4). 
Another channel the manufacturer uses in one country (Denmark) is channel 9 where the 
manufacturer owns a 10 per cent share of a distributor.  
Table 12: Distribution channels 
Distribution channel options of the case firm
1 company - direct export to enduser
2 company - sales agent (individual) - enduser
3 company - distributor - enduser
4 company - sales agent (individual) - distributor - enduser
5 company - competitor - enduser
6 company - sales agent - value added reseller - enduser 
7 company - value added reseller - enduser 
8 company - sales agent (distributor) - enduser
9 company - 10% distributor equity share - enduser
 
To understand the channel combinations that the firm uses in different countries, I compared the 
firm’s channel system in the domestic market to the 18 most important foreign markets (see Table 
13). The results indicate that the firm uses all four channel categories studied in the literature: single 
indirect (SI), direct-only (D-O), dual (DU), and multiple indirect (MI) channels. Moreover, all four 
categories are not only employed for the standard products but also for customised products.  
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Table 13: Channel categories used 
Standard parts
Ejector pins Channel category Customized parts Channel category
1 Germany 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 Dual channels 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 Dual channels
2 Austria 2,3,5,6 Dual channels 1,2,3,4,5 Dual channels
3 Italy 3 Single indirect 1,3 Dual channels
4 Denmark 9 Single direct 9 Single direct
5 Switzerland 1,2,3,5,6 Dual channels 1,2,3 Dual channels
6 The Netherlands 3,5,8 Multiple indirect 3,8 Multiple indirect
7 Turkey 2,4 Multiple indirect 2 Single indirect
8 Hungary 1,3 Dual channels 3 Single indirect
9 Sweden 1,3 Dual channels 1,3 Dual channels
10 Poland 5,8 Multiple indirect 1,3 Dual channels
11 France 1,3 Dual channels 3 Single indirect
12 Portugal 1,3 Dual channels 1 Single direct
13 UK 3 Single indirect 1 Single direct
14 Belgium 3,5 Multiple indirect 3,8 Multiple indirect
15 Finland 3 Single indirect 3 Single indirect
16 The Czech Republic 3,7,8 Multiple indirect 2 Single indirect
17 Brazil 3 Single indirect 1,3 Dual channels
18 Slovenia 1,3 Dual channels n/a n/a
19 Slovakia 1,3 Dual channels 1,3 Dual channels
Country
 
Emerging themes — while managers are not concerned about theory and constructs, the 
independent variables that I found during the interview process emerged as themes. For instance, 
managers discussed the difficulty to evaluate the performance of sales staff, which is represented by 
the behavioural uncertainty (BU) construct. Managers discussed that they mitigate the performance 
evaluation problem of indirect channels by a direct channel and adopt a DU channel system which 
gives them a higher market transparency. Moreover, the firm’s ability to generate market 
information differs across countries. The interviews indicate that the firm relies on indirect channel 
partners when it has difficulties gaining market intelligence in a country. One manager mentioned 
that s/he uses distributors as the best source of information about certain markets, thus supporting 
the hypothesis that firms with weak market orientation (MO) use fewer direct channels. This 
assertion also shows the need to use indirect channels in certain export markets. In summary, the 
questions that concerned managers fit within what I attribute to being the key independent 
variables, suggesting that TCE and RBT aspects apply to export channel choice.  
4.3 Primary study 
A research design serves as a framework because it contains information about the research 
questions, the research goal, the methods used to meet this goal, and the sources of data collection 
(Saunders, Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). The literature distinguishes between two types of 
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research design, exploratory and conclusive (Malhotra, 2008). As the goal of the present research is 
to test specific hypotheses that were previously developed, this study employs a conclusive research 
framework to examine specific relations (Malhotra, 2008). 
4.3.1 Questionnaire design  
The questionnaire design employed elements of the principles of the tailored design method (TDM) 
introduced by Dillman (2006). It aims to reduce sampling, nonresponse, and measurement errors 
with a good sample, question and instrument design. The questionnaire was originally developed in 
English, translated into German and translated back by another researcher to ensure compatibility of 
the questionnaire items. Furthermore, to ensure the meaning in English and German was close for 
each question, the questionnaire items were adapted during the pre-test of the questionnaire by 
asking interviewees how they understood the questions. The questions were carefully designed with 
simple language by avoiding abstract words and phrases and by using as much as possible everyday 
business language common to marketing and sales managers. The wording was as brief as possible 
while containing the information necessary to reflect each item.  
 Questionnaire presentation — the questionnaire was designed for ease of the respondents’ 
use and was presented in a neat and attractive design to reduce potential drop-out during the survey. 
The front page contained the University of Queensland logo, a brief title about the survey content 
and brief, but coherent information about the study purpose, the duration of the survey, ethical 
guidelines, and the person responsible for the survey. Contact information was provided in case 
respondents needed to ask questions or address any concerns. The second page contained brief 
instructions while the remainder of the questionnaire contained the questions. The instructions 
asked the respondents to focus on their most important product in their most important export 
country (i.e., by annual profit) while answering the questionnaire. This method helped to keep the 
respondents focused on the study context and to avoid confusion with other export activities. The 
end of the questionnaire expressed appreciation to respondents for participating in the survey as 
well as the option to give their contact details if they wished to receive the results. Finally, there 
was a statement about the confidentiality of the data. 
 Questionnaire format — a nine-page questionnaire was developed to be distributed among 
relevant respondents. The survey questionnaire contained eight sections. Section 1 focused on 
general information about the firms such as number of employees, number of export countries or 
founding year; this information was used as controls in the research model. These brief questions 
ensured the participants that the questionnaire was quick and easy to answer and allowed an easy 
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start before more detailed questions about their export activities were covered. While some 
recommend placing what can be potentially sensitive questions at the end of the survey information 
(e.g. Aaker, Kumar, Leone, & Day, 2010, Converse & Presser, 1986), this was not necessary in my 
survey because the questions related to everyday company and/or trade information. 
 Section 2 concerned the firms’ export channel system in their most dominant export country 
for their most important product. Because receiving accurate information for this part is necessary 
(i.e., the dependent variable), it was presented as early as possible in the questionnaire. Several 
export channels were listed and respondents were asked to check all in use for this product and this 
market. In addition, respondents were asked to provide an approximate sales percentage for each 
channel in this market. Then, an option was given to add channel categories that were not 
mentioned in the text. The paragraphs in the remaining sub-sections were organised according to 
the theoretical constructs derived from the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to provide 
information about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement pertaining to the 
situation of their firm.  
 Scaling — items representing a theoretical construct are measured based on a scaling 
method where respondents are located on a continuum from 1 to 7 (Likert scale) (Likert, 1932, 
Malhotra, 2008). For most scales, the anchors, 1 ”Strongly disagree“ and 7 “Strongly agree“ were 
used (Vagias, 2006). Except for measuring marketing capabilities (MCs), the anchors 1 “Much 
worse” and 7 “Much better” were used as the respondents were asked to rate their firms´ 
capabilities in relation to their most important competitor. A 7-point scale was preferred to a 5-point 
scale because it is more reliable (Churchill Jr, 1979).  
4.3.2 Questionnaire pretest  
The questionnaire was pretested in a pilot study on a small sample before the main study was 
conducted. This allowed problems to be eliminated in advance (Malhotra, 2008), to refine 
instruments, detect mistakes, and adapt the wording to the research context (Diamantopoulos, 
Reynolds, & Schlegelmilch, 1994). The questionnaire was first pretested with the six managers of 
the pre-study and then on a set of 33 firms via an online-survey. The 33 firms were members of the 
VDMA association and complied with the sample criteria of the main study.  
 First, the six managers were asked to complete the questionnaire and were then interviewed 
to ensure both that they understood the nature of the concepts measured and face validity and 
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content validity of the items (Churchill Jr, 1979). The feedback and suggestions by the managers 
were used to refine the questionnaire and adapt the wording of the items. For instance, the scale and 
anchors of some questions were adapted to improve clarity for ease of the answering of questions.  
 Then, the adapted questionnaire was sent out via personalised emails to members of the 
VDMA association with the help of the association’s administration. This resulted in a pretest 
sample of 33 firms. The resulting data were analysed and tested to ensure that the responses 
followed a logical structure. This pretest indicated a low dropout rate and an average response time 
between 15 to 20 minutes, confirming the results of the first round of the pre-test. After the positive 
results of the second round of the pre-test, the main study was conducted and data collected. 
 Sample — the sample for this study were German industrial firms in the mechanical 
engineering industry. This industry was chosen because it represents the second largest industry in 
Germany whose firms are highly internationalised. The survey was limited to this industry to 
minimise bias that could arise from characteristics unique to individual industries. However, this 
industry is still diverse enough to allow for a range of different channel systems and conditions. For 
instance, firms operate in a range of areas such as construction, metals, automotives, waste 
engineering, air and drive technology, building control and management, electronics, micro- and 
nano-technologies, engine systems for power and heat generations, food processing machinery and 
machine tools and manufacturing systems. Although these industries are part of mechanical 
engineering, firms are often involved in more than one. The sample was restricted to one country to 
reduce influences from different environmental conditions (Robinson & Pearce, 1988, Wolff & 
Pett, 2000). 
 Using German engineering firms is well-suited to analyse export channel choices. German 
firms in the mechanical engineering industry are among the leading firms in this industry 
worldwide, exporting at an average rate of 76 per cent and thus are well experienced in international 
export (VDMA, 2014). This sector is appropriate to study complex channel choices, such as 
multiple channel design decisions. This approach limits the possibility of channel choices that 
merely result from inefficiencies or poor management. To be included in this study, firms had to 
meet the following criteria: (1) have headquarter in Germany, (2) be manufacturing firms, (3) be 
active in the mechanical engineering industry.  
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 Key informant approach — a key informant approach is most common in organisational 
research (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993). The key informant was the marketing, sales or export 
manager; a leading member of the international sales team or the CEO of a firm. Managers 
occupying such roles necessarily know about the export activities of their company and can thus 
communicate it (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993). To ensure key informant quality, managers 
were asked what level of responsibility they hold in their company and if they could answer 
questions about the exporting of their most valuable products in their most important market. 
Moreover, key informants needed to be familiar with the overall exporting activities and the 
strategic and tactical operations of their companies. In addition, being in management, they were 
able to answer questions about the BU constructs that cover assessing the performance of sales 
personnel.  
 Unit of analysis — the unit of analysis determines the level of investigation of a study 
(Malhotra, 2008). This unit can vary such as different companies, various departments within one 
company, exporter-importer relationships, individuals, or even whole network relationships. In this 
thesis, I chose the channel system employed by firms in the most important export country for its 
most important export product as my unit of analysis. This choice is similar to other channel 
research studies and thus ensures comparability of results (e.g. McNaughton, 2002, Sa Vinhas & 
Anderson, 2008). Furthermore, a unit of analysis needs to be limited to one product and one country 
to exclude obvious reasons for choosing multiple channels such as product and country differences. 
Hence, focusing on the most important product and export country ensures that the respondents 
know about the unit of investigation and are able to answer relevant questions. 
4.4 Data collection  
Hypotheses were tested using a sample of German manufacturing firms that export to different 
countries using various sales channels. Data were collected between August 2014 and April 2015 in 
the mechanical engineering industry using a purposive sampling approach. The collection involved 
several phases as outlined below. 
 The sample was drawn from industrial firms in the mechanical engineering industry and 
consisted of 3,100 German firms that had been identified through the German Mechanical 
Engineering Association, VDMA, the largest such association in Germany. Such a sample is well-
suited to analyse export channel choices, including multiple channel choice.   
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 Initially, the sample was aimed only at participants of the VDMA industry association. 
However, I encountered difficulties in data collection which prompted me to follow several 
different routes of collecting data to ensure a relevant minimum sample size of 200 firms. The 
difficulties stemmed from the low response rate I received from the sent out emails via the industry 
association. One of the reasons for the low response rate is that more and more university students 
are collecting primary data for their theses. Low response rates of about 10% among German firms 
are also reported in other studies (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, Maekelburger, 
Schwens, & Kabst, 2012). Firms in Germany are asked almost every day by students to participate 
in interviews or surveys and also other industry and research institutes regularly conduct surveys. 
This has led to an increasingly defensive attitude by firms about participating in surveys. More and 
more have even decided not to participate in any survey or automatically block email addresses 
from universities because of the increasing activities. 
 Phase 1 — the initial data was based on an online survey among VDMA members with the 
help of the association. The VDMA consists of 39 sub-divisions of specialised engineering 
departments. Eleven departments were contacted, five of which agreed to email the online link of 
the survey with an information letter to their members. While some of these departments agreed to 
send a reminder after a few weeks, others did not want to send their members more than one email. 
Thus, this approach only led to a small response of 34 participants.  
 Phase 2 — after consulting with the VDMA head of marketing and statistics, we agreed that 
I would personally collect data in Germany by attending VDMA meetings organised by the 
association. There, I distributed the questionnaire among attendees, mainly managing board 
members or CEOs. However, after visiting four meetings, it became clear that this approach would 
not result in a sufficient sample size within the allocated timeframe. Also, several scheduled 
meetings were cancelled at short notice due to an insufficient number of participants. 
 Phase 3 — I decided to attend industrial trade shows in Germany to distribute the 
questionnaire among the exhibiting firms. There are other cases of using trade shows for collecting 
data in the channel literature (e.g. Frazier & Lassar, 1996, Wallace, Johnson, & Umesh, 2009). 
Trade shows are adequate for collecting data, because usually the majority of firms in the industry 
attend several trade shows a year. Firms that do not attend are typically either too small or not well-
connected. In addition, relevant key informants such as executive marketing and sales managers are 
present at these shows, thus providing a forum for direct access to such informants. Finally, firms 
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can be reminded to answer the questionnaire during the days of the trade show which ensures a 
higher response rate. The list of trade shows was taken from the VDMA web site and some were 
recommended by survey participants during the data collection. Overall, I attended eight exhibition 
fairs and collected 149 usable questionnaires at these exhibitions. Each attendance lasted on average 
four to five days. At two exhibitions, another student helped to distribute questionnaires to 
accelerate the process.  
 Phase 4 — at the same time, I contacted a data collection agency (which was a former 
statistics department of the University of Bonn). After consultation with the head of statistics, it was 
decided to purchase 259 email addresses. These firms belonged to two of the 39 sub-divisions of the 
VDMA which had not been contacted previously. The address list was taken from the association 
web site.  
 Overall, the two online-surveys and personally collected data resulted in a usable sample of 
257 participants (see Table 14).  
Table 14: Overview data collection procedure 
Sample
1 Euromold, Frankfurt November, 2014 21
2 Valve World, Dusseldorf December, 2014 5
3 Eltec, Nuremberg January, 2015 38
4 BAU, Munich January, 2015 32
5 ProSweets, Cologne February, 2015 18
6 Intec, Leipzig February, 2015 15
7 Fastener Fair, Stuttgart March, 2015 12
8 Anuga Food Tech, Cologne March, 2015 7
1 Erfa Business Development, Frankfurt October, 2014 7
2 Erfa Business Development, Denkendort October, 2014 12
3 Erfa Marketing and Sales, Hanover November, 2014 9
4 Erfa Marketing and Sales, Munich November, 2014 0
E-mail dispatch via association ~ 500 recipients
August - September 2014 34
E-mail dispatch to purchased e-mail addresses 259 recipients
January & April 2015 47
Total 257
Online survey
Association Meetings
Exhibitions
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4.5 Measurement and operationalisation of variables 
For each construct, two or more items are used to ensure higher reliability and validity of the 
measures. Classical test theory distinguishes between reflective and formative measures (Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991). All measures used in this study are reflective because they reflect an unobservable 
construct (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). In contrast, formative measures are thought to cause an 
unobservable construct (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). 
 Asset specificity (AS) — is defined as “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1985, 
p.95). Commons (1934) conceptualises AS as a multidimensional construct and identifies four 
distinct dimensions: human, physical, site and dedicated AS. Later, brand name capital and 
temporal specificity were added (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). However, the large majority of the 
literature conceptualises AS either as human and/or physical AS or uses a general AS measure 
(Carter & Hodgson, 2006, David & Han, 2004). Not all dimensions of AS are relevant to export 
channel choice and previous channel literature emphasises asset specificity in terms of human and 
physical asset specificity (Kabadayi, 2011, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). As exporting typically 
does not require specific physical investments, this study employs a measure of the extent to which 
manufacturers have specifically invested in sales personnel (i.e., humans) to sell their products 
(Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). This measure is derived from the items developed by Anderson 
(1985), John and Weitz (1988) and Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990). The items reflect how much 
specialised knowledge a salesperson needs to sell firms’ products (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 
2007). The scale used is a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 7 “Strongly 
agree” reflecting how much the questionnaire items reflect the situation in the individual firms. The 
items are summarised in Table 15 below.  
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Table 15: Measurement asset specificity 
No
Questionnaire 
label
Item Reference
1 v12
A specialised sales effort is needed to market this 
product line.
Klein, Frazier & Roth, 
1990
2 v13
It is difficult for a new salesperson to learn our ways of 
doing things.
Anderson, 1985
3 v14
It takes a long time for a salesperson to learn about our 
products thoroughly.
Anderson, 1985
4 v15
It takes a long time for a salesperson to get to know our 
customers.
Anderson, 1985
5 v16
It takes a long time for a salesperson to get to know our 
competitors and their products.
John & Weitz, 1988
Asset Specificity
 
Behavioural uncertainty (BU) — is defined as the difficulty of a channel manager to evaluate the 
performance of sales personnel (Kabadayi, 2011, Williamson, 1985). However, studies often do not 
specify which sales personnel is referred to and used to measure the overall BU of sales personnel 
in a channel (e.g. Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). Some even disregard this TCE factor 
(e.g. Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, McNaughton, 2002). In the pre-study, I thus gathered the information 
that several respondents struggled to assess the overall BU in a sales channel. Therefore, this 
construct performs two roles: first, it reflects the extent to which it is difficult to assess the 
performance of firms’ own sales personnel; and second, it directly measures how well channel 
managers can evaluate the performance of their sales employees. This means that this construct is 
reversed and firms are expected to prefer fewer integrated channels as their BU of their own sales 
personnel increases. BU is measured using the items developed by Anderson (1985) and  John and 
Weitz (1989) with a 7-point Likert scale with the anchors “Strongly disagree” and “Strongly agree”. 
The items reflect how difficult it is to assess the selling performance of firms’ own sales employees. 
The items are summarised in Table 16 below.  
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Table 16: Measurement behavioural uncertainty 
No
Questionnaire 
label
Item Reference
1 v17rev
It is always easy to assess how well each salesperson is 
doing.
John & Weitz, 1988
2 v18rev We have accurate activity reports for each salesperson. John & Weitz, 1988
3 v19
It is difficult to evaluate the performance of sales 
personnel.
John & Weitz, 1988
4 v20
It is difficult to evaluate how much effort an individual 
really puts into his job.
John & Weitz, 1988
5 v21rev
On the whole it is easy to assess how well each 
salesperson is doing.
John & Weitz, 1988
6 v22
On the whole there are several salespeople involved in a 
sale.
Anderson, 1985
Behavioural Uncertainty
 
Environmental uncertainty (EU) (as it relates to volatility) — is defined as “an individual’s 
perceived inability to predict something accurately" (Milliken, 1987, p.136). “Something” in this 
case refers to frequent changes in the environment (volatility) and the extent of the number of 
sources of uncertainty (diversity). A highly diverse market is one with several different customers, 
end-users or competitors (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). In the debate about the definition and 
operationalisation of the EU construct (e.g. Boyd & Fulk, 1996, Milliken, 1987, Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997), two perspectives are distinct. One perspective maintains that it is possible to describe 
environments in terms of how objectively certain they are whereas the other perspective considers 
EU as a perceptual phenomenon (Lawrence, Lorsch, & Garrison, 1967, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
This study adopts the perceptual perspective and defines it as “an individual’s perceived 
inability to predict something accurately” (Milliken, 1987, p.136). This uncertainty largely varies 
with an individual’s knowledge and the specific situation or, in this case, environment. Uncertainty 
as a unidimensional construct is increasingly questioned to the extent that different ways to 
disentangle it are proposed (e.g. Milliken, 1987, Tosi & Slocum, 1984, Yasai-Ardekani, 1989). 
Several authors distinguish two EU dimensions, volume and technological uncertainty (Heide & 
John, 1990, Heide & Stump, 1995); both address the volatility of a market (Seggie, 2012). A market 
is volatile when it is difficult to forecast outcomes, for example, regarding competitor action.  
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Besides this traditional volatility component (demand and technological) Klein (1989) and 
Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) argue that diversity adds an additional form of uncertainty to an 
international context. A market is diverse when there are many competitors, final end-users, and 
customers with high dissimilarities among them (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). In such a market, 
firms need to adopt multiple strategies to meet varied and specialised demands (McNaughton, 
2002). While diversity has not received attention in the international marketing literature (Seggie, 
2012), I adopt it in this thesis.  
Technological uncertainty describes the inability to forecast the technical requirements in a 
relationship (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006), although this component is not expected to be 
important to German engineering firms. This is because, with a share of 17 per cent of global 
engineering trade, the German mechanical engineering industry is the leading global exporting 
industry apart from China, USA and Japan (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978). As the German 
mechanical engineering industry is among the most advanced of the technological sectors, 
‘technological uncertainty’ has little relevance to German engineering firms in their international 
sales activities (e.g. Peteraf & Barney, 2003, Quinn, 2010). EU is measured using items developed 
by Anderson (1985), John and Weitz (1988) and Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990). The items are 
summarised in Table 17 below.  
Table 17: Measurement volatility 
No
Questionnaire 
label
Item Reference
1 v27
We are often surprised by the actions of our distributors 
and sales agents.
Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990
2 v28 We are often surprised by the actions of our competitors. Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990
3 v29 We are often surprised by the actions of our customers. Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990
4 v30rev It is easy to monitor trends. John & Weitz, 1988
5 v31rev There is a stable market volume. John & Weitz, 1988
6 v32rev Customer product needs are stable. SaVinhas, 2002
Volatility
 
Environmental uncertainty (as it relates to diversity) — reflects the extent to which there are 
multiple sources of uncertainty in the environment (i.e., it is highly heterogeneous). A foreign 
market with high diversity would contain many customers, final end-users, and many competitors 
for a firm’s products. It is measured using items developed by Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990). The 
items are summarised in Table 18 below.  
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Table 18: Measurement diversity 
No
Questionnaire 
label
Item Reference
1 v23 There are many end-users of this product line. Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990
2 v24 There are many competitors for this product in this market. Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990
3 v25 There are many potential intermediaries. Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990
4 v26rev Users of this product have a limited source of suppliers. Zhang & Hu, 2011
Diversity
 
Market orientation (MO) — there exist two main perspectives on MO in the literature (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990); a behavioural perspective (Luo, Griffith, Liu, & Shi, 2004) and a cultural perspective 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). This study adopts the behavioural perspective of MO that emphasises 
the generation and use of market information. Market-oriented firms are well informed about the 
market and are able to use that knowledge to create superior value for their customers (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990). Luo, Griffith, Liu, and Shi (2004) define MO “as composed of three sets of 
activities: (1) organisation-wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and future 
customer needs, (2) dissemination of the intelligence across departments, and (3) organisation-wide 
responsiveness to it” (Malhotra, 2008, p.54). Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1995) and Malhotra 
(2008) show the three sets to be sub-dimensions of a higher-order construct: MO. It is a three-
dimensional construct consisting of “Market intelligence generation”, “Market intelligence 
dissemination” and “Responsiveness to market intelligence”. as measured by Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993). The items for each dimensions of their scale are shown in Table 19.  
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Table 19: Measurement market orientation 
Dimension Item
Market 
intelligence 
generation 
1. In this business unit we meet with customers at least once a year to find out 
what products/services they will need in the future. (v48)
2. In this business unit, we do a lot of in-house market research. (v50)
3. We poll end-users at least once a year to assess the quality of our 
products/services. (v49)
4. We often talk with or survey those who can influence our end-users’ purchases 
(e.g. retailers or distributors) (v52)
5. In this business unit, intelligence in our competitors is generated independently 
by several departments. (v53)
6. We periodically review the likely effects of changes in our business environment 
(e.g. regulations) on customers. (v51)
Market 
intelligence 
dissemination 
1. We have interdepartmental meetings at least once a quarter to discuss market 
trends and developments. (v54)
2. Marketing personnel in our business unit spend time discussing customers’ 
future needs with other functional departments. (v57)
3. Our business unit periodically circulates documents (e.g. reports, newsletters) 
that provide information on our customers. (v55)
4. When something important happens to a major customer or market, the whole 
business unit knows about it in a short time. (v58)
5. Data on customer satisfaction are disseminated at all levels in this business unit 
on a regular basis. (v56)
Responsiveness 
to market 
intelligence 
1. It takes us forever to decide how to respond to competitor price changes. 
(Reversed) (v62)
2. For various reasons, we tend to ignore changes in our customers’ 
product/service needs. (Reversed) (v61)
3. We periodically review our product/service development efforts to ensure that 
they are in line with what customers want. (v88)
4. If a major competitor were to launch an intensive campaign targeted at our 
customers, we would implement an immediate response. (V63)
5. Customer complaints fall on deaf ears in this business unit. (Reversed) (v60)
6. Even if we came up with a great marketing plan, we probably would not be able 
to implement it in a timely fashion. (Reversed) (v59)
Reference:
Jaworski & Kohli (1993); Kohli & Jaworski (1990); Morgan, Vorhies & Mason 
(2009)
Market Orientation
 
Marketing capabilities — MCs are defined as integrative processes through which the 
collective knowledge, skills, and resources of the firm are applied to the market-related needs of the 
business. The business can thus add value to its goods and services and meet competitive demands 
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(Crook, Ketchen Jr, Combs, & Todd, 2008, Harmancioglu, Droge, & Calantone, 2009). Six distinct 
MCs are measured in this study (pricing, product, marketing communication, selling, marketing 
planning, and marketing implementation (Morgan, Vorhies, & Mason, 2009). Each is a sub-
dimension of the higher-order construct, MC (Vorhies & Morgan, 2005). The items used in the 
questionnaire are shown in Table 20. 
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Table 20: Measurement marketing capabilities 
Dimension Item
Pricing 
capabilities
"The ability to extract the 
optimal revenue from the 
firm's customers (Vorhies 
& Morgan, 2005, p.82)"
1. Using pricing skills and systems to respond quickly to 
market changes. (v64)
2. Knowledge of competitors’ pricing tactics. (v65)
3. Doing an effective job of pricing products/services. (v66)
4. Monitoring competitors’ prices and price changes. (v67)
Product 
capabilities
"The process by which 
firms develop and manage 
product and service 
offerings (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p.82)"
1. Ability to develop new products/services. (v68)
2. Developing new products/services to exploit R&D 
investment. (v69)
3. Successfully launching new products/services. (v70)
4. Ensuring that product/service development efforts are 
responsive to customer needs. (v71)
Marketing 
communication 
capabilities
"The firm's ability to 
manage customer value 
perceptions (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Developing and executing advertising programs. (v72)
2. Advertising management and creative skills. (v73)
3. Brand image management skills and processes. (v74)
Selling 
capabilities
"The process by which the 
firm acquires customer 
orders (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Giving salespeople the training they need to be effective. 
(v75)
2. Sales management planning and control systems. (v76)
3. Selling skills of salespeople. (V77)
4. Sales management skills. (v78)
5. Providing effective sales support to the salesforce. (v79)
Marketing 
planning 
capabilities
"The firm's ability to 
conceive marketing 
strategies that iptimize the 
match between the firm's 
resources and its 
marketplace (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Marketing planning skills. (v80)
2. Ability to effectively segment and target market. (v81)
3. Developing creative marketing strategies. (v82)
4. Thoroughness of marketing planning processes. (V83)
Marketing 
implementation 
capabilities
"The process by which 
intended marketing 
strategy is transformed 
into realized resource 
deployments (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Allocating marketing resources effectively. (v84)
2. Organizing to deliver marketing programs effectively. 
(v85)
3. Translating marketing strategies into action. (v86)
4. Executing marketing strategies quickly. (v87)
Reference:
Morgan, Zhou, Vorhies & Katsikeas (2003), Vorhies & Morgan (2005), Morgan, 
Vorhies & Mason (2009)
Marketing capabilities
 
Performance — refers to how the channel system contributes to firm performance (Kabadayi, 2011, 
Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007) through overall sales, profit, growth and overall channel 
performance (Kumar, Stern, & Achrol, 1992) (see Table 21). 
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Table 21: Measurement performance 
Item
Sales
Channel 
contribution 
to sales 
1. Over the past three years, your channel system has generated high sales 
revenues. (v6)
2. Over the past three years, your channel system has enabled the 
company to achieve high level of market penetration. (v1)
3. Over the past three years, your channel system has met the sales target 
you had set for it. (v2)
Profit
Channel 
contribution 
to profit 
1. Your company’s cost of servicing your channel system is 
unreasonable.(Reversed) (v7rev)
2. The channel system’s demands for support have resulted in inadequate 
profits for your company. (Reversed) (v8rev)
3. Your company has made inadequate profits from your channel system. 
(Reversed). (v5)
Growth
Channel 
contribution 
to growth 
1. In the past three years, your current channel system has contributed 
enormously to your company’s revenue growth. (v3)
2. In the past three years, your current channel system has been very 
successful in expanding your business. (v4)
Global 
channel
Global 
channel 
performance 
1. Your channel system leaves a lot to be desired from an overall 
performance standpoint. (Reversed) (v9rev)
2. Overall, the results of your relationship with your channel have 
exceeded your expectations. (v10)
3. Taking all the different factors into account, your channel’s 
performance has been..? (v11)
Reference:
Performance
Kumar, Stern & Achrol (1992), Kabadayi, Eyuboglu & Thomas (2007)
Dimension
 
Export channels — for this dependent variable, respondents were asked to identify which export 
channels they use for their most important product in their most valuable export country. They 
could choose from a list of eight different export channels derived from both the literature and the 
manager pre-study interviews. While respondents could also choose from other channels that were 
not listed, only three respondents took this option. These export channels were then categorised into 
four: single indirect (SI), multiple indirect (MI), dual (DU) or direct-only (D-O). Respondents could 
choose one or more channels from the following list: 
 
1. We sell directly from headquarter to the end-user. 
2. We sell via a sales subsidiary to the end-user. 
3. We sell via distributors in this export country. 
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Description
1 Single indirect channel (SI)
Includes one type of indirect export channel, for example 
distributor.
2 Multiple indirect channels (MI)
Includes two or more indirect export channels, for example 
distributor and sales agents.
3 Dual channels (DU)
Concurrently employs one or more direct channels and one or 
more indirect channels. For example exporting directly from 
home by using own employees and using a distributor.
4 Direct-only (D-O)
Direct exporting from the home market by using own employees 
and/or using a sales subsidiary.
Channel category
4. We use sales agents to sell to end-users. 
5. We use sales agents to sell to distributors. 
6. We use sales agents to sell to secondary producers. 
7. We sell directly to secondary producers in this export country. 
8. We sell to competitors in this export country. 
9. Other sales channels that are not listed are: _______________ 
The channel types 1 and 2 are direct sales channels as the firm uses company employees to directly 
sell to end-users. All other channels (3-8) are indirect channels as the firm uses some form of 
middle-men to sell its products to end-users. Depending on the combination of these channel types 
of each sample firm, the channel system of each sample firm was categorised into one of four 
categories which are illustrated in Table 22 below (see also Introduction, p.7ff.):  
 
Table 22 Channel categories 
 
If a firm used just one of the indirect channels (channel 3 to 8), it fell within the first category, SI 
channel. If a firms used two or more indirect channels, it was put in category 2, MI channels. If a 
firm used one or both of the direct channels (1 and 2) in addition to one or more indirect channels (3 
to 8), it fell within the third category, DU channels. The fourth category was for firms that used one 
or both of the direct channels (1 and/or 2).  
 Control variables — based on previous export channel literature (He, Brouthers, & 
Filatotchev, 2013), the following controls were included: market experience measured by the 
number of years firms were already exporting to their most important export country, company age 
measured in years for which a company has operated, firms size was measured by the number of 
employees. Firm size was then categorised into small, medium and large firms. International 
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experience was measured by the number of export countries to which a firm exports according to 
five categories: 10 or fewer, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, and over 40 export countries.  
4.6 Methods of analysis 
4.6.1 The multinomial logistic regression model: Channel choice 
The multinomial logit model (MNLM) has become increasingly popular within the strategy 
literature because it allows strategic management choices with multiple outcomes and therefore 
allows to go beyond assessing binary strategic choices (Wulff, 2015). The literature within the field 
of strategic entry mode choice and channel choice especially adopts this approach (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). 
 Researchers within the entry mode and channel choice literature commonly distinguish 
between different entry modes and export channels (e.g., greenfield, acquisition, joint ventures, the 
use of sales agents, distributors, or direct export). However, theorising and interpreting research 
have often been limited in experiential studies and reduced to a binary decision framework when 
using binary logistic regression. In the past, some mode and channel choices were either eliminated 
or aggregated for ease of modeling that choice. However, this approach has limited theorisation 
within strategy research. As Martin (2013) emphasises, the MNLM allows researchers to address 
this limitation so they can compare strategic decisions among multiple mode choices. Thus, 
application of the multinomial logit extends and refines current research beyond binary choice 
categories. 
 However, current research using this model raises systematic issues in its application and 
interpretation (Wulff, 2015). Researchers have overlooked the specific characteristics of this model 
that might have led previous research findings to be invalidly interpreted (Wulff, 2015). For 
example, Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) and Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) limit the analysis of their 
results to a coefficient interpretation, creating uncertainty about their findings. Therefore, this thesis 
aims to extend current research both to refining the strategic choice of export channels and applying 
the MNLM. Applying a more advanced analytical approach might allow the relationships that have 
been overlooked in previous research to be ascertained. 
 The multinomial logistic regression method estimates the effect of independent variables on 
the probability (differential odds) that one of the alternatives is chosen. It models relationships 
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between a polytomous dependent variable and multiple independent variables and match the binary 
logistic regression in the case when the dependent variable is dichotomous. Logistic regression is a 
special case of multinomial logit regression (Orme & Combs-Orme, 2009).  
 A multinomial logit regression entails a set of binary logistic regressions that are estimated 
simultaneously, as each category of the dependent variable is compared with the designated base 
category. In this thesis, each channel category is compared with the base category single indirect 
channel, which is equivalent to the market mode in TCE. For the dependent variable channel 
choice, I identify four categories of export channel choice: single indirect (SI), multiple indirect 
(MI), dual channels (DU) and a direct-only (D-O) channel. I define the SI export channel as the 
base category, the default choice in the transaction cost framework, and thus assign it a value of 0. 
The MI, DU and DO categories will be assigned the values of 1, 2 and 3 respectively. MNML does 
not assume a natural ordering of the outcome variables so that the base category of the outcome 
variable can be used for comparison with the remaining categories (Malhotra, 1984). In addition, 
the marginal effects of the regression analysis can be assessed because they allow the probability 
that any of the four alternatives is chosen over the other three alternatives to be compared. The 
software, StataIC 14, is used for data analysis. 
4.6.2 The binary logistic regression model: Performance   
To test the channel performance hypotheses, I adopt one of the methods used by researchers to 
avoid endogeneity in strategic choice research (Brettel, Engelen, & Müller, 2010). Shaver (1998) 
notes that, as firms choose entry modes based on their attributes and industry conditions, their 
choice is therefore endogenous and self-selected. As firms self-select strategies (such as export 
channel choice) (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013), it is not possible to compare strategy 
performance in an experimental setting where firms are randomly assigned strategies. 
 While firms choose strategies to maximise their anticipated profit, it is not feasible to argue 
that one strategy unconditionally results in higher performance (Shaver, 1998). For example, some 
firms choose to enter a market via acquisition and some via greenfield investments; this means 
firms expect that acquisition strategies have performance advantages under certain conditions, 
whereas greenfield strategies have performance advantages under other conditions (Shaver, 1998). 
This self-selection is possible under two conditions: (1) Firms choose their strategies randomly, or 
(2) All factors that influence performance can be incorporated into the empirical model; that is, 
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there are no unobservable effects on performance (Shaver, 1998). As these two conditions do not 
hold, one needs to account for self-selection. To cover this in research into firms’ strategy as it 
relates to self-selection, Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) and Shaver (1998) suggest a two-step 
technique that distinguishes firms that adhere to TCE predictions (‘the fit group”) and those who 
deviate from TCE’s predictions (“the non-fit group”). These researchers’ approach underlies the 
procedure of my thesis. The difference is that because my research categorises four channels, there 
exists a ‘range of fit’ (misalignment) from 1 to 4 instead of a distinction between ‘fit’ and ‘non-fit’. 
 Misalignment ranges from 1 to 4. Therefore, each measure was divided into four equal 
categories based on the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, representing a level of misalignment from 1 to 
4. For example, for firms with a high level of AS (level 4), TCE suggests employing a D-O channel 
(channel category 4). When a firm with a level 4 of AS employs a D-O channel (channel category 
4), the level of misalignment is 1. The specific calculation of each level is outlined in the next 
chapter.  
4.7 Summary 
This chapter discussed the research method employed to answer the research question proposed in 
this study. In the next chapter, the results of the data analysis are presented. To perform the 
statistical analysis, I used StataIC 14, SPSS Statistics 13 and AMOS 23. 
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Chapter 5: Data analysis and results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the sample characteristics of the respondents and provides information about 
missing data. The key constructs of my research are assessed using confirmatory factor analysis. 
Further, I outline how the multinomial and logistic regression analyses are presented, which 
anticipate findings presented in the next chapter.  
5.1.1 Data screening 
The suitability of the data for factor analysis and multinomial regression were assessed by checking 
univariate and multivariate normality, missing data, and the continual distribution of the items.  
 A screening of histograms, Q-Q plots, and box plots indicates that the majority of the data is 
approximately normally distributed. Among the 88 original variables were five with problematic 
skewness and kurtosis values. Of those, only one was included in the final measurement scales 
(v60, skewness: -1.29, kurtosis: 1.73). No data transformation was carried out as one variable was 
not considered problematic. It is imperative to assess the amount and pattern of missing data as this 
can distort multivariate analysis results (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). The extent of missing data 
was assessed by analysing the number of cases containing missing data (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). Based on this, three cases were removed from the initial sample of 257 
cases because of an excessive amount of missing data (61% and over). After removing these three 
cases, a sample size of 254 remained. This removal can be justified as the three comprise only those 
cases with the highest amount of missing data. Nevertheless, the resulting subjects-to-variables ratio 
(STV) for each construct is still sufficiently high. These STVs are: performance (42:1), asset 
specificity (AS) (127:1), behavioural uncertainty (BU) (127:1), volatility (127:1), diversity (85:1), 
market orientation (MO) (36:1) and marketing capabilities (MCs) (16:1). Their ratios are 
sufficiently high for factor analysis as they can be similarly compared to the median ratio reported 
in the review by Henson and Roberts (2006) of 11:1 (i.e., marginal to sufficient). 
5.1.2 Missing value analysis 
Overall, there is little missing data because 66 per cent of cases have no missing data and no 
variable has more than 5 per cent missing data (except for the control market experience with 7.5 
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per cent missing data). The degree of randomness was assessed next by conducting a missing value 
analysis for each variable within which the missing data for all variables were found to be missing 
completely at random. Therefore, missing values were replaced with a mean calculated based on the 
valid data using mean replacement in SPSS. After visually inspecting histograms, Normal Q-Q 
Plots, Box Plots and z-values, normal distribution was evident and no univariate or multivariate 
outliers were detected. An assessment of scatterplots and residual plots revealed no violation of 
linearity, homoscedasticity and the independence of error variances.  
 Potential multicollinearity was assessed by inspecting variance inflation factors (VIF) and 
bivariate correlations among the independent variables. None of the VIFs was above 10, which is 
the general rule of thumb for detecting severe multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2013, Kline, 2011). However, some of the VIFs were above 5, thus indicating a potential 
multicollinearity problem (Keith, 2014). An inspection of the bivariate correlations of the individual 
variables shows that the correlation among some items was between 0.80 and 0.90.  
5.1.3 Preliminary data analysis: Sample characteristics 
A final sample of 254 cases was analysed after eliminating three cases with missing values. The 
channel categories in the sample are distributed as follows (see Table 23): The majority of firms 
(127 firms) uses a combination of a direct and one or more indirect channels (50 per cent). Further, 
59 firms use direct exporting and/or have a foreign sales subsidiary, whereas 40 firms use a single 
indirect (SI) export channel and 28 firms use multiple indirect (MI) export channels.  
Table 23: Sample export channel category frequencies 
Frequency Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Single indirect 40 15.7 15.7
Multiple 
indirect
28 11.0 26.8
Dual 127 50.0 76.8
Direct only 59 23.2 100.0
254 100
Valid
Total  
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 Firm age — the firm age is illustrated in Table 24 below. It varies from 1 to 317 years, 
whereas 55 per cent are fewer than 60 years old while the majority (52 per cent) are between 20 and 
70 years old. 
Table 24: Age distribution of sample 
Age of business n %  %
< 5 years 6 2% 2%
5 to less than 10 years 4 2% 4%
10 to less than 20 years 17 7% 11%
20 to less than 30 years 28 12% 23%
30 to less than 40 years 27 11% 34%
40 to less than 50 years 29 12% 46%
50 to less than 60 years 21 9% 55%
60 to less than 70 years 20 8% 63%
70 to less than 80 years 15 6% 69%
80 to less than 90 years 15 6% 75%
90 to less than 100 years 12 5% 80%
100 to less than 110 years 16 7% 87%
110 to less than 120 years 5 2% 89%
120 to less than 130 years 5 2% 91%
130 to less than 140 years 3 1% 92%
140 to less than 150 years 5 2% 94%
Over 150 years 14 6%
Totals 242 100% 100%  
Firm size — as can be seen in Figure 3 below, 26 per cent of the firms have fewer than 50 full-time 
employees and 19 per cent have over 1,000 full-time employees, whereas only 9 per cent of the 
firms have between 501 and 1,000 employees. Thus, the sample contains roughly an equal amount 
of small firms (<50), medium-sized firms (51–1,000) and large firms (>1,000). 
 
Figure 3: Number of full-time employees 
The large majority of the firms (58 per cent) has an annual revenue of fewer than 50 Mio. EUR. On 
the other hand, 17 per cent have an annual revenue between 50 and 100 Mio. EUR, 13 per cent 
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between 50 and 1,000 Mio EUR, and 6 per cent have an annual revenue between 100-250 and 250-
500 Mio. EUR as depicted in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4: Revenue in Mio. € 
International Experience — most firms have a high level of internationalisation, with only 19 per 
cent exporting to fewer than 10 countries; most firms (33 per cent) export to over 41 countries, see 
Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5: Number of export countries 
 
5.2 Measurement model 
5.2.1 Validation of key constructs 
Before investigating the relationships of interest, each key construct was determined by using 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). To draw meaningful 
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conclusions from subsequent analyses, validating the measurement model is essential (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). After initially examining each factor using EFA, the 
dimensionality, reliability and validity of the constructs were based on the CFA results. CFA can be 
applied because established scales are used to measure each construct, providing knowledge about 
the underlying factor structure (Byrne, 2013). Hence, the dimensionality and factor structure of each 
construct is hypothesised based on the literature and assessed using sample data and model 
statistics. The results of each CFA are reported in the following sub-sections. 
5.3 CFA: Transaction cost variables 
For each transaction cost construct, I initially conducted individual EFAs. For AS, I extracted a 
single factor and retained four out of five items.2 For BU, I removed four out of six items owing to 
their low communalities.3 For volatility, I extract two factors and removed one item also because of 
low communalities.4 Based on the literature, I hypothesised volatility as a unidimensional construct 
although, at this stage in the EFA, I retained the two extracted factors for further EFA. For 
diversity, I removed one out of four items because of low communalities.5 Then, I conducted an 
EFA with the remaining items from which I extracted five factors although the two volatility items 
that had previously formed a separate construct had crossloadings and therefore were removed.6 In 
the following EFA, I removed one AS item from the model because it had crossloadings.7 I then 
made further modifications to improve model fit to the conceptual model (see Figure 6). The EFA 
with the remaining items extracted four factors with a simple factor structure and no crossloadings.  
                                                 
2 V12 was removed because of skewed and kurtotic values as well as low communalities.  
3 V18rev: .118, v22: .037, v17rev: .118, v21rev: .18. 
4 V30rev: .137.  
5 V26rev: .096. 
6 V31rev, 32rev. 
7 V16. 
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Figure 6: Conceptual model transaction cost variables 
Model fit — the chi-square value is, at 0.07 > 0.05, not statistically significant, indicating good 
model fit. Moreover, RMSEA indicates a good fit (i.e., 0.04 < 0.05), as does the SRMR (0.044 < 
0.09) and normed chi-square value of 1.50 < 3, GFI 0.973 > 0.95, and TLI, IFI and NFI above 0.90 
(Hu & Bentler, 1998). 
 As depicted in Table 25, the factor loadings for AS, BU and volatility exceed a value of 0.50 
and are statistically significant. Squared multiple correlations are larger or close to 0.50 and 
Cronbach’s alpha values exceed 0.70 for these three constructs, signifying adequate reliability. The 
factor loadings for diversity are below 0.50 for two items and one item is not statistically 
significant. However, this construct was retained as it has been explored only tentatively in the 
literature (e.g. Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990).  
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Table 25: CFA results TCE variables 
Item
Asset 
Specificity
SE**
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
SE** Volatility SE** Diversity SE**
v14a .69 .00
v15 .91 .29
v19a .75 .00
v20 .92 .18
v27a .67 .00
v29 .82 .26
v23a .37 .00
v24 .77 1.0b
v25 .41 .29
Coefficient alpha .77 .82 .71 .53
Highest item SMC .82 .85 .67 .60
Lowest item SMC .47 .57 .45 .14
Standardised Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was 
fixed to the value of 1.0 during the estimation process, b Significant at p<0.05.
Model Fit: χ2  = 31.48 df(p)=21 (.07), χ2/df=1.50, RMSEA=.04 [0.00;0.07] , SRMR=.044, GFI=.973, 
AGFI=.943, NFI=.940, CFI=.979, TLI=.963, IFI=.979
 
Discriminant validity (see Table 26) is established for all four constructs based on the -difference 
test (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Construct reliability (see Table 27) is established for AS, BU and 
volatility based on a composite reliability (CR) values close to or above 0.80 and maximal 
reliability H values above 0.70 for all three constructs. The construct, diversity, exhibits a poor 
composite reliability value, although maximal reliability is close to 0.70 and average variance 
extracted is above 0.50. Table 28 shows the correlation of constructs and Table 29 the correlation 
matrix. Based on these results, all three constructs were deemed acceptable for further analysis.  
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Table 26: TCE construct discriminant validity 
Constructs Free Model Constrained Model Comparison of Models
χ2(df) χ2(df) ∆χ2(df)
Asset Specificity/Behavioural Uncertainty 31.48 (21) 48.95 (22) 17.47 (1)**
Asset Specificity/Volatility 31.48 (21) 63.89 (22) 32.41 (1)**
Asset Specificity/Diversity 31.48 (21) 67.30 (22) 35.82 (1)**
Behavioural Uncertainty/Volatility 31.48 (21) 38.20 (22) 6.72 (1) **
Behavioural Uncertainty/Diversity 31.48 (21) 65.61 (22) 34.13 (1)**
Volatility/Diversity 31.48 (21) 90.12 (22) 58.64 (1)**
**Significance at p<0.01  
Table 27: Construct reliability 
Factor CR AVE H
Asset Specificity 0.77 0.78 0.85
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
0.83 0.83 0.87
Volatility 0.71 0.72 0.74
Diversity 0.52 0.53 0.65
CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance 
Extracted, H =Maximal reliability  
 
Table 28: Correlation of constructs 
Asset 
Specificity
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
Volatility Diversity
Asset 
Specificity
(.88)
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
.43 (.91)
Volatility .24 .42 (.85)
Diversity .26 .08 .04 (.73)
Figures in brackets show the AVE square root values
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Table 29: Correlation matrix — TCE Variables 
v14 v15 v19 v20 v23 v24 v25 v27 v29
v14 1
v15 .622
** 1
v19 .111 .195** 1
v20 .145* .197** .694** 1
v23 .005 .007 .044 .007 1
v24 .219
**
.209
** .007 .049 .277** 1
v25 -.042 .035 .078 .095 .232** .305
** 1
v27 .035 .076 .250** .285** -.072 -.042 .054 1
v29 .133
*
.223
**
.235
**
.314
** -.044 .077 -.011 .549** 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 
 
5.4 CFA: Resource-based variables 
5.4.1 Market orientation (MO) 
Market orientation (MO) was hypothesised as a second-order, three-dimensional construct (e.g. 
Long & Freese, 2006, Luo, Griffith, Liu, & Shi, 2004, Malhotra, 2008). To determine the factor 
structure, I firstly assessed individual EFA and CFA for each construct. I performed three individual 
EFAs and CFAs for the dimensions: market intelligence generation, market intelligence 
dissemination and responsiveness to market intelligence (see Appendix B.1).  
 
Second-order CFA market orientation — After assessing that each item loads on their designated 
factor, I conducted EFA and CFA with all items from the individual factor analyses. During the 
EFA, three factors were extracted, each of which loads on their designated factor, except one that is 
deleted because of crossloadings8 (Brown, 2015). Then, I conducted the CFA (see the conceptual 
model in Figure 7). 
                                                 
8 V88 loads on two factors. 
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Figure 7: Conceptual model MO 
Assessment of model fit — The chi-square value was statistically significant at p<0.001 (see Table 
30). The model exhibits satisfactory fit to the data as indicated by the values of a range of fit 
evaluation criteria. The normed chi-square value shows good model fit at 2.96 < 3 (Hu & Bentler, 
1998). The RMSEA of 0.09 suggests a mediocre model fit classification in that it falls in the range 
of 0.05 to 0.10 (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The SRMR indicates good model fit with a value of 0.06, 
being below the cut-off criteria of 0.09 (Hu & Bentler, 1998). GFI and AGFI compare the ability of 
a model to reproduce the variance-covariance matrix to the ability of no model at all. The AGFI 
adjusts the GFI for the number of degrees of freedom expended in estimating the model parameters. 
A value of 1.0 would indicate a perfect model fit, whereby most researchers expect values to be 
greater than 0.90 or 0.95 for correctly specified models (Grimm & Yarnold, 2000). The GFI value 
of 0.97 indicates a good fit; the incremental fit indices (TLI, IFI, CFI) exceed the heuristic value of 
0.90, thereby supporting the model (Hu & Bentler, 1998, Martínez-López, 2013). 
 After establishing that the hypothesised model fits the data reasonably well, I estimate the 
parameters of the measurement model next (see Table 30), along with their associated bootstrap 
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standard errors. In all cases, the parameter estimates fell outside the range of ±2 bootstrap standard 
errors which indicates a significant non-zero estimate.  
Table 30: CFA results MO 
Item
Market 
Intelligence 
Generation
SE**
Market 
Intelligence 
Dissemination
SE**
Responsiveness 
to Market 
Intelligence
SE**
v50a .78 .00
v53 .61 .12
v55a .70 .00
v56 .75 .14
v59a .56 .00
v60 .72 .17
v61 .71 .18
Coefficient alpha .65 .69 .68
Highest item SMC .61 .56 .51
Lowest item SMC .37 .50 .32
Model Fit: χ2  = 32.56 df(p)=11 (.00), χ2/df=2.96, RMSEA=.09 [0.05;0.12] , SRMR=.064, 
GFI=.965, AGFI=.910, NFI=.923, CFI=.946, TLI=.897, IFI=.948
Standardised Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading 
was fixed to the value of 1.0 during the estimation process.
 
 
Assessment of construct validity — After assessing the results of the CFA, each latent construct is 
evaluated for convergent and discriminant validity.  
 Convergent validity is assessed by inspecting the factor loadings and reliability of each 
construct. All factor loadings are statistically significant at the p<0.05 level and are practically 
significant with values above 0.5, indicating that each factor explains the majority of the variance of 
each item. Reliability is assessed using the coefficient alpha and the square multiple correlations 
(SMC) of each item. All items except two suggest item reliability as they were larger than 0.50. 
However, the coefficient alpha for each construct was close to 0.70, indicating adequate reliability. 
Discriminant validity measures the degree to which different constructs are distinct and is assessed 
by comparing the free and constrained model for each pair of constructs (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988). First, a free model was estimated for the construct pairs MI generation/MI dissemination, MI 
generation/responsiveness and MI dissemination/responsiveness and compared with the respective 
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constrained model by setting the correlation parameter to 1.0. By comparing the -values of the 
constrained model with the free model, discriminant validity between the constructs is assessed. As 
the free model fits significantly better than the constrained model (  ≥ ± 6.63 for p ≤ 0.01 or ± 
3.84 for p ≤ 0.05) for the construct pairs, MI generation/responsiveness and MI dissemination/ 
responsiveness, it can be concluded that each construct is unique in that it captures information that 
the other constructs cannot (see Table 31) (Hair, Money, Samouel, & Page, 2007). As the construct 
pair MI generation/MI dissemination does not similarly indicate discriminant validity, an alternative 
technique based on Fornell and Larcker (1981) is used (see Table 32). This technique is more 
stringent (see also Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006). Hereby, the AVE for each 
construct needs to be larger than the squared correlation between them and any other construct. As 
AVE (MI generation): 0.66 > 0.682. = 0.46 and AVE (MI dissemination): 0.69 > 0.46, discriminant 
validity of the constructs is established.9 Thus, construct validity was established by assessing 
convergent and discriminant validity.  
Table 31: Discriminant validity market orientation 
Constructs Free Model Constrained Model Comparison of Models
χ2(df) χ2(df) ∆χ2(df)
MI Generation/MI Dissemination .44 (1) 1.59 (2) 1.12a
MI Generation/Responsiveness 19.44 (4) 30.64 (5) 11.20 (1)**
MI Dissemination/Responsiveness 20.95 (4) 32.06 (5) 11.11 (1)**
**Significance at p<0.01; *Significance at p<0.05; a = Not significant  
  
Table 32: MO — correlations of latent constructs 
MI Generation MI Dissemination Responsiveness
MI Generation (.81)
MI Dissemination .68 (.83)
Responsiveness .38 .51 (.84)
Figures in brackets show the AVE square root values  
Construct reliability: CR is below the cut-off value of 0.80 for MI generation and MI dissemination 
(see Table 33), however maximal reliability H is close to the cut-off value of 0.70 for both 
constructs. In addition, all three dimensions exceed the suggested level of 0.50 for variance 
                                                 
9 Or  
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extracted. Thus, all the specified indicators sufficiently specify the constructs as indicated by the 
reliability H and variance-extracted estimates. The correlation matrix is illustrated in Table 34.  
Table 33: MO — construct reliability 
Factor CR AVE H
MI Generation 0.56 0.66 0.68
MI Dissemination 0.67 0.69 0.69
Responsiveness 0.80 0.70 0.72
CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance 
Extracted, H =Maximal reliability  
 
Table 34: MO — correlation matrix 
v50 v53 v55 v56 v59 v60 v61
v50 1
v53 .477** 1
v55
.383** .327** 1
v56 .389
**
.294
**
.526
** 1
v59 .332** .264** .304** .391** 1
v60 .164** .073 .195** .279** .361** 1
v61 .186** .137* .201** .209** .369** .550** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
 
Based on the literature, it was hypothesised that MO is a three-dimensional construct consisting of 
the underlying dimensions market intelligence generation, dissemination and responsiveness to 
market intelligence. As demonstrated by the results of the reliability and validity analysis it can be 
concluded that MO consists of three distinct dimensions.  
5.4.2 Marketing capabilities (MCs) 
EFA and CFA were first conducted for each dimension of the MCs construct which was 
hypothesised as a second-order six-dimensional construct based on previous literature (e.g. 
Majumdar & Ramaswamy, 1995). Six individual EFAs and CFAs for the dimensions product, 
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pricing, selling, communication, marketing planning and marketing implementation were 
performed. For each dimension, factor loadings were statistically significant and reliability was 
indicated by the Cronbach alpha values being above 0.70 for each dimension, each of which had a 
poor RMSEA value, but acceptable SRMR, GFI and CFI fit indices. Because the exception was the 
dimension, marketing planning, it was removed from the second-order factor later in the analysis. 
The output for each dimension is shown in Appendix B.1. 
Second-order CFA marketing capabilities — After determining that each construct was extracted 
individually as a single factor, I conducted EFA and CFA with all items at once. During EFA, four 
dimensions were extracted: pricing, product, selling and marketing implementation. While the 
dimensions, communication and marketing planning, were not extracted, the corresponding items 
did not load on the same factor and were therefore removed. After deleting them, four dimensions 
were extracted leaving the factor solution with a simple structure, showing relatively high structure 
coefficients for each variable on one factor and relatively small values for the remaining (see Figure 
8 & Table 35).  
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Figure 8: Marketing capabilities — conceptual model 
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Table 35: CFA results — MCs 
Item
Product 
Capabilities
SE**
Pricing 
Capabilities
SE**
Selling 
Capabilities
SE**
Marketing 
Implementation
SE**
v68a .86 .00
v69 .81 .06
v70 .74 .06
v71 .71 .06
v65a .81 .00
v66 .77 .08
v67 .84 .08
v75a .75 .00
v76 .79 .07
v77 .87 .08
v78 .89 .08
v79 .83 .08
v84a .88 .00
v85 .92 .05
v86 .89 .05
v87 .80 .06
Coefficient alpha .86 .85 .91 .93
Highest item SMC .74 .71 .79 .85
Lowest item SMC .51 .59 .50 .64
Standardised Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was fixed to the value of 
1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 267.87 df(p)=100 (.00), χ2/df=2.68, RMSEA=.08 [0.07;0.09] , SRMR=.0533, GFI=.886, AGFI=.837, 
NFI=.912, CFI=.943, TLI=.932, IFI=.943
 
Convergent validity — all factor loadings are statistically significant at p<0.05 and all loadings 
exceed a value of 0.50, as do the squared multiple correlations, suggesting item reliability and 
practical significance.  
 Discriminant validity was assessed for the construct pairs product/pricing, selling/pricing 
and implementation/pricing based on the -difference test (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). As the 
remaining construct pairs failed to pass this test, discriminant validity was assessed using Fornell 
and Larcker (1981). As the  - values for the constructs product, selling and implementation 
are larger than the correlations between these and remaining constructs, discriminant validity is 
established (see Table 37).  
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 Construct reliability (see Table 38) — CR for each dimension is close to, or above, the cut-
off value of 0.80, maximal reliability H is above the value of 0.70 for all dimensions, and average 
variance extracted is above 0.50 for all constructs, indicating adequate reliability.  
Table 36: Discriminant validity — MCs 
Constructs Free Model Constrained Model Comparison of Models
χ2(df) χ2(df) ∆χ2(df)
Product/Pricing 262.08 (98) 269.76 (99) 7.68 (1)*
Product/Selling 262.08 (98) 265.05 (99) 2.97 (1)a
Product/Implementation 262.08 (98) 262.63 (99) 0.55 (1)a
Selling/Pricing 262.08 (98) 268.31 (99) 6.23 (1)**
Selling/Implementation 262.08 (98) 264.58 (99) 2.50 (1)a
Implementation/Pricing 262.08 (98) 272.48 (99) 10.40 (1)*
**Significance at p<0.01 *Significance at p<0.05 a not significant  
 
Table 37: MCs — correlations of latent constructs 
Product 
Capabilities
Pricing 
Capabilities
Selling 
Capabilities
Marketing 
Implementation
Product 
Capabilities
(.93)
Pricing Capabilities .67 (.92)
Selling Capabilities .82 .65 (.95)
Marketing 
Implementation
.83 .66 .31 (.96)
Figures in brackets show the AVE square root values  
 
Table 38: MCs — construct reliability 
Factor CR AVE H
Product .77 .86 .88
Pricing .81 .85 .85
Selling .89 .91 .92
Implementation .88 .93 .94
CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance 
Extracted, H =Maximal reliability
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This second-order construct indicates acceptable model fit based on a range of fit indices. The 
RMSEA and GFI values suggest a mediocre model fit whereas the SRMR value of 0.0533 < 0.09 
indicates a good model fit. Similarly, a good model fit is suggested by a CFI of 0.943 > 0.90. Based 
on this assessment, this model was deemed acceptable for subsequent analysis. Table 39 shows the 
correlation matrix. 
Table 39: MCs — correlation matrix 
v65 v66 v67 v68 v69 v70 v71 v75 v76 v77 v78 v79 v84 v85 v86 v87
v65 1
v66 .603** 1
v67 .688** .646** 1
v68 .315
**
.368
**
.304
** 1
v69 .226
**
.351
**
.325
**
.715
** 1
v70 .303** .377** .319** .596** .645** 1
v71 .298
**
.338
**
.344
**
.667
**
.507
**
.483
** 1
v75 .426
**
.314
**
.348
**
.380
**
.400
**
.436
**
.318
** 1
v76 .488** .384** .426** .351** .346** .464** .326** .704** 1
v77 .494** .395** .454** .385** .308** .373** .410** .622** .665** 1
v78 .431
**
.352
**
.425
**
.355
**
.335
**
.384
**
.419
**
.614
**
.672
**
.810
** 1
v79 .401
**
.377
**
.462
**
.382
**
.390
**
.421
**
.471
**
.625
**
.612
**
.713
**
.763
** 1
v84 .365** .379** .294** .389** .431** .448** .371** .502** .470** .439** .446** .490** 1
v85 .348
**
.422
**
.361
**
.421
**
.474
**
.485
**
.379
**
.515
**
.538
**
.462
**
.479
**
.484
**
.831
** 1
v86 .361
**
.418
**
.340
**
.398
**
.430
**
.493
**
.359
**
.482
**
.486
**
.427
**
.423
**
.429
**
.757
**
.818
** 1
v87 .303** .378** .290** .411** .356** .511** .413** .455** .428** .409** .403** .455** .705** .704** .759** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
5.5 CFA — performance  
Performance was initially hypothesised as a four-dimensional construct containing the dimensions: 
contribution to sales, contribution to profit, contribution to growth, and contribution to global 
channel performance (Kabadayi, Eyuboglu, & Thomas, 2007, Kumar, Stern, & Achrol, 1992). In 
the EFA, only three factors were extracted. However, after removing items with low-
communalities10 two extracted factors, global channel performance and sales performance, 
remained and the items that did not belong to these factors were removed (see Figure 9). To assess 
the model in CFA, performance was correlated with the marketing capability dimension product, to 
allow model identification and assessment of model fit. The CFA results are depicted in Table 40. 
                                                 
10 V7rev: Communality: .054, v8rev: .235 
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Figure 9: Performance — conceptual model 
 Convergent validity — all factor loadings are statistically significant and exceed a value of 
0.50 suggesting practical significance. Moreover, squared multiple correlations are above or close 
to 0.50 and Cronbach’s alpha is above 0.70 for all dimensions, indicating adequate reliability. The 
model shows acceptable fit based on an RMSEA value of 0.07 < 0.08, SRMR of 0.036 < 0.09. The 
GFI of 0.95 indicates acceptable fit as well as the incremental fit indices (TLI, IFI, CFI), which 
exceed 0.90.  
 Discriminant validity (see Table 41) is established based on the - difference test 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The performance constructs indicate acceptable CR based on values 
above 0.80 and a maximal reliability H above 0.70. Moreover, average variance extracted is above 
0.50 for both dimensions (see Table 42). Based on these values, this model is deemed acceptable for 
further analysis. The correlations of latent constructs is shown in Table 43 and the correlation 
matrix in Table 44. The mean, median, standard deviation as well as the minimum and maximum 
values of the variables are shown in Table 45 and 46. 
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Table 40: CFA results — performance 
Item
Sales 
Performance
SE**
Global Channel 
Performance
SE** Product SE**
v1a .72 .00
v2 .88 .10
v6 .72 .10
v9reva .66 .00
v10 .71 .11
v11 .77 .10
v68a .81 .00
v69 .81 .06
v70 .71 .06
v71 .71 .06
Coefficient alpha .81 .75 .90
Highest item SMC .77 .59 .79
Lowest item SMC .51 .43 .50
Standardised Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading 
was fixed to the value of 1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 69.02 df(p)=32 (.00), χ2/df=2.16, RMSEA=.07 [0.05;0.09] , SRMR=.036, 
GFI=.949, AGFI=.912, NFI=.937, CFI=.965, TLI=.956, IFI=.965
 
 
Table 41: Performance — discriminant validity 
Constructs Free Model Constrained Model Comparison of Models
χ2(df) χ2(df) ∆χ2(df)
Sales 
Performance/Global 
69.02 (32) 74.40 (33) 5.38 (1)*
Performance/Product 69.02 (32) 101.97 (33) 32.95 (1)**
**Significance at p<0.01 *Significance at p<0.05 a not significant  
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Table 42: Performance — construct reliability 
Factor CR AVE H
Sales 
Performance
.86 .82 .85
Global Channel 
Performance
.84 .76 .77
CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance 
Extracted, H =Maximal reliability
 
 
Table 43: Correlations of latent constructs — performance 
Global Channel 
Performance
Sales 
Performance
Product
Global Channel 
Performance
(.91)
Sales 
Performance
.62 (.87)
Product .37 .12 (.93)
Figures in brackets show the AVE square root values  
 
Table 44: Correlation matrix — performance 
v1 v2 v6 v9rev v10 v11 v68 v69 v70 v71
v1 1
v2 .633
** 1
v6 .511** .632** 1
v9rev .326** .278** .256** 1
v10 .249** .389** .313** .506** 1
v11 .365
**
.448
**
.408
**
.506
**
.529
** 1
v68 .138* .093 .159* .183** .252** .259** 1
v69 .062 .022 .062 .200** .205** .185** .715** 1
v70 .075 .044 .065 .269** .219** .183** .596** .645** 1
v71 .016 .074 .034 .124
*
.241
**
.218
**
.667
**
.507
**
.483
** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 45: Predictor variables 
Asset 
Specificity
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
Volatility Diversity
Market 
Orientation
Marketing 
Capabilities
Mean 5.16 3.91 3.47 4.27 4.62 4.65
Median 5.00 4.00 3.50 4.33 4.61 4.63
Standard Deviation 1.27 1.58 1.26 1.22 1.06 0.95
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1.83 1.35
Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 7  
 
Table 46: Control and outcome variables 
Market 
Experience
Firm Age
International 
Experience
Firm Size Performance
Mean 23.56 65.38 2.75 2.16 4.59
Median 19 55.00 3.00 2.00 4.67
Standard Deviation 19.22 46.38 1.089 0.82 1.02
Minimum 0 1 1 1 1.33
Maximum 111 317 4 3 7
Note: Market Experience and Firm Age in years. International Experience categorised in 4 categories: 1: 
Exporting to ≤ 10 countries, 2: ≤ 20, 3: ≤ 40, 4: > 40. Firm Size: Small (1) (≤ 250 employees), Medium (2) (≤ 
500), Large (3) (> 500). Performance: Likert-scale 1 to 7.
 
 
5.6 Data analysis 
When interpreting results from the multinomial logit model (MNLM), specific care must be taken 
that differs from using binary logistic regression models (Wulff, 2015). One reason is that an 
MNLM is intrinsically nonlinear, meaning that the same types of output measures cannot be used as 
with binary logistic models or ordinary least square regression models (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). 
This is because in these types of models, the marginal effect (i.e., the effect of a unit change in the 
predictor variable on the dependent variable) is not equal to the predictor’s coefficient (Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2009). Instead, this effect depends on all the other variables across all choice alternatives 
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). Moreover, maximum likelihood estimation is used for this type of 
model. Because the same fit statistics (such as R2) cannot be used to assess model fit, several post-
estimation analyses are thus necessary. Therefore, I specifically use predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects to be able to detect the nature of the relationship between a predictor variable and 
the channel choice alternatives and, ultimately, test hypotheses about this type of relationship 
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). 
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First, I assess the overall model fit which, if satisfactory, can be used to assess the 
significance of individual predictors. I test the overall significance of predictors using a likelihood-
ratio (LR) test and discriminance of channel categories using a Wald test. Second, I test the sign and 
significance of coefficients by comparing two categories at once by rotating the base category. 
These results give a basic idea about the relationships in the model but, as the MNLM is non-linear, 
single coefficients are not sufficient to understand the full model. Therefore, the relationships 
between the predictors and channel choice alternatives are analysed using graphical representations 
of predicted probabilities and marginal effects. Moreover, the presentation of results is 
complemented with summary measures at low, mean and high values of each predictor. Finally, I 
test whether or not a performance effect exists depending on the theoretical channel choice 
recommendations by using a binary logistic regression analysis, which are discussed in the next 
chapter.  
5.6.1 Multinomial logit regression  
Model fit — Table 48 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables. In 
Table 48 none of the measures substantially overlaps. The largest correlation between the 
independent variables is 0.42 between firm size, firm age and international experience. Therefore, a 
possible threat of criterion contamination can be ruled out (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007).  
Three models were estimated via multinomial logistic regression (see Table 50). First, two 
base models, A and B, were assessed. This allowed me to compare the added contribution of the 
transaction cost and resource-based variables compared to a baseline model containing only control 
variables, and only control and transaction cost variables. Therefore, Model A includes only the 
control variables market experience, firm age, international experience, and firm size. The four 
channel categories (0 = single indirect [SI], 1 = multiple indirect [MI], 3 = dual [DU], 4 = direct-
only [D-O]) are the dependent variable. In Model B, the transaction cost variables AS, BU, 
volatility, and diversity were introduced. In Model C, the resource-based variables, MO and MCs, 
were included in the regression. I gained confidence in the regression specification because of the 
following model statistics. Assessing the MNLM significance and fit follows the same procedures 
as in binary logistic regression models (Long & Freese, 2014, Wulff, 2015). That is, model fit is 
assessed using (1) the significance test of the model log likelihood (change in -2LL), (2) measures 
analogous to R2 (e.g., the Nagelkerke R2), and (3) the classification matrices to measure model 
accuracy.  
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The initial log likelihood function is a statistical measure comparable to total sums of 
squares in linear regression. If this measure decreases, the independent variables have a relationship 
with the dependent variable which improves the ability to accurately predict the dependent variable. 
The significance test of the log likelihood value is analogous to the F-test for R2 or change in R2 for 
multiple regression. This tests whether the improvement in the model achieved by adding the 
independent variables is statistically significant. In this case, the log likelihood test is statistically 
significant at p < 0.01 for all three models, Model A, B and C. Moreover, the log likelihood value 
decreases from Model A (616.72) over Model B (584.55) to Model C (572.38), indicating that both, 
transaction cost and resource-based variables support this model. So Model B is superior to Model 
A and Model C is superior to Model A and B in its ability to accurately predict the dependent 
variable based on the decreasing log likelihood value (see Table 50). 
Furthermore, Nagelkerke R2 indicates the strength of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, analogous to R2 in multiple regression. Model C 
shows a substantially higher Nagelkerke R2 -value of 0.296 compared to Model A, which includes 
only the controls with a value of 0.125, and compared to Model B, which includes controls and 
transaction cost variables with a value of 0.258. This indicates a higher explanatory power of Model 
B over Model A and of Model C over Model A and B (see Table 50). 
Classification matrices are another measure for model accuracy. If the predicted and actual 
group (i.e., channel category) membership are the same, the prediction is correct for that case. 
Model A predicts 37.40 per cent, Model B 46.10 per cent and Model C predicts 49.88 per cent of 
the cases correctly. Indicating that Model B is superior to Model A and Model C is superior to 
Model A and B in predicting group (i.e. channel category) membership correctly. This value can be 
compared to a baseline random prediction. To calculate the percentage correctly by chance, one 
needs to sum the squared proportions of each group11:  (0.1572 +0.112 + 0.52 + 0.2322) = 0.3406. It 
is required that the accuracy of the estimated model be 25 per cent better than a prediction by 
chance. Therefore: 1.25 x 0.3406 = 0.4258 = 42.58 per cent. Model C meets this requirement with 
49.88 per cent > 42.58 per cent (an increase of 17 per cent correctly classified cases). In addition, 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is lower for Model C (638.38) than for Model B (638.54) 
and Model A (646.72) (see Table 50). This shows that the model fit has improved sufficiently to 
compensate for the additional complexity caused by adding more variables (Raftery, 1995). Further, 
when comparing the model’s prediction accuracy with guessing the most common category (i.e. 
                                                 
11 Group proportions for N=254 are: Single indirect: 15.70%, Multiple indirect: 11.00%, Dual: 50.00%, Direct only:      
23.20%. 
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Dual = 50 per cent), Model C is with 49.88 per cent just below guessing the most common 
category. In sum, these results indicate a good model fit. The classification rates were calculated on 
the same sample as used for estimating the model coefficients.  
Testing individual hypotheses — After assessing that the model fits reasonably well we can inspect 
hypotheses about individual predictors (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004). In MNLM, whether individual 
predictors have no effect can be tested by using a LR test12 (Long & Freese, 2014). This test 
assesses whether an individual variable has any effect on the dependent variable and is considered 
as an omnibus test for the effect of a variable (Long & Freese, 2014). Thereby, the significance of 
individual variables as a whole is tested by comparing the maximum likelihood value of the full 
model to that of the model without that variable. This type of hypothesis testing differs from binary 
models because this type includes more than one coefficient (J) for each variable. Hence, to be able 
to test the overall significance of a variable, the hypothesis needs to be tested to ensure that the J 
coefficients for that variable are jointly equal to zero (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004). The LR test 
statistic follows a chi-square distribution with J13 degrees of freedom (Wulff, 2015). Because the 
LR test in Model C is significant for five of the six predictors (see Table 47), the model with five of 
the predictors fits significantly better than a model without them. Using AS as an example, the 
results for each significant predictor can be interpreted as follows: 
 The effect of AS on channel choice is significant at the 0.05 level (LR = 8.405, df = 3, p < 
0.05). Table 47 shows that the effect of AS, BU, volatility, diversity and MO on channel choice is 
significant at the 0.05 level. I can thus reject the hypothesis that AS, BU, volatility, diversity and 
MO are independent of channel choice. Correlations and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 
48. 
                                                 
12 Alternatively a Wald test can be used.  
13 For a calculation of the degrees of freedom see Appendix B.4. 
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Table 47: LR test for independent variables 
Variables Chi2 df P > Chi2
Market Experience 9.311 3 0.025
Firm Age 3.198 3 0.362
International Experience 14.082 3 0.003
Firm Size 4.499 3 0.212
Asset Specificity 8.405 3 0.038
Behavioural Uncertainty 7.968 3 0.047
Volatility 7.94 3 0.047
Diversity 7.991 3 0.046
Market Orienation 8.143 3 0.038
Marketing Capabilities 2.250 3 0.522  
Table 48: Correlation and descriptive statistics 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
Single Indirect (1) versus 
Multiple Indirect (2) versus 
Dual (3) versus Direct (4)
2.87 1.05
2 Asset Specificity 5.15 1.27 .100
3 Behavioural Uncertainty 3.95 1.58 -.198** .203**
4 Volatility 3.48 1.26 -.011 .145* .338**
5 Diversity 4.27 1.22 -.093 .109 .071 -.012
6 Market Orientation 4.61 1.05 .105 -.116 -.337
**
-.127
* .074
7 Marketing Capabilities 4.65 0.94 .146* .002 -.247** -.139* -.049 .310**
8 Market Experience 23.69 19.27 -.065 .093 -.032 -.118 .117 .017 .068
9 Firm Age 65.83 46.46 .001 .089 -.009 -.010 .033 .071 -.049 .292**
10 International Experience 2.76 1.08 .205** .164** -.063 -.022 .123 .096 .087 .386** .253**
11 Firm Size 2.16 0.82 .135* .136* -.048 .045 .097 .109 .064 .292** .424** .420**
Variables
Levels of significance: ** = 1%, * = 5%, N = 245  
Test for combining alternatives — This test assesses whether the choice alternatives in the 
dependent variable are indistinguishable or not with respect to the variables in the model (Long & 
Freese, 2014). That is whether the different channel categories are distinguishable or not. When 
they cannot be distinguished, one might be able to combine some of the channel categories.14 I use 
the Wald test to test the null hypothesis that two channel alternatives can be combined for all pairs 
of channel alternatives. The results in Table 49 show that I can reject the hypothesis that the 
                                                 
14 However Long and Freese (2014) note to practice caution in combining alternatives even when the test is positive due 
to dangers in overfitting the data.  
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categories 1 & 2, 1 & 3, 1 & 4, 2 & 3, 2 & 4 and 3 & 4 are indistinguishable. The results further 
indicate that all channel categories are distinguishable and cannot be combined. This result supports 
dividing the channel choices in the four different categories: SI, MI, DU, and D-O.  
Table 49: Wald test for combining alternatives 
Channel 
combinations tested
Chi2 df P > Chi2
1 &2 18.600 10 0.046
1 & 3 20.830 10 0.022
1 & 4 29.172 10 0.001
2 & 3 22.097 10 0.015
2 & 4 19.899 10 0.030
3 & 4 23.360 10 0.009
Note: 1 = Single Indirect, 2 = Multiple Indirect, 3 = Dual, 
4 = Direct-only.
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Table 50: Results of multinomial regression with different base categories 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
Single 
Indirect 
Versus 
Multiple 
Indirect
Single 
Indirect 
Versus 
Dual
Single 
Indirect 
Versus 
Direct-only
Multiple 
Indirect 
Versus 
Dual
Multiple 
Indirect 
Versus 
Direct-
only
Dual 
Versus 
Direct-only
Single 
Indirect 
Versus 
Multiple 
Indirect
Single 
Indirect 
Versus Dual
Single 
Indirect 
Versus 
Direct-only
Multiple 
Indirect 
Versus Dual
Multiple 
Indirect 
Versus 
Direct-only
Dual Versus 
Direct-only
Single 
Indirect 
Versus 
Multiple 
Indirect
Single 
Indirect 
Versus Dual
Single 
Indirect 
Versus Direct-
only
Multiple 
Indirect 
Versus Dual
Multiple 
Indirect 
Versus Direct-
only
Dual Versus 
Direct-only
Market 
Experience
0.000 -0.009 -0.030** -0.009 -0.030** -0.021** 0.001 -0.008 -0.030** -0.008 -0.031** -0.022** 0.002 -0.008 -0.031** -0.010 -0.033** -0.022**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010)
Firm Age -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.005 0.000 -0.011* -0.005 -0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.000 -0.012* -0.005 -0.005 0.007 0.007 -0.000
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
International 
Experience
0.153 0.667*** 0.628*** 0.514** 0.474** -0.039 0.139 0.666*** 0.624*** 0.527** 0.484** -0.042 0.118 0.675*** 0.607*** 0.557** 0.489** -0.068
(0.257) (0.209) (0.215) (0.224) (0.229) (0.168) (0.270) (0.213) (0.224) (0.240) (0.244) (0.177) (0.273) (0.216) (0.227) (0.242) (0.244) (0.178)
Firm Size 0.688* 0.422 0.550* -0.266 -0.138 0.128 0.793** 0.336 0.531* -0.457 -0.262 0.195 0.758* 0.322 0.495 -0.436 -0.263 0.173
(0.354) (0.281) (0.288) (0.307) (0.312) (0.220) (0.381) (0.288) (0.305) (0.333) (0.341) (0.232) (0.387) (0.293) (0.312) (0.335) (0.339) (0.234)
Asset 
Specificity
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ -0.313 0.094 0.211 0.407** 0.525*** 0.118 -0.281 0.106 0.226 0.387** 0.507*** 0.120
(0.198) (0.164) (0.173) (0.173) (0.179) (0.137) (0.205) (0.167) (0.177) (0.178) (0.182) (0.138)
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
-0.196 -0.251* -0.443*** -0.055 -0.247 -0.192* -0.033 -0.237* -0.371** -0.204 -0.338** -0.134
(0.172) (0.136) (0.143) (0.153) (0.158) (0.110) (0.181) (0.141) (0.150) (0.163) (0.169) (0.118)
Volatility ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ -0.148 0.261 -0.0431 0.409** 0.105 -0.304** -0.190 0.256 -0.038 0.446** 0.152 -0.294**
(0.216) (0.165) (0.176) (0.194) (0.201) (0.139) (0.217) (0.165) (0.177) (0.195) (0.202) (0.141)
Diversity ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 0.087 0.083 -0.272 -0.004 -0.358* -0.355*** 0.022 0.068 -0.298* 0.046 -0.320* -0.365***
(0.208) (0.163) (0.172) (0.183) (0.189) (0.136) (0.213) (0.166) (0.176) (0.188) (0.190) (0.138)
Market 
Orientation
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
0.701** 0.054 0.226 -0.647*** -0.475* 0.172
(0.281) (0.209) (0.223) (0.247) (0.255) (0.171)
Marketing 
Capabilities
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
0.223 0.181 0.364 -0.042 0.141 0.183
(0.270) (0.231) (0.250) (0.223) (0.240) (0.189)
Constant -1.417* -1.122* -1.045* 0.295 0.371 0.076 0.883 -1.723 0.994 -2.606** 0.11 2.716*** -3.716 -2.809 -1.859 0.908 1.858 0.950
(0.730) (0.583) (0.600) (0.678) (0.694) (0.521) (1.379) (1.230) (1.216) (1.257) (1.216) (1.046) (2.277) (1.831) (1.870) (2.016) (2.023) (1.484)
Log likelihood 616.72*** 616.72*** 616.72*** 616.72*** 616.72*** 616.72*** 584.55*** 584.55*** 584.55*** 584.55*** 584.55*** 584.55*** 572.38*** 572.38*** 572.38*** 572.38*** 572.38*** 572.38***
R2 Nagelkerke 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296
Akaike 646.72 646.72 646.72 646.72 646.72 646.72 638.54 638.54 638.54 638.54 638.54 638.54 638.38 638.38 638.38 638.38 638.38 638.38
Information
Criterion
c
2 31.30*** 31.30*** 31.30*** 31.30*** 31.30*** 31.30*** 69.01*** 69.01*** 69.01*** 69.01*** 69.01*** 69.01*** 81.18*** 81.18*** 81.18*** 81.18*** 81.18*** 81.18***
Correctly 37.40% 37.40% 37.40% 37.40% 37.40% 37.40% 46.10% 46.10% 46.10% 46.10% 46.10% 46.10% 48.0% 48.0% 48.0% 48.0% 48.0% 48.0%
classified
N 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
Change in c2 ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 37.71(12)***37.71(12)***37.71(12)*** 37.71(12)*** 37.71(12)*** 37.71(12)*** 49.88(18)*** 49.88(18)*** 49.88(18)*** 49.88(18)*** 49.88(18)*** 49.88(18)***
Model A
Note: Standard errors in parantheses. Levels of significance: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. The first channel category is always the base category, e.g. for Single Indirect Versus Multiple Indirect, Single Indirect is the base category.
Model A Model B Model C 
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Selecting different base outcomes — The results in Table 49 accord with those in Table 50 about 
the coefficients comparing outcomes with different base categories in the multinomial logit 
regression. Table 50 sums up all pairs of outcomes in which the category number of the first 
alternative is lower than that of the second. That is, the base category is always lower for each pair. 
For example, it compares: choosing between a SI channel (1) and MI channels (2) or choosing 
between DU channels (3) and a D-O channels (4). The channel category number of the base 
category is always lower than the number of the comparison category.  
The results from Table 50 are modelled in Figure 10. It shows that AS is statistically 
significant and positively related to choosing DU channels over MI channels (p < 0.05) and a D-O 
channel over MI channels (p < 0.01). BU is negatively related to choosing DU channels over a SI 
channel, but only at the 10 per cent level. In addition, BU is statistically significant and negatively 
related to choosing a D-O channel over a SI channel (p < 0.05), and a D-O channel over MI 
channels (p < 0.05). Attention should be paid to the definition of BU here. In contrast to the TCE 
definition, BU is reversed in the context of channel choice. That is, BU is defined as the uncertainty 
a firm faces in monitoring the behaviour of its own sales personnel (and not in monitoring the 
behaviour of indirect sales personnel). That is, I hypothesise that the higher the uncertainty 
associated with a firm monitoring its own sales personnel, the more likely it will choose a SI 
channel. Thus, the higher their BU, the more likely it will choose a SI or MI channels.  
 Volatility is statistically significant and positively related to choosing DU channels over MI 
channels (p < 0.05) and a D-O channel over DU channels (p < 0.05). Furthermore, diversity is 
statistically significant and negatively related to choosing a D-O channel over a SI channel, yet only 
at the 10 per cent level. Additionally, diversity is statistically significant and positively related to 
choosing a D-O channel over DU channels (p < 0.01). Finally, MO is statistically significant and 
positively related to choosing MI channels over an SI channel (p < 0.05) and negatively related to 
choosing DU channels over MI channels (p < 0.01) and negatively related to choosing a D-O 
channel over MI channels (p < 0.10).  
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Figure 10: Significant channel coefficients different base categories 
5.7 Interpreting results in a multinomial logit model (MNLM)  
In this section, I analyse graphical representations of predicted probabilities and marginal effects, 
both of which are necessary to assess the directional relationship between the predictor variables 
and the probability of choosing a specific channel category (Long & Freese, 2014, Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2015). To achieve this assessment, it is necessary to plot the predicted 
probabilities. In addition, analysing marginal effects helps to determine whether or not an increase 
in a predictor is significantly associated with an increase or decrease in the predicted probabilities 
of choosing a specific channel category (Wulff, 2015).  
 Because marginal effects represent the slope of the predicted probability curve for predictor 
values, of interest is the curvature and confidence interval rather than the nature of the relationship 
(Wulff, 2015). When the confidence intervals of the marginal effects include zero, the marginal 
effects are insignificant. In areas where the confidence intervals do not include zero, the marginal 
effects are significantly different from zero. Then, an increase in a predictor is significantly 
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associated with an increase or decrease in predicted probabilities (Wulff, 2015). The significant 
predictor values are highlighted in the predicted probability graphs by circles.  
Nature of relationships  — Hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5 and H6 state that the predictors are 
associated with channel choice in an ordered way. That is, with an increase in AS, for example, 
firms are more likely to move from choosing SI to MI to DU to D-O channels. Therefore, the 
distribution of channel choice is theorised to behave like an ordered model. 
5.8 Insertion: Ordinal regression models 
Figure 11 illustrates how the predicted probability curves behave in an ordinal model where the five 
outcome categories of the example are ordered from lowest to highest (1 to 5). An increase in a 
positive coefficient x is associated with an increase in the probability of the highest category from 0 
to 1 (y = 5 in the figure). In contrast, an increase in x is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of the lowest category from 0 to 1 (y = 1 in the figure). In Figure 11, the middle categories 2, 3 and 
4 have bell-shaped probability curves (y = 2, y = 3, y = 4) with higher categories occurring at larger 
values of x (Long, 2015). The height of the probability curves in the middle depends on the relative 
sizes of the outcome categories (Long & Freese, 2014). In an ordered model, changes in the 
probabilities (i.e., marginal effects) of the lowest and highest category are always in the opposite 
direction whereas probabilities for the middle categories can change sign over the range of the 
predictor (Long & Freese, 2014). 
 
Figure 11: Predicted probability curves in an ordinal regression model  
Source:  Long (2015, p. 175) 
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While nominal models, such as the MNLM used here, can contain predictions that behave like an 
ordinal model, they are not restricted to that purpose (Long, 2015). This means that this model 
supports hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H5 and H6 so that: 
 changes in the predicted probabilities (i.e., marginal effects) for SI need to be negative for 
AS, volatility, diversity, MO and MCs and positive for BU.  
 for D-O, marginal effects need to be positive for all predictors, except negative for BU. 
 for MI and DU channels, marginal effects first need to be positive and then negative.  
Moreover, these effects need to be significant at p < 0.05.  
5.9 Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for AS  
A plot of the predicted probabilities for the four different channel categories and AS is shown in 
Figure 12. The significant values are highlighted by circles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The directional relationship between a predictor and the probability of a choice depends on 
all variables and their estimated coefficients across the choice alternatives. Thus, it is not sufficient 
just to look at the estimated coefficients to evaluate the direction of the relationship between AS and 
the probability of choosing a specific channel category (Wulff, 2015).   
Figure 12: Predicted probabilities and marginal effects asset specificity 
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 Previously, I was able to assess the effect of individual predictors on the choice between 
pairs of channel categories. Table 50 and Figure 12 shows that AS has a positive significant effect 
on choosing DU channels over MI channels and on choosing D-O channels over MI channels. I 
noted earlier that the directional relationship between a predictor and the probability of a choice 
depends on all variables and their estimated coefficients across all choice alternatives (Long & 
Freese, 2014, Wiersema & Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2015). Hence, analysing coefficients is not 
sufficient to evaluate the direction of the relationship between individual predictors and the 
probability of choosing a specific export channel category. This means that we analyse results by 
inspecting predicted probabilities and marginal effect graphs. The graph of predicted probabilities 
(with significant values highlighted) is shown in Figure 12 while Appendix B.2 shows all graphs of 
predicted probabilities and marginal effects including confidence intervals.  
Predicted probabilities — Because the probability of choosing a SI channel decreases as AS 
increases (see Figure 12), SI channels seem clearly to relate to AS negatively, while MI channels 
seem to relate negatively to AS even more strongly. Inversely, while the probability of choosing 
DU channels increases, it does so less than the probability of choosing D-O channels, which has the 
steepest probability curve related to increasing AS. According to Figure 12, there seems to be a cut-
off point around ‘3’, after which firms have a higher probability of choosing DU or D-O channels 
rather than SI or MI channels. To assess whether an increase in AS is significantly associated with 
an increase or decrease in predicted probabilities, we need to turn to the marginal effects (Wulff, 
2015).  
Marginal effects — Marginal effects are defined as those that “represent the slope of the 
curve for given predictor values” (Wulff, 2015, p.14) and “measure the change in the probability of 
an outcome for a change in the predictor, holding all other independent variables constant at 
specific values” (Long & Freese, 2014, p.239). For low to mid-levels of AS, an increase in AS is 
positive and significantly associated with an increase in the predicted probability of choosing a D-O 
channel. In contrast, for mid-to-high levels of AS, an increase in the level of AS is negative and 
significantly related to the predicted probability of choosing MI channels. A change in the level of 
AS does not affect the predicted probabilities of choosing a SI or DU channels. 
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5.9.1 AS and multiple indirect (MI) channel choice  
For MI channels, the marginal effects (dy/dx) are negative for all values of AS but become less 
negative (see Table 51). For small to large values of AS, marginal effects range from -0.0945 to -
0.0201. Z-statistic values range from -78 to -4.48. 
 The decrease in the predicted probabilities of MI channels is significant for mean to large 
values of AS. After the value of ‘3’, the effect becomes significant to the maximum value of the 
predictor. These effects are illustrated in 0.5 increments in the Table 51. Values 1 to 13 correspond 
to the measurement range 1 to 7 in 0.5 increments (i.e., 1 to 7 has 6 increments/0.5 =12 + 1 = 13). 
So a value of 6 is a 3 on the 1 to 7 scale of Figure 12. 
Table 51: Marginal effects (here MEM) for AS and MI channels 
Delta-method
assetspec dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0944965 -.0531798 -1.78 0.0076 -.1987269 .0097339
2 -.0901942 -.0530111 -1.70 0.089 -.194094 .0137056
3 -.084482 -.0504012 -1.68 0.094 -.1832664 .0143025
4 -.0777213 -.0458656 -1.69 0.090 -.1676162 .0121737
5 -.0703045 -.0400564 -1.76 0.079 -.1488136 .0082047
6 -.0626106 -.0336411 -1.86 0.063 -.128546 .0033248
7 -.0549709 -.0272076 -2.02 0.043 -.1082969 -.0016449
8 -.0476489 -.0212094 -2.25 0.025 -.0892187 -.0060792
9 -.0408331 -.0159508 -2.56 0.010 -.0720962 -.0095701
10 -.0346408 -.0116041 -2.99 0.003 -.0573843 -.0118973
11 -.0291282 -.0082449 -3.53 0.000 -.045288 -.0129685
12 -.0243039 -.00589 -4.13 0.000 -.0358481 -.0127598
13 -.0201423 -.0044949 -4.48 0.000 -.0289522 -.0113325
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
 
5.9.2 AS and direct-only (D-O) channel choice 
Marginal effects (dy/dx) are positive for all values of AS, but become smaller. From small to large 
values of AS, the marginal effects range from 0.0402 to 0.0381. The Z-statistic values range from 
3.98 to 1.15. The increase in the probabilities of D-O channels is significant for small to mean 
values of AS. After the mean of 3 (on a scale from 1 to 7), the effect becomes insignificant (see 
Table 52). 
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Table 52: Marginal effects (here MEM) for AS and D-O channels 
Delta-method
assetspec dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .040208 .0100899 3.98 0.000 .0204322 .0599839
2 .0420729 .0114535 3.67 0.000 .0196245 .0645214
3 .0434041 .0132517 3.28 0.001 .0174312 .069377
4 .0442079 .015367 2.88 0.004 .0140892 .0743266
5 .044525 .0176993 2.52 0.012 .0098351 .0792149
6 .0444205 .0201497 2.20 0.027 .0049277 .0839133
7 .0439734 .022615 1.94 0.052 -.0003512 .088298
8 .0432658 .0249937 1.73 0.083 -.0057209 .0922526
9 .042375 .0271976 1.56 0.119 -.0109313 .0956814
10 .0413683 .0291594 1.42 0.156 -.0157831 .0985197
11 .0403004 .0308354 1.31 0.191 -.0201359 .1007366
12 .0392127 .0322037 1.22 0.223 -.0239053 .1023308
13 .0381351 .0332599 1.15 0.252 -.0270531 .1033232
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
5.10 Summary measures 
After analysing graphical results, the marginal effects can be summarised. However, using just 
these summary measures can lead to results being misinterpreted, that is, to overlook areas of 
insignificance or significance, or a change in sign of the marginal effect. As the marginal effect of a 
predictor depends on the values of all other independent values, results can be summarises in two 
main ways that differ in the way the other independent variables are treated (Long & Freese, 2014).  
 Results can be summarised using either marginal effects at the mean (MEM) or average 
marginal effect (AME) values. The MEM value computes the marginal effect of the predictor of 
interest (e.g., AS) while holding all other variables at their means. The AME value computes the 
marginal effect of the predictor for each observation and then computes the average of these effects. 
Thus, the MEM approach uses mean values, whereas the AME approach uses the actual observed 
values in the sample (Long & Freese, 2014, Wulff, 2015). While MEM and AME might produce 
different results, there is no agreement as to which approach is superior (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009, 
Wulff, 2015). Therefore both values are reported below. 
Asset specificity — As we can see in Table 53, an increase in asset specificity (AS) is associated 
with a significant decrease in the probability of MI channels (p < 0.01) for AME and MEM values. 
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AS is also associated with a significant increase in choosing D-O channels (p < 0.10) for AME 
values.  
Table 53: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of AS on the probability of choosing SI, MI, DU and 
D-O channels 
Single 
Indirect
Multiple 
Indirect
Dual 
Channels
Direct-only 
AME -0.010 -0.040*** 0.008 0.041*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.025) (0.023)
MEM -0.013 -0.037*** 0.006 0.044
(0.019) (0.014) (0.029) (0.028)
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%. *** = 1%, AME = Average Marginal Effect, MEM = Marginal 
Effects at Mean Values, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effect on the 
probability of
Asset Specificity
 
These results can be interpreted as follows: 
AME 
 By holding AS at the mean and averaging the marginal effects computed for each sample 
unit, a 1 unit increase in AS is associated with  
o an insignificant decrease in the probability of choosing a SI channel of -0.010. 
o a significant decrease in the probability of choosing MI channels of -0.040 (p < 
0.01). 
o an insignificant increase in the probability of choosing DU channels of 0.008. 
o a significant increase in the probability of choosing a Direct-channel of 0.041 (p < 
0.10). 
MEM  
 By holding all variables, even AS, at their mean value and increasing AS by 1 per cent is 
associated with  
o an insignificant decrease in the probability of choosing a SI channel of -0.013. 
o a significant decrease in the probability of choosing MI channels of -0.037 (p < 
0.01). 
o an insignificant increase in the probability of choosing DU channels of 0.005. 
o an insignificant increase in the probability of choosing a D-O channel of 0.044.  
 
However, using only single summary measures cannot reflect the variation of the marginal effects 
over the range of the predictor. Therefore, multiple AME/MEM values should be computed at 
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different levels of the explanatory variable to comprehend the magnitude and variation of the effects 
(Long, 1997, Long & Freese, 2014). Tables 54 and 55 show the summary measures at low (one 
standard deviation below the mean), mean and high (one standard deviation above the mean) values 
of each predictor.  
Marginal effect of AS on the probability of choosing MI channels and a D-O channel at different 
values of the predictor — The effect of AS on MI channels is significant for low, mean and high 
values of AS (p < 0.01) (see Table 54). Relying on only these summary measures would lead me to 
conclude that AS has a negative significant effect on choosing MI channels over the range of the 
predictor. However, the graph (see Figure 12) shows that the negative effect starts to become 
significant only after the predictor reaches a value of “3”. Yet, the low value of the predictor (1 SD 
below the mean), is 3.89. Thus, both summary measures, AME and MEM, do not display that 
insignificant effect. Moreover, these summary measures also do not display the significant positive 
effect of AS on choosing D-O channels (see Figure 12) for low values of AS (0 to 3) (see Table 55). 
Therefore, interpreting results is best done graphically. 
Table 54: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of AS on the probability of choosing MI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.079*** -0.093***
(0.018) (0.022)
-0.088*** -0.104***
(0.019) (0.021)
-0.093*** -0.112***
(0.020) (0.020)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, ***p < 0.001. Low Value: 3.89, Mean: 5.16, High Value: 6.43.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Table 55: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of AS on the probability of D-O channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.162 0.150
(0.125) (0.104)
0.209 0.192
(0.166) (0.139)
0.254 0.235
(0.204) (0.174)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses. Low Value: 3.89, Mean: 5.16, High Value: 6.43.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Conclusion for asset specificity (AS) — Hypothesis H1 is partly supported, because the marginal 
effects are only partially significant. The predicted probabilities of SI, DU and D-O behave as 
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theorised in that, with increasing AS, the probability of choosing D-O channels increases. The 
probability of choosing a SI channel decreases and the probability of choosing DU channels is first 
positive and then becomes negative. However, only the effect of choosing D-O channels is 
significant for low to mean values of AS. Partly consistent with the hypothesis is the probability of 
choosing MI channels. While too be fully consistent with, and thus support the hypothesis, the 
effect would need first to be positive and then negative, the probability of choosing MI channels is 
negative for all values of AS. Thus, the effect of MI channels is consistent with the hypothesis for 
mid-to-high values of the predictor.  
5.11 Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for BU 
Predicted probabilities — Figure 13 shows that the probability of choosing a SI channel increases 
as BU increases. Similarly, whereas the probability of choosing MI channels increases, the 
predicted probability curve is not as steep as for SI channels. Inversely, with increasing BU, the 
probability to choose D-O channels decreases. Moreover, firms are more likely to choose DU 
channels for low to mid-levels of BU (around a value of ‘4’). Then, the probability for DU channel 
choices decreases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Predicted probabilities and marginal effects 
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Marginal effects — The significant marginal effects are again highlighted by circles in Figure 13. 
For low to mid-levels of BU, an increase in BU is positive and significantly associated with 
choosing SI channels. A similar outcome is associated with choosing MI channels for low levels of 
BU. In contrast, an increase in BU is negative and significantly associated with choosing D-O 
channels for all but very low levels of BU, whereas DU channel choice is insignificantly associated 
with BU.  
5.11.1 BU and single indirect (SI) channel choice 
For SI channels, the marginal effects (dy/dx) are positive for all values of BU and become 
increasingly positive. From small to large values of BU, marginal effects range from 0.0189 to 
0.0443 and Z-statistic values range from 4.79 to 1.34. As Table 56 shows, marginal effects are 
significant up until the mid-value of the predictor. 
Table 56: Marginal effects  (here MEM) of BU and SI 
Delta-method
behuncert dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .0188852 .0039442 4.79 0.000 .0111548 .0266157
2 .0210949 .0050122 4.21 0.000 .0112712 .0309185
3 .023419 .0065394 3.58 0.000 .0106021 .036236
4 .0258308 .0084637 3.05 0.002 .0092423 .0424193
5 .028296 .0107258 2.64 0.008 .0072738 .0493181
6 .0307736 .0132686 2.32 0.020 .0047676 .0567795
7 .033217 .0160307 2.07 0.038 .0017973 .0646366
8 .0355753 .0189438 1.88 0.060 -.0015539 .0727044
9 .0377955 .0219325 1.72 0.085 -.0051913 .0807824
10 .0398252 .0249175 1.60 0.110 -.0090123 .0886626
11 .0416148 .0278204 1.50 0.135 -.0129122 .0961419
12 .0431212 .0305688 1.41 0.158 -.0167924 .1030349
13 .0443095 .0331013 1.34 0.181 -.0205679 .1091869
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
 
5.11.2 BU and multiple indirect (MI) channel choice 
Marginal effects are increasingly positive for choosing MI channels. Yet, effects are significant 
only for low values of BU. Marginal effects range from 0.0128 to 0.0212 and Z-statistic values 
range from 3.46 to 0.78 (see Table 57). 
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Table 57: Marginal effects (here MEM) of BU and MI 
Delta-method
behuncert dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .0128286 .0037084 3.46 0.004 .0055603 .0200968
2 .0139859 .0047785 2.93 0.003 .0046201 .0233516
3 .015146 .0061404 2.47 0.014 .003111 .027181
4 .0162856 .0077487 2.10 0.036 .0010985 .0314727
5 .0173786 .0095645 1.82 0.069 -.0013674 .0361245
6 .0183963 .0115508 1.59 0.111 -.0042428 .0410353
7 .0193091 .0136695 1.41 0.158 -.0074826 .0461008
8 .0200877 .015881 1.26 0.206 -.0110386 .0512139
9 .0207043 .018145 1.14 0.254 -.0148593 .0562679
10 .0211349 .0204225 1.03 0.301 -.0188924 .0611623
11 .0213602 .0226777 0.94 0.346 -.0230872 .0658076
12 .0213673 .0248796 0.86 0.390 -.0273959 .0701305
13 .0211506 .0270033 0.78 0.433 -.0317749 .0740761
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
 
5.11.3 BU and direct-only (D-O) channel choice 
There exists a clear negative relationship with choosing D-O channels. Marginal effects range from 
-0.0497 to -0.0407, indicating a constant rate of change across the range of the predictor. Z-statistic 
values range from -1.72 to -4.07. Effects start to become significant from a value of 6 which is 
equivalent to a value of 3 on the scale of the predictor (1 to 7) (see Table 58). 
Table 58: Marginal effects (here MEM) of BU and D-O 
Delta-method
behuncert dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0496817 .0288298 -1.72 0.085 -.1061871 .0068238
2 -.0504597 .0289196 -1.74 0.081 -.107141 .0062216
3 -.0510149 .0286213 -1.78 0.075 -.1071117 .0050819
4 -.0513192 .0279319 -1.84 0.066 -.1060647 .0034262
5 -.0513475 .0268611 -1.91 0.056 -.1039943 .0012993
6 -.0510788 .0254327 -2.01 0.045 -.1009259 -.0012316
7 -.0504978 .0236839 -2.13 0.033 -.0969174 -.0040782
8 -.0495969 .0216648 -2.29 0.022 -.0920591 -.0071348
9 -.0483772 .0194367 -2.49 0.013 -.0864725 -.0102819
10 -.0468489 .017071 -2.74 0.006 -.0803074 -.0133904
11 -.0450322 .0146474 -3.07 0.002 -.0737406 -.0163239
12 -.0429567 .0122546 -3.51 0.000 -.0669753 -.0189381
13 -.0406599 .0099937 -4.07 0.000 -.0602471 -.0210726
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
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5.12 Summary measures 
Marginal effect of BU on the probability of choosing SI and D-O channels at different values of the 
predictor — The summary measures indicate a significant (p < 0.05) positive effect of BU with 
choosing SI channels and a significant (p < 0.05) negative effect with choosing D-O channels. Both 
AME and MEM values are significant at p < 0.05 (see Table 59). 
Table 59: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of BU on the probability of choosing SI, MI, DU and 
D-O channels 
Single 
Indirect
Multiple 
Indirect
Dual 
Channels
Direct-only 
AME 0.030** 0.020 -0.007 -0.043**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020)
MEM 0.032** 0.020 -0.004 -0.048**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024)
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%. *** = 1%, AME = Average Marginal Effect, MEM = Marginal 
Effects at Mean Values, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effect on the 
probability of
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
 
Considering the marginal effects for different values of the predictor shows that the significant 
effect for choosing SI channels emerges only for low values of the predictor. As the graph (see 
Figure 13) shows, this effect is significant only for low to mid-levels of BU. The summary 
measures for mean and high values are insignificant for choosing SI channels (see Table 60). 
Table 60: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of BU on the probability of SI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.088* 0.078*
(0.053) (0.047)
0.157 0.134
(0.105) (0.088)
0.228 0.192
(0.166) (0.136)
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, *p < 0.10. Low Value: 2.36, Mean: 3.94, High Value: 5.52.  
For MI channels, the summary measures (see Table 61) do not reflect the significant values for low 
levels of BU that are reflected in the graph (see Figure 13). Therefore, based on the summary 
measures, I would conclude that BU does not affect MI channel choice. However, the graph (see 
Figure 13) indicates that for low values, BU has a significant positive effect on MI channels. This 
exemplifies that it might be not sufficient to interpret summary measures of marginal effects 
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(Wulff, 2015). That is because marginal effects are not necessarily constant across the range of the 
predictor (Wulff, 2015), which is not captured by a summary measure that averages the results. 
Table 61: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of BU on the probability of MI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.050 0.049
(0.044) (0.043)
0.086 0.083
(0.088) (0.082)
0.118 0.114
(0.142) (0.127)
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
While the summary measures show a significant negative effect for choosing D-O channels with 
increasing BU for both AME and MEM measures (see Table 62), the graph (see Figure 13) shows 
that this effect becomes significant only after a value of around “3”. This exemplifies the need for a 
graphical interpretation of results when employing an MNML model, as in this case summary 
measures are not enough to detect and interpret the full relationship between the predictor and the 
dependent variable. As previous channel choice studies neither calculated the different marginal 
effects and predicted probabilities over the range of the predictors, nor provided a graphical 
interpretation of their results, there remain uncertainties about their findings.  
Table 62: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of BU on the probability of D-O channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.108** -0.096**
(0.044) (0.038)
-0.170*** -0.152***
(0.059) (0.053)
-0.221*** -0.198***
(0.063) (0.059)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.001. Low Value: 2.36, Mean: 3.94, High 
Value: 5.52.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Conclusion for BU — Hypothesis H2 is partially supported by the data. In line with the hypothesis 
are the predicted probabilities of SI, DU and D-O channels. With increasing BU, firms are less 
likely to choose D-O channels but more likely to choose SI channels. DU channels indicate a non-
linear effect, with predicted probabilities first having a positive relationship to BU but then 
becoming negative after mid-levels of the predictor. However, not all values are significant. While 
most of the marginal effects for SI and D-O channels are significant, none of the marginal effects 
for DU channels is. To support the ordered hypothesis, MI channels would also need to show a non-
linear predicted probability curve as MI channels is one of the middle categories. However, all 
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values are positively related to BU. With most of the marginal effects being significant for SI and 
D-O channels and these effects being in line with the hypothesis, I conclude that hypothesis H2 is 
partly supported by the data. 
5.13 Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for volatility 
Predicted probabilities — Figure 14 below shows that the probability of choosing a SI channel 
decreases as volatility increases, as does the probability of choosing MI channels, although the 
negative relationship is even stronger for MI than for SI channels. In contrast, the probability of 
choosing DU channels increases, showing a clear positive relationship with volatility. Yet, for D-O 
channel choices, the relationship with volatility is negative for all its values of volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal effects — For mid- to high levels of volatility, there is a significant negative relationship 
with MI channel choice, starting around a value of ‘4”. DU channel choices have a significant 
positive relationship with volatility across the whole range of the predictor. At last, D-O channel 
choice is significantly negative related to volatility for higher values of the predictor.  
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5.13.1 Volatility and multiple indirect (MI) channel choice 
For MI channel choice, marginal effects are negative ranging from -0.0343 to -0.0120 (see Table 
63). Z-statistic values range from -0.94 to -3.49, therefore becoming less negative. Effects start to 
become significant from a value of “8” which is equivalent to a value of “4” on the 1-7 Likert scale 
of the predictor (see Figure 14). Thus, for mid-to high levels of volatility, firms are less likely to 
choose MI channels.  
Table 63: Marginal effects (here MEM) of volatility and MI 
Delta-method
volatil dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0342844 .0362833 -0.94 0.345 -.1053984 .0368295
2 -.0329845 .0321056 -1.03 0.304 -.0959102 .0299412
3 -.0345041 .027891 -1.13 0.259 -.0861695 .0231613
4 -.0298511 .023738 -1.26 0.209 -.0763767 .0166746
5 -.028042 .019744 -1.42 0.156 -.0667395 .0106556
6 -.0261021 .0160013 -1.63 0.103 -.0574641 .0052599
7 -.0240644 .0125948 -1.91 0.056 -.0487497 .0006208
8 -.0219677 .0096019 -2.29 0.022 -.040787 -.0031484
9 -.019854 .0070993 -2.80 0.005 -.0337684 -.0059395
10 -.0177652 .0051767 -3.43 0.001 -.0279113 -.007619
11 -.0157407 .0039407 -3.99 0.000 -.0234644 -.0080169
12 -.0138145 .0034293 -4.03 0.000 -.0205358 -.0070933
13 -.012014 .0034443 -3.49 0.000 -.0187647 -.0052632
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
5.13.2 Volatility and dual (DU) channel choice 
For DU channel choices, all marginal effects are significantly and positively related to volatility 
with effects ranging from 0.0618 to 0.0666 and Z-statistic values ranging from 4.43 to 4.18. The 
rate of change is therefore relatively constant across the range of the predictor as can be seen in 
Table 64 and Figure 14.  
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Table 64: Marginal effects (here MEM) of volatility and DU channels 
Delta-method
volatil dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .0618375 .039468 4.43 0.000 .0345022 .0891727
2 .0665357 .0177122 3.76 0.000 .0318205 .101251
3 .0707816 .0214249 3.30 0.001 .0287896 .1127735
4 .0744068 .0247879 3.00 0.003 .0258235 .1229902
5 .0772583 .0275273 2.81 0.005 .0233058 .1312109
6 .0792109 .029412 2.69 0.007 .0215645 .1368574
7 .0801794 .0302776 2.65 0.008 .0208363 .1395225
8 .0801266 .0300465 2.67 0.008 .0212365 .1390167
9 .0790664 .0287368 2.75 0.006 .0227432 .1353895
10 .077062 .0264591 2.91 0.004 .0252031 .1289209
11 .0742187 .0234011 3.17 0.002 .0283533 .1200841
12 .0706732 .0198053 3.57 0.000 .0318556 .1094909
13 .066581 .0159462 4.18 0.000 .035327 .097835
[95% Conf. Interval]
 
5.13.3 Volatility and direct-only (D-O) channel choice 
Marginal effects for D-O channels are all negative ranging from -0.0266 to -0.0392 and Z-statistic 
values range from -0.73 to -3.94 (see Table 65). The rate of change is relatively constant with 
effects becoming significant for higher volatility values.  
Table 65: Marginal effects (here MEM) of volatility and D-O 
Delta-method
volatil dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0265928 .0365592 -0.73 0.467 -.0982475 .0450618
2 -.0306721 .0348209 -0.88 0.378 -.0989199 .0375756
3 -.0344457 .0332558 -1.04 0.300 -.0996259 .0307344
4 -.0377931 .0317994 -1.19 0.235 -.1001189 .0245326
5 -.0406036 .0303401 -1.34 0.181 -.100069 .0188618
6 -.0427855 .0287445 -1.49 0.137 -.0991236 .0135526
7 -.0442743 .026891 -1.65 0.100 -.0969798 .0084312
8 -.0450387 .0246993 -1.82 0.068 -.0934485 .0033711
9 -.0450829 .0221477 -2.04 0.042 -.0884915 -.0016742
10 -.0444453 .0192778 -2.31 0.021 -.0822291 -.0066616
11 -.0431945 .0161879 -2.67 0.008 -.0749221 -.0114669
12 -.0414212 .0130215 -3.18 0.001 -.0669429 -.0158995
13 -.0392304 .0099614 -3.94 0.000 -.0587543 -.0197064
0.0450618
p ≤ 0.05
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5.14 Summary measures 
Marginal effect of volatility on the probability of choosing MI, DU and D-O channels at different 
values of the predictor — The summary measures for AME values show a significant (p < 0.01) 
positive effect for choosing DU channels with increasing volatility. For MEM values, there is also a 
significant (p < 0.10) negative effect with choosing MI channels (see Table 66).  
Table 66: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of volatility on the probability of choosing SI, MI, 
DU and D-O channels 
Single 
Indirect
Multiple 
Indirect
Dual 
Channels
Direct-only 
AME -0.010 -0.027 0.067*** -0.030
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
MEM -0.011 -0.027* 0.076*** -0.038
(0.019) (0.016) (0.029) (0.028)
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%. *** = 1%, AME = Average Marginal Effect, MEM = Marginal 
Effects at Mean Values, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effect on the 
probability of
Volatility
 
Looking more closely at MI channels shows that low, mean and high values are significantly 
negatively related to volatility (see Table 67).  
Table 67: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of volatility on the probability of MI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.048** -0.052**
(0.020) (0.025)
-0.066*** -0.073**
(0.023) (0.029)
-0.079*** -0.089***
(0.023) (0.029)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Low Value: 2.21, Mean: 3.47, High 
Value: 4.73.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Similarly, choosing DU channels is significantly positively related to volatility for low, mean and 
high values of the predictor (see Table 68).  
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Table 68: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of volatility on the probability of DU channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.168*** 0.151***
(0.064) (0.055)
0.255*** 0.234***
(0.091) (0.083)
0.330*** 0.310***
(0.106) (0.102)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Low Value: 2.21, Mean: 3.47, High 
Value: 4.73.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
For D-O channels, all values are at least significant at p < 0.10 except for low values of the 
predictor when using AME measures (see Table 69).  
Table 69: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of volatility on the probability of D-O channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.090* -0.072
(0.053) (0.046)
-0.141* -0.115*
(0.072) (0.065)
-0.185** -0.155**
(0.081) (0.077)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, *p < 0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Low Value: 2.21, Mean: 3.47, High 
Value: 4.73.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Conclusion for volatility — To support hypothesis H3, marginal effects for SI channels would need 
to be significantly negatively related to volatility. D-O channels would need to be significantly 
positively related to volatility while MI and DU channels would need to exhibit a non-linear, first 
positive and then negative relationship to volatility. While the negative relationship of SI channels 
with volatility fits the hypothesis, none of the marginal effects are significant for this channel 
category. At odds with the hypothesis is both that the predicted probability curve for D-O channels 
is negative for all values of the predictor and that DU and MI channel curves are linear instead of 
non-linear. While firms are less likely to choose MI channels with increasing volatility, there exists 
a clear positive and significant relationship to choosing DU channels with increasing volatility. 
Hence, hypothesis H3 is not supported by the data.  
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5.15 Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for diversity 
Predicted probabilities — Figure 15 indicates that the probability of choosing SI and MI channels 
slightly increases as diversity increases. Choosing DU channels also relates positively to diversity 
across the range of the predictor. In contrast, D-O channel choices clearly decrease when diversity 
increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal effects — As well as this clear negative relationship with D-O channel choice for all 
values of diversity, for low to mid-values, firms are significantly more likely to choose DU 
channels as diversity increases.  
5.15.1 Diversity and dual (DU) channel choice 
Marginal effects are positive for all values of diversity, ranging from 0.0516 to 0.039 and Z-statistic 
values range from 3.47 to 1.27. Effects are significant for low to mid-levels of the predictor (see 
Table 70). 
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Figure 15: Predicted probabilities and marginal effects diversity 
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Table 70: Marginal effects (here MEM) of diversity and DU channels 
Delta-method
diversi dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .0515831 .014873 3.47 0.001 .0224326 .0807336
2 .0536193 .018094 2.96 0.003 .0181557 .089083
3 .0550489 .0210614 2.61 0.009 .0137693 .0963284
4 .0558172 .0236328 2.36 0.018 .0094978 .1021367
5 .055904 .0257327 2.17 0.030 .0054689 .1063391
6 .0553247 .0273495 2.02 0.043 .0017206 .1089287
7 .0541279 .0285264 1.90 0.058 -.0017828 .1100387
8 .0523902 .0293432 1.79 0.074 -.0051214 .1099018
9 .0502071 .0298935 1.68 0.093 -.008383 .1087973
10 .0476848 .0302634 1.58 0.115 -.0116304 .107
11 .0449306 .0305163 1.47 0.141 -.0148803 .1047415
12 .0420463 .0306877 1.37 0.171 -.0181005 .1021931
13 .0391221 .0307886 1.27 0.204 -.021224 .0994667
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
5.15.2 Diversity and direct-only (D-O) channel choice 
All values are significant for choosing D-O channels. All effects are negative and range from -
0.0787 to -0.0462 and Z-statistic values range from -3.18 to -5.56 (see Table 71). 
Table 71: Marginal effects (here MEM) of diversity and D-O 
Delta-method
diversi dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0787028 .0247472 -3.18 0.001 -.1272064 -.0301992
2 -.0806547 -028316 -2.85 0.004 -.136153 -.0251563
3 -.0815765 .0309001 -2.64 0.008 -.1421396 -.0210134
4 -.0814181 .0323167 -2.52 0.012 -.1447577 -.0180784
5 -.0801859 .03249 -2.47 0.014 -.1438652 -.0165066
6 -.0779422 .0314566 -2.48 0.013 -.1395961 -.0162884
7 -.0747988 .0293557 -2.55 0.011 -.132335 -.0172627
8 -.070905 .0264056 -2.69 0.007 -.122659 -.0191509
9 -.0664333 .0228723 -2.90 0.004 -.1112622 -.0216044
10 -.0615647 .0190371 -3.23 0.001 -.0988768 -.0242526
11 -.0564746 .0151706 -3.72 0.000 -.0862085 -.0267407
12 -.0513222 .0115194 -4.46 0.000 -.0738997 -.0216044
13 -.0462433 .0083143 -5.56 0.000 -.0625391 -.0299476
[95% Conf. Interval]
 
5.16 Summary measures 
Marginal effect of diversity on the probability of choosing DU and D-O channels at different values 
of the predictor — The AME measures show a significant (p < 0.05) positive effect for choosing 
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DU channels and a significant (p < 0.01) negative effect for choosing D-O channels. When using 
MEM measures, only the significant effect for DU channels becomes visible (see Table 72).  
Table 72: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of diversity on the probability of choosing SI, MI, DU 
and D-O channels 
Single 
Indirect
Multiple 
Indirect
Dual 
Channels
Direct-only 
AME 0.008 0.010 0.048** -0.065***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023)
MEM 0.010 0.009 0.058** -0.076
(0.019) (0.015) (0.029) (0.028)
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%. *** = 1%, AME = Average Marginal Effect, MEM = Marginal 
Effects at Mean Values, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effect on the 
probability of
Diversity
 
For DU channels, the marginal effects for MEM and AME values are significant only for low levels 
of the predictor at p < 0.10 (see Table 73). 
Table 73: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of diversity on the probability of DU channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.152* 0.130*
(0.089) (0.079)
0.197 0.172
(0.124) (0.112)
0.233 0.207
(0.156) (0.143)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, *p<0.10. Low Value: 3.05, Mean: 4.27, High Value: 5.48.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
 For D-O channels, all values are significant at p < 0.01 (see Table 74). 
Table 74: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of diversity on the probability of D-O channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.184*** -0.165***
(0.049) (0.045)
-0.230*** -0.210***
(0.051) (0.049)
-0.263*** -0.243***
(0.049) (0.048)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, ***p<0.01. Low Value: 3.05, Mean: 4.27, High Value: 5.48.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Conclusion for diversity — Hypothesis H4 states that firms are more likely to choose DU or MI 
channels with increasing diversity as opposed to SI or D-O channels. This hypothesis is partly 
supported because the negative effect between choosing D-O channels and diversity, which is in 
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line with H4, is significant, this means that marginal effects are significant across the level of 
diversity. Also in line with H4 is the positive relationship between DU channel choice and diversity 
for low-to-mid levels of the predictor. In contrast, diversity does not seems to impact upon the 
choice of SI nor MI channels. 
5.17 Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for MO 
Predicted probabilities — Figure 16 shows both that a negative relationship exists between 
choosing SI channels and MO, and that a negative relationship exists between choosing DU 
channels as MO increases. By contrast, the probability of choosing MI channels increases with 
increasing MO. Firms are more likely to choose D-O channels for low to high levels of MO, 
whereas for very high levels, the probability of choosing D-O channels decreases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal effects — For low to above-mean levels of MO, an increase is significantly positively 
related to choosing MI channels. Inversely, there is a significant negative relationship with DU 
channels for high levels of MO. In addition, for high levels of MO, firms are significantly less likely 
to choose SI channels as MO increases.  
 
Figure 16: Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects Market 
Orientation 
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5.17.1 MO and single indirect (SI) channel choice 
All marginal effects are negative, ranging from -0.0171 to -0.0253 and Z-statistic values range from 
-0.42 to -2.67. Effects are significant for high levels of the predictor (see Table 75). 
Table 75: Marginal effects (here MEM) of MO and SI 
Delta-method
morient dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.017077 .0408525 -0.42 0.676 -.0971464 .0629923
2 -.0175363 .0390347 -0.45 0.653 -.094043 .0589703
3 -.0180731 .0370925 -0.49 0.626 -.0907731 .0546269
4 -.0187015 .0350012 -0.53 0.593 -.0873025 .0498996
5 -.0194332 .0327291 -0.59 0.553 -.0835811 .0447147
6 -.0202738 .0302411 -0.67 0.503 -.0795452 .0389976
7 -.0212164 .0275061 -0.77 0.441 -.0751274 .0326946
8 -.0222341 .024513 -0.91 0.364 -.0702786 .0258105
9 -.0232709 .0212931 -1.09 0.274 -.0650047 .0184629
10 -.0242344 .0179482 -1.35 0.177 -.0594122 .0109433
11 -.0249946 .0146701 -1.70 0.088 -.0537476 .0037583
12 -.0253937 .0117378 -2.16 0.031 -.0483994 -.002388
13 -.0252722 .0094693 -2.67 0.008 -.0438318 -.0067127
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
 
5.17.2 MO and multiple indirect (MI) channel choice 
For MI channels, the marginal effects are increasingly positive ranging from 0.0076 to 0.1254 with 
Z-statistic values ranging from 1.72 to 1.71. MEM are significant for low to higher levels of MO 
(see Table 76). 
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Table 76: Marginal effects (here MEM) of MO and MI 
Delta-method
morient dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .0075571 .004392 1.72 0.085 -.0010528 .0161671
2 .0101637 .004791 2.12 0.034 .0007736 .0195539
3 .0136039 .0050157 2.71 0.007 .0037734 .0234344
4 .0181016 .0050934 3.55 0.000 .0081187 .0280844
5 .0239119 .0054296 4.40 0.000 .01327 .0345537
6 .0313037 .0071341 4.39 0.000 .0173211 .0452863
7 .0405239 .0113045 3.58 0.000 .0183675 .0626803
8 .051736 .0182706 2.83 0.005 .0159264 .0875457
9 .0649297 .0279663 2.32 0.020 .0101166 .1197427
10 .079807 .0399168 2.00 0.046 .0015715 .1580424
11 .0956732 .052933 1.81 0.071 -.0080736 .1994201
12 .1113821 .0649457 1.72 0.086 -.0159092 .2386734
13 .1254022 .0732107 1.71 0.087 -.0180082 .2688925
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
p ≤ 0.05
 
5.17.3 MO and dual (DU) channel choice 
MO is negatively related to choosing DU channels with marginal effects ranging from -0.019 to -
0.0704 and Z-statistic values range from -0.48 to -2.41. Effects start to become significant only for 
very high levels of the predictor (see Table 77).  
Table 77: MEM of MO and DU 
Delta-method
morient dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0198458 .0410829 -0.48 0.629 -.1003669 .0606752
2 -.0224168 .0403143 -0.56 0.578 -.1014314 .0565979
3 -.0253218 .039653 -0.64 0.523 -.1030403 .0523968
4 -.0286222 .039057 -0.73 0.464 -.1051725 .0479281
5 -.032378 .0384581 -0.84 0.400 -.1077545 .0429984
6 -.0366363 .0377728 -0.97 0.332 -.1106696 .037397
7 -.041448 .0369274 -1.12 0.262 -.1137881 .0309646
8 -.0466593 .0358974 -1.30 0.194 -.117017 .0236983
9 -.0522393 .034741 -1.50 0.133 -.1203303 .0158518
10 -.0578827 .0335781 -1.72 0.085 -.1236946 .0079293
11 -.0631708 .0324599 -1.95 0.052 -.1267911 .0004494
12 -.0675506 .031167 -2.17 0.030 -.1286368 -.0064644
13 -.0704053 .0291555 -2.41 0.016 -.1275491 -.0132615
[95% Conf. Interval]
p ≤ 0.05
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5.18 Summary measures 
Marginal effect of MO on the probability of choosing SI, MI and DU channels at different values of 
the predictor — The effect of MO is significant for MI channels at p < 0.01 for AME and MEM 
values (see Table 78). 
Table 78: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MO on the probability of choosing SI, MI, DU and 
D-O channels 
Single 
Indirect
Multiple 
Indirect
Dual 
Channels
Direct-only 
AME -0.026 0.057*** -0.043 0.012
(0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029)
MEM -0.024 0.053*** -0.049 0.019
(0.023) (0.020) (0.035) (0.035)
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%. *** = 1%, AME = Average Marginal Effect, MEM = Marginal 
Effects at Mean Values, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effect on the 
probability of
Market 
Orientation
 
Considering different marginal effects for low, mean and high values of the predictor (see Table 79) 
shows that marginal are significant for all values of SI channels. These effects were not visible 
when using single summary measures shown in Table 78. This shows the importance of computing 
different if not all marginal effect values for the predictor range. 
Table 79: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MO on the probability of SI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.080** -0.087**
(0.039) (0.042)
-0.108*** -0.119***
(0.037) (0.042)
-0.122*** -0.136***
(0.032) (0.037)
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Low Value: 3.21, Mean: 4.62, High Value: 5.68.  
 148 
 
 Similarly, all marginal effects for MI channels are significant (see Table 80).  
Table 80: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MO on the probability of MI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.316* 0.286**
(0.173) (0.138)
0.510** 0.446**
(0.248) (0.199)
0.637** 0.557**
(0.253) (0.219)
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Low Value: 3.21, Mean: 4.62, High Value: 5.68.  
 Moreover, all marginal effects for choosing DU channels are significant (see Table 81).  
Table 81: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MO on the probability of DU channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.204** -0.170**
(0.093) (0.077)
-0.296*** -0.246***
(0.101) (0.087)
-0.347*** -0.292***
(0.089) (0.082)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Low Value: 3.21, Mean: 4.62, High Value: 5.68.
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
 
Whereas the single summary measures in Table 78 indicate significant effects only for MI channels, 
other effects become apparent when computing marginal effects for low, mean and high values of 
MO.  
Conclusion for MO — In line with hypothesis H5 is the negative relationship between MO 
and SI channels, which are mostly significant. While the positive relationship with choosing D-O 
channels is also an aspect of H5, none of the marginal effects are significant. Inconsistent with the 
hypothesis is the significant positive effect between choosing MI channels and MO as well as the 
significant negative effect between choosing DU channels and MO. Hence, hypothesis H5 is not 
supported.  
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5.19 Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for MCs 
Predicted probabilities — Figure 17 shows that the probability of choosing an SI channel is 
negatively related to increasing MCs while MI channel choices do not seem to be influenced by 
MCs. In contrast, a clear positive relationship exists between choosing D-O channels and MCs. For 
DU channel choices, the probabilities seem first to increase slightly before decreasing with 
increasing MCs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal effects — Figure 17 indicates a significantly positive relationship between choosing D-O 
channels and MCs for very high levels of MCs. In contrast, a significant negative relationship exists 
with SI channels for very low levels of MCs. 
5.19.1 MCs and singe indirect (SI) channel choice 
Marginal effects are negative ranging from -0.0463 to -0.0207. Effects are significant for very high 
levels of MCs and Z-statistic values range from -0.78 to -2.48 (see Table 82). 
Figure 17: Predicted probabilities and marginal effects marketing 
capabilities 
= marginal effect significant 
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Table 82: Marginal effects (here MEM) of marketing capabilities and SI 
Delta-method
dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 -.0463304 .0596265 -0.78 0.437 -.1631961 .0705354
2 -.0446596 .0559602 -0.80 0.425 -.1543396 .0650204
3 -.0428101 .0517591 -0.83 0.408 -.1442561 .0586359
4 -.0408087 .0471625 -0.87 0.387 -.1332455 .0516281
5 -.0386844 .0423125 -0.91 0.361 -.1216153 .0442465
6 -.0364674 .0373475 -0.98 0.329 -.1096671 .0367323
7 -.034188 .032397 -1.06 0.291 -.0976849 .029309
8 -.0318762 .0275771 -1.16 0.248 -.0859263 .022174
9 -.0295605 .0229877 -1.29 0.198 -.0746156 .0154947
10 -.0272675 .0187117 -1.46 0.145 -.0639419 .0094068
11 -.0250215 .0148157 -1.69 0.091 -.0540597 .0040167
12 -.0228434 .0113541 -2.01 0.044 -.045097 -.0005897
13 -.0207512 .0083791 -2.48 0.013 -.0371738 -.0043285
[95% Conf. Interval]
marketing-
capabilities
p ≤ 0.05
 
5.19.2 MCs and direct-only (D-O) channel choice 
Marginal effects are positive with a relative constant range of change ranging from 0.3564 to 
0.0517 with z-statistic values ranging from 2.75 to 1.13. Effects are significant for only low levels 
of the predictor (see Table 83). 
Table 83: Marginal effects (here MEM) of marketing capabilities and D-O 
Delta-method
dy/dx Std.Err. z P>|z|
1 .0356389 .0129752 2.75 0.006 .010208 .0610698
2 .0379007 .0163618 2.32 0.021 .0058321 .0699692
3 .0400821 .020032 2.00 0.045 .0008201 .0793442
4 .0421522 .023847 1.77 0.077 -.004587 .0888915
5 .0440807 .0276798 1.59 0.111 -.0101706 .0983321
6 .0458389 .0314076 1.46 0.144 -.0157188 .1073966
7 .0474008 .0349109 1.36 0.175 -.0210234 .115825
8 .0487435 .038076 1.28 0.200 -.025884 .1233711
9 .0498485 .0407983 1.22 0.222 -.0301148 .1298118
10 .0507015 .0429876 1.18 0.238 -.0335527 .1349556
11 .0512932 .0445712 1.15 0.250 -.0360648 .1386512
12 .0516196 .0454979 1.13 0.257 -.0375546 .1407938
13 .0516815 .0457395 1.13 0.259 -.0379664 .1413293
[95% Conf. Interval]
marketing-
capabilities
p ≤ 0.05
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5.20 Summary measures 
Marginal effect of MCs on the probability of choosing SI and D-O channels at different values of 
the predictor — Looking at single summary measures of the marginal effects for MCs (see Table 
84) shows that none of the values is significant.  
Table 84: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MCs of the probability of choosing SI, MI, DU and 
D-O channels 
Single 
Indirect
Multiple 
Indirect
Dual 
Channels
Direct-only 
AME -0.030 0.001 -0.012 0.041
(0.026) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033)
MEM -0.031 0.000 -0.017 0.048
(0.026) (0.019) (0.038) (0.039)
Marketing 
Capabilities
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%. *** = 1%, AME = Average Marginal Effect, MEM = Marginal 
Effects at Mean Values, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effect on the 
probability of
 
When computing several marginal effects for low, mean and high levels of the predictor (see Table 
85), the negative relationship effects between MCs and choosing SI channels become significant at 
p < 0.10 for low levels of the predictor and become increasingly significant for mean and high 
levels of MCs.  
Table 85: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MCs on the probability of SI channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
-0.084* -0.088*
(0.044) (0.053)
-0.098** -0.104*
(0.044) (0.055)
-0.108*** -0.117**
(0.042) (0.055)
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
High (1 SD above)
Note: Delta-method standard errors in parantheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Low Value: 3.70, Mean: 4.65, High Value: 5.60.  
In contrast, the significant marginal effects for low levels of MCs and D-O channels (see Table 86) 
do not become apparent when computing marginal effects for different values of the predictor.  
Table 86: Marginal effects (MEM and AME) of MCs on the probability of D-O channels 
Value of Predictor Marginal Effect at Variable Means (MEM) Average Marginal Effect (AME)
0.183 0.158
(0.161) (0.139)
0.229 0.198
(0.200) (0.175)
0.273 0.238
(0.235) (0.209)
High (1 SD above)
Low (1 SD below)
Mean
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Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
0 - 25th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
Asset Specificity ≤ 4.5 > 4.5, ≤ 5 > 5, ≤ 6 > 6
Behavioural Uncertainty ≤ 2.5 > 2.5, ≤ 4 > 4, ≤ 5 > 5
Volatility ≤ 2.5 > 2.5, ≤ 3.5 > 3.5, ≤ 4 > 4
Market Orientation ≤ 3.86 > 3.86, ≤ 4.61 > 4.61, ≤ 5.35 > 5.35
Marketing Capabilities ≤ 4.06 > 4.06, ≤ 4.62 > 4.62, ≤ 5.31 > 5.31
Table 87: Calculation of misalignment variable categories 
Conclusion for marketing capabilities — In line with hypothesis H6 is the significant positive effect 
between choosing D-O channels and high values of MCs. Also in line is the significant negative 
effect for choosing SI channels and low values of MCs. Hence, this indicates marginal support for 
hypothesis H6.  
5.21 Performance 
Calculation of misalignment — Calculations of misalignment are based on Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, and Schilke (2011). First, each independent variable was divided into four equal categories 
based on the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles as can be seen in Table 87. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, the level of misalignment (from 1 to 4) was calculated for each case based on the channel 
categories and categories of each independent variable. For example, the channel category chosen 
by each case was compared to the channel category suggested by the theoretical model. This means 
that a level of AS of “2” would be in line with choosing channel category “2” (MI channels). This 
would result in a fit, that is, the lowest level of misalignment (i.e., “1”). If the case company chose a 
channel category “3” (DU channels), but has an AS level of “2”, this would result in a level of 
misalignment of “2” (see Table 88). 
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The frequency distribution of the different levels of misalignment among the predictor variables is 
shown in Table 89. 
Level Channel category Calculation Misalignment
1 1 |1-1| = 0 1
1 2 |1-2| = 1 2
1 3 |1-3| = 2 3
1 4 |1-4| = 3 4
Asset Specificity
Level Channel category Calculation Misalignment
2 1 |2-1| = 1 2
2 2 |2-2| = 0 1
2 3 |2-3| = 1 2
2 4 |2-4| = 2 3
Asset Specificity
Level Channel category Calculation Misalignment
3 1 |3-1| = 2 3
3 2 |3-2| = 1 2
3 3 |3-3| = 0 1
3 4 |3-4| = 1 2
Asset Specificity
Level Channel category Calculation Misalignment
4 1 |4-1| = 3 4
4 2 |4-2| = 2 3
4 3 |4-3| = 1 2
4 4 |4-4| = 0 1
Asset Specificity
Table 88: Calculation of misalignment 
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Table 89: Misalignment frequencies 
Variable
Level of 
Misalignment
Frequency Percent
1 72 28%
2 93 37%
3 54 21%
4 35 14%
1 47 18%
2 96 38%
3 65 26%
4 46 18%
1 61 24%
2 90 35%
3 70 28%
4 33 13%
1 68 27%
2 86 34%
3 81 32%
4 19 7%
1 77 30%
2 92 36%
3 67 27%
4 18 7%
Asset 
Specificity
Behavioural 
Uncertainty
Volatility
Market 
Orientation
Marketing 
Capabilities
 
Fit calculations for diversity — For the variable, diversity, because the hypothesis based on TCE 
distinguishes only between single and multiple channels, the variable is divided into two categories, 
low and high levels of diversity. It is hypothesised that low levels of diversity fit with choosing a SI 
channel or D-O channels and that high levels of diversity fit with either MI or DU channels (see 
Table 90). 
Table 90: Calculation of fit for diversity and performance 
Channel 
Categories
Non-Fit (0) Fit (1)
1, 4 Fit
2, 3 Non-Fit
2, 3 Fit
1, 4 Non-Fit
Low 
High
Note: 1 = Single Indirect, 2 = Multiple Indirect, 3 = Dual, 4 = Direct-only
Diversity
≤ 4.33
> 4.33
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Performance dummy variable — The dependent variable, performance, is created according to its 
low and high levels using the median value (see Table 91).  
Table 91: Performance dummy variable 
Variable Low (0) High (1)
Performance ≤ 4.67 > 4.83  
Figure 18 displays the conceptual model for testing the normative performance hypotheses. The 
level of misalignment of each predictor variable is hypothesised to influence the performance 
outcome for each firm. In other words, a fit between the diversity a firm faces and its channel 
choice influences their performance. All hypotheses are tested simultaneously using binary logistic 
regression.  
 
Figure 18: Conceptual model for performance 
5.21.1 Logistic regression results for performance 
Model fit — Table 92 shows that the model predicts 80.70 per cent of cases accurately, that is, the 
predicted rather than the actual group membership is correct for 80.70 per cent of the cases.  
Table 92: Performance classification table 
0 1
Performance Dummy Variable 0 47 35 57.3
1 14 158 91.9
Overall Percentage 80.7
Predicted
Observed Percentage Correct
Performance Dummy 
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The model is significant (p < 0.05) with a small chi-square value (16.39). Together with the high 
level of correctly classified cases, the model indicates a good fit.  
Logistic regression results — Table 93 shows that two out of six performance hypotheses are 
supported. For AS, a higher level of misalignment leads to a lower performance (p < 0.01). For 
diversity, a fit between diversity and channel choice leads to a higher performance (p < 0.10). 
Therefore, hypotheses H7 and H10 are supported. Hypotheses concerning misalignment for BU 
(H8), volatility (H9), MO (H11), and MCs (H12) are not supported.  
Table 93: Logistic regression results performance 
Variables
Parameter 
Estimates
Standard 
Error
Control Variables
Market Experience 0.001 0.009
Firm Age 0.001 0.004
International Experience 0.171 0.168
Firm Size 0.178 0.231
Transaction Cost Variables
Misalignment Asset Specificity -1.077*** 0.176
Misalignment Behavioural Uncertainty 0.172 0.176
Misalignment Volatility 0.072 0.168
Fit Diversity 0.537* 0.311
Resource-Based Variables
Misalignment Market Orientation 0.296 0.186
Misalignment Marketing Capabilities 0.243 0.176
Constant 0.319 0.918
N 254
Chi-square 16.39
Significance 0.037
Correctly classified 80.70%
Levels of Significance: * = 10%, *** = 1%  
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Sensitivity analysis – As a robustness check, the performance results are analysed using multiple 
linear regression analysis. If there is a significant relationship between an independent variable (i.e. 
the different levels of misalignment) and the performance variable, I interpret this as support for the 
hypothesis (see also Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & Schilke, 2011). The R² value of 8.4% indicates a 
satisfactory explanatory power of channel choice on performance (Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & 
Schilke, 2011). However, results differ to the logistic regression results. When employing binary 
logistic regression analysis misalignment values for AS and DIV have a statistically significant 
impact on firm performance. In contrast, when employing linear regression analysis, misalignment 
values of BU significantly impact firm performance.  
 
Table 94 Sensitivity analysis - multiple regression Performance 
Variables
Parameter 
Estimates
Standard 
Error
Control Variables
Market Experience 0.081 0.029
Firm Age -0.036 0.607
International Experience 0.158 0.029
Firm Size -0.036 0.342
Transaction Cost Variables
Misalignment Asset Specificity -0.047 0.484
Misalignment Behavioural Uncertainty 0.147** 0.031
Misalignment Volatility 0.013 0.850
Fit Diversity 0.027 0.667
Resource-Based Variables
Misalignment Market Orientation -0.079 0.249
Misalignment Marketing Capabilities -0.044 0.518
N
R²
Significance
Standardised Beta Coefficients. Levels of Significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
254
0.084
0.015
 
 
Therefore, for further robustness checking, I consider quantile regression analysis.
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I compared the OLS regression result with the regression results of the 25th, 50th and 75th quantile. Therefore, in the context of my study, quantile 
regression analysis allows me to analyse: What are the factors influencing performance for firms with low, medium and high performance? After 
running the OLS regression and the 25th, 50th and 75th quantile regression results in Stata/IC 15.0, I plotted the results: 
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The graphs show that there is no significant difference between OLS and quantile regression as the 
quantile regression results are within the confidence intervals of the OLS regression. Quantile 
regression is significantly different from OLS when the OLS coefficient is outside of the quantile 
regression coefficient confidence interval. Therefore, there is no point in using quantile regression 
(Koenker & Hallock, 2001). 
 
In Figure 1, the OLS coefficient is plotted as a horizontal line with the confidence interval as two 
horizontal lines around the coefficient line. The OLS coefficient does not vary by quantiles. The 
quantile regression coefficients are plotted as lines varying across the quantiles with confidence 
intervals around them. If the quantile coefficient is outside the OLS confidence interval then there is 
a significant difference between the quantile and OLS coefficients. However, that is not the case 
here as all quantile regression coefficients are within the OLS confidence interval.  
 
The different results of the performance analysis might stem from a potential bias due to undetected 
endogeneity issues (see limitations). Even though I have followed current guidelines to account for 
endogeneity, newer approaches exist that might be superior to current praxis (e.g. Certo, Busenbark, 
Woo, & Semadeni, 2016). However, this praxis has not been adapted in the current literature as it is 
difficult to implement. Further research is needed to provide guidelines that can be implemented in 
the analysis.  
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5.22 Sensitivity analysis: Comparison of multinomial logit with an ordered logit model 
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An outcome is ordinal when the categories are assumed to be ordered; an outcome is nominal when the categories are assumed to be unordered (Long 
& Freese, 2014). As a sensitivity analysis, I compare the results of the predicted probabilities when using an ordered logit model. The results are 
illustrated in the six graphs above. When fitting the ordinal model, I receive nearly identical results for AS, BU and MCs. However, the results are 
quite different for diversity, volatility and MO. An ordered logit model requires that the changes of the ‘extreme’ categories (i.e., in this case of SI and 
D-O) are in the opposite direction. If this not be the case, an ordinal model forces the data into this pattern and provides misleading results (Long & 
Freese, 2014). When fitting a MNLM, I receive the results that the probabilities for MI channels increase with MO and decrease for DU channels. 
Similarly, I note that the probabilities for DU channels increase with volatility and decrease for D-O channels. This pattern could not be obtained when 
fitting an ordinal model. Therefore, I conclude that the multinomial model is appropriate to this analysis.
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5.23 Sensitivity analysis: Multiple regression — degree of integration  
The multiple regression analysis assesses the relationship between the predictor variables and the 
percentage of direct export (by sales volume) as the dependent variable (i.e., degree of integration). 
The results in Table 94 indicate that AS is significantly positively related to the degree of 
integration, BU and diversity are significantly negatively related to the degree of integration. The 
resource-based variables, MO and MCs, do not influence the degree of integration.  
Table 94: Sensitivity analysis — multiple regression 
Variables
Parameter 
Estimates
Standard 
Error
Parameter 
Estimates
Standar
d Error
Parameter 
Estimates
Standard 
Error
Control Variables
Market Experience -0.094 0.123 -0.089 0.118 -0.088 0.119
Firm Age 0.037 0.051 0.032 0.049 0.031 0.049
International Experience 0.014 2.248 -0.001 2.150 0.000 2.160
Firm Size -0.169** 3.054 -0.181*** 2.919 -0.181 2.937
Transaction Cost Variables
Asset Specificity - - 0.229*** 1.652 0.230*** 1.667
Behavioural Uncertainty - - -0.207*** 1.377 -0.206*** 1.471
Volatility - - -0.025 1.717 -0.026 1.727
Diversity - - -0.186*** 1.681 -0.187*** 1.702
Resource-Based Variables
Market Orientation - - - - 0.009 0.889
Marketing Capabilities - - - - -0.009 0.884
N
R2
Significance
Standardised Beta Coefficients. Levels of Significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%
0.047 0.000 0.000
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
254
0.037 0.147 0.147
 
 Diversity has the opposite effect predicted by TCE; Klein et al, 1990 find similarly that 
diversity negatively relates to vertical integration (see also Carter & Hodgson). 
 Volatility also has (even though not significant) the opposite effect as predicted. 
Interestingly, when measured as a binary variable, volatility has a positive effect on 
integration, but also not significant. 
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5.24 Sensitivity analysis: Binary Logistic Regression — direct versus indirect channel choice 
In the binary logistic regression model, AS is significantly positively related to direct channel 
choice (p<0.05) and BU (in this case, uncertainty regarding a firm’s own employees) significantly 
negatively related to direct channel choice (p<0.01). Thereby supporting TCE that increasing AS 
and BU increases the probability to choose direct channels (see Table 95). 
Table 95: Sensitivity analysis — binary logistic regression 
Variables
Parameter 
Estimates
Standard 
Error
Control Variables
Market Experience -0.015 0.009
Firm Age -0.001 0.004
International Experience 0.317* 0.166
Firm Size 0.269 0.221
Transaction Cost Variables
Asset Specificity 0.298** 0.132
Behavioural Uncertainty -0.375*** 0.122
Volatility 0.189 0.137
Diversity -0.143 .133
Resource-Based Variables
Market Orientation -0.050 0.172
Marketing Capabilities 0.105 0.190
Constant -1.051 1.470
N 202
Chi-square 28.38
Significance 0.002
Correctly classified 64.40%
Levels of Significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%  
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5.25 Summary 
The chapter presents the analysis of the data and the results of the multinomial and binary logistic 
model testing. After assessing the measures using CFA in SPSS/AMOS 23, the model was 
estimated using Stata/IC 14. The results signify a non-linear relationship between the predictor 
variables and the channel choice alternatives, which I illustrated in the predicted probability and 
marginal effect graphs and tables of this thesis. Besides the graphical interpretation of the results, 
summary measures were calculated, which illustrated on the example of BU that summary measures 
are not necessarily enough to capture the full relationship between a predictor and a polynomial 
dependent variable. The performance analysis shows that choosing channels according to the level 
of AS and diversity has a significant positive effect on the performance of the firms. Therefore, 
specific care regarding these two characteristics should be taken by managers when deciding which 
export channel structure to employ. The hypotheses results are depicted in Table 96 and are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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Table 96: Overview of hypotheses 
Hypotheses
H1: The higher the firm's asset specificity, the more direct its channel choice. 
(Single Indirect → Multiple Indirect → Dual Channels → Direct-only).
Partly supported
H7: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of asset specificity have higher 
performance.
Supported
H2: The higher the firm's behavioral uncertainty, the more indirect its channel choice. (Direct-
only → Dual Channels → Multiple Indirect → Single Indirect).
Partly supported
H8: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of behavioural uncertainty have 
higher performance.
Not supported
H3: The higher the fim's volatility, the more direct its channel choice. 
(Single Indirect → Multiple Indirect → Dual channels → Direct-only).
Not supported
H9: Firms that align their export channel choice to the level of volatility in an export country have 
higher performance.
Not supported
H4: The higher the firm's diversity, the more likely the adoption of a multiple channel system as 
opposed to a single export channel. (Single Indirect/Direct-only→ Dual Channels/Multiple 
Indirect)
Partly supported
H10: A fit between diversity and export channel choice will result in higher performance. Supported
H5: The stronger the firm's market orientation, the more direct its channel choice. (Single 
Indirect → Multiple Indirect → Dual Channels → Direct-only).
Not supported
H11: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of market orientation have higher 
performance.
Not supported
H6: The stronger the firm's marketing capabilities, the more direct its channel choice. (Single 
indirect → Multiple Indirect → Dual Channels → Direct-only).
Marginal support
H12: Firms that align their export channel choice to their level of marketing capabilities have 
higher performance.
Not supported
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I summarise TCE’s predictions for the relationship 
between each independent variable with the level of channel integration. Then, I present what the 
literature finds about the relationships between TCE constructs and channel choice. I proceed by 
describing the findings of this thesis as they relate to TCE’s and RBT’s predictions and the 
literature. I then discuss the importance of the theories, TCE and RBT, as they relate to channel 
choice before concluding this chapter. The discussion to follow covers how asset specificity (AS), 
behavioural uncertainty (BU), volatility, diversity, market orientation (MO), and marketing 
capabilities (MCs) are related to the channel choices that firms make. In my model, these choices 
either involve a single indirect (SI), multiple indirect (MI), dual (DU), or direct-only (D-O) channel 
systems.  
6.2 Asset specificity (AS) 
AS refers to the extent that specialised investments are needed to support an exchange (Williamson, 
1981). This thesis focuses on human AS, that is, how much firms need to invest in a salesperson to 
sell their products. For instance, the time needed for a new salesperson to be apprised of the 
products involves a firm investing in that salesperson in a specialised and dedicated manner. This 
investment cannot be redeployed to another salesperson or other applications without a significant 
loss in value (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). In circumstances where the level of AS is 
high, TCE asserts that firms safeguard themselves against the possible opportunistic behaviour of 
independent channel partners (such as sales agents or distributors) by internalising these 
investments, that is, by choosing a direct channel, that is employing their own sales personnel. 
While previous studies find that firms tend to integrate channels somewhat with higher 
levels of AS, the results are mixed and inconclusive. Most support for the positive effect of AS is 
found when human AS affects the choice between an internal sales employee and an independent 
sales agent. Also found is the positive effect of learning and training requirements of a salesperson 
to sell a product when firms choose their own sales personnel (Anderson, 1985, Anderson & 
Coughlan, 1987, Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984). Other research into the choice between other 
direct and indirect channel configurations supports this result such as the positive effect of AS on 
choosing integrated rather than non-integrated channels (Kim & Daniels, 1991). Similarly, a 
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positive effect has been found in choosing DU rather than MI channels (Kabadayi, 2008, Kabadayi, 
2011) and in choosing DU rather than an SI channel (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995).  
Nevertheless, as discussed in the literature review, this finding as it relates to human AS is 
not supported by other studies (e.g. Stapleton & Hanna, 2002), results are more mixed for other 
measures of channel choice (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, & Müller, 2010 who used a scale with the 
anchors 'exclusively indirect' and 'exclusively direct channels' and a scale with the percentage of 
direct sales going through all direct channels), and other measures of AS (e.g. Regan, 1997 who 
used a measure of investments into advertising and information systems). Moreover, results seem to 
differ depending on which channel categories are compared. For example, a negative effect of 
human AS is found on choosing a hybrid channel (joint ventures) instead of a direct one (company 
employees), no effect is found for choosing an indirect (distributors, wholesalers or OEMs) instead 
of a direct channel (sales employees or a sales subsidiary) (McNaughton, 1996). Furthermore, the 
findings by Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) do not support TCE’s prediction of a positive effect on 
channel integration. Their results point in an opposite direction, suggesting that firms would prefer a 
market channel rather than a hybrid one with increasing levels of AS. On the whole, few studies’ 
findings are inconsistent because they suffer from methodological shortcomings that cast doubts 
about the validity of their results (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990).  
To improve the previous mixed results by addressing the limitations of earlier studies, this 
thesis tests transaction cost theory’s predictions about the choice between four export channel 
configurations. This means that the estimation and post-estimation results of the data analysis need 
to be interpreted in combination to understand the effects of the independent variables on the 
different channel choices. Thus, the binary comparisons from Table 50 need to be interpreted in 
light of the results of the predicted probabilities and marginal effects.  
The results of this study indicate that AS is negatively associated with choosing MI channels 
and positively associated with choosing D-O channels. It does not affect the choice of a SI channel 
nor of DU channels. Therefore, some of TCE’s predictions are supported by this model, namely the 
positive relationship between lower levels of AS and choosing a D-O channel as well as the 
negative relationship between mid-to-high levels of AS and choosing MI channels. Firms do not 
choose to employ MI channels once their required specific investments approach a medium level. 
This is in line with TCE’s assertion that firms prefer integrated channels as AS increases. The non-
significant effect for low levels of AS on MI channels indicates these low levels are not yet 
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important enough for the firm to desist from choosing MI channels to avoid possible opportunistic 
behaviour by their independent channel partners.  
As expected, while AS is significantly positively related to choosing D-O channels, it is 
surprising that this effect is significant only for low to mid-levels of AS, but not for higher levels. 
There is no further move towards a D-O channel after a certain level of AS has been reached. This 
means that firms are sensitive to the level of investment they employ for sales personnel especially 
at lower levels than at higher levels. One reason could be that firms that already train sales staff at a 
mid-to-high level are less sensible to the possible opportunistic threats incurred by high levels of 
AS. Contrary to expectations, firms with higher levels of investments thus try not to safeguard these 
investments by relying on channel integration.  
While the previously discussed relationships support TCE’s predictions regarding AS to 
some extent, not all predictions can be supported by the results of this thesis because decisions to 
choose a SI or a DU channel are not influenced by the level of AS that firms face. Inspecting the 
predicted probabilities and marginal effects shows that interpreting only coefficients from binary 
comparisons (see Table 50), as it was practiced in earlier studies, can lead to misinterpretation and 
concluding erroneously (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004, Wulff, 2015).  
After looking at the coefficients from the binary comparisons in Table 50, one can 
determine that AS plays a role for two different choice sets, particularly when choosing between MI 
channels and DU channels, and between MI channels and a D-O channel. This means that the level 
of asset specific investments is important (see Table 50, model C, 4 and 5) because, with an 
increasing level of AS, firms tend to prefer a DU channel or a D-O channel over MI channels. 
Hence, the relationship is supported in the case of the binary choice between MI and DU channels, 
and MI and a D-O channel. The positive effect for choosing DU rather than MI channels is in line 
with Kabadayi (2011) who finds that firms choose DU channels with high levels of investments in 
their independent channel partners.  
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the coefficients from the binary choice 
comparisons determine the direction of the relationship between the independent variables and the 
probability of choosing a specific channel alternative (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004, Wulff, 2015). 
When comparing the choice between MI channels and DU channels, an increase in the level of AS 
positively affect the probability to choose DU channels (see Table 50, number 4 of model B) 
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(0.0407, p < 0.05) and C (0.387, p < 0.05). Yet, when looking at the results of the predicted 
probabilities and marginal effects in Figure 19, it becomes clear that the level of AS does not affect 
the choice of DU channels. Thus, when all four different channel categories are compared, the 
results of the coefficient interpretation from the binary comparisons can differ. This is important as 
previous studies that tried to go beyond a binary choice comparison have overlooked the analyses of 
these crucial post-estimation results. Moreover, previous studies of binary choice sets often mention 
that, while firms in their sample use multiple channels (e.g. He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, 
Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990), they do not include these choices in their analyses. Such research can 
lead to erroneous conclusions when only a limited channel choice set is compared to one another.  
Another important aspect of the relationships between the independent variables and 
channel choice becomes visible with this analysis. The relationships differ depending on the level of 
each predictor. For instance, we can see that AS is positively related to choosing a D-O channel, but 
only for low-to-mid levels. Once a certain level of AS is reached, other factors come into play so 
that AS is no longer the deciding factor for choosing a D-O channel (see Figure 19). This might 
explain why some studies find an effect from, for example, choosing a hybrid channel rather than a 
direct one, but not for choosing a market channel rather than a direct one (McNaughton, 1996). In 
such a case, the positive relationship might only exist for higher levels of AS, or not at all. To 
understand the reasons for the mixed results of earlier studies, additional post-estimation results 
would need to be calculated; this was undertaken in the research of this thesis.   
This analysis also shows that I am uncertain about the results of some of the earlier studies 
(e.g. Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990, McNaughton, 1996) because they have 
not supplemented their coefficient interpretation and binary choice comparisons by interpreting the 
predicted probabilities and marginal effects. This indicates that more research is needed into what 
are the other factors that firms use to choose between the remaining channel configurations that are 
not influenced by TCE factors.  
Furthermore, my results suggest that AS does not influence the likelihood of choosing a SI 
channel. The binary comparisons between choosing an SI channel and any of the other channel 
categories are not statistically significant (see Table 50). Likewise, the marginal effects of choosing 
an SI channel are not statistically significant (see Figure 19). Thus for firms considering a SI 
channel, employing any of the other channel categories might just not be an option for strategic 
reasons, thus leaving the level of specific investments without impact on their channel choice. Yet, 
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the choice of a SI channel is influenced by the level of BU and MO, as can be seen later in this 
chapter.  
6.3 Behavioural uncertainty (BU) 
BU refers to the extent to which it is difficult to assess the performance of a salesperson 
(Williamson, 1981). It can be difficult for firms to assess the level of performance they earn from a 
salesperson in instances when team sales are common, it is difficult to monitor salespeople, firms 
do not receive activity reports, or a sale involves many service requirements that are not easily 
trackable. When it is more difficult for a firm to assess a salesperson’s performance and what 
contributes to a sale with an end customer, having indirect export channels involves higher 
transaction cost. This is because the firm would have to monitor its channel partners more 
thoroughly to determine true performance (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). Therefore, from 
a TCE point of view, firms are more likely to choose hierarchical channels as BU increases.  
Previous channel studies have measured BU by how difficult it is for firms to assess the 
performance of a salesperson without determining if they ask for an internal salesperson or a 
salesperson from a channel partner (e.g. Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). In other instances, 
researchers asked specifically about the difficulty to assess the performance of an independent 
salesperson from independent channel partners such as sales agents or distributors (e.g. Kabadayi, 
2011). Because not all firms in my research sample use independent salespeople, I avoid confusion 
by applying BU to the difficulty to assess the performance of firms’ own sales personnel. This 
means that the relationship between BU and channel integration is reversed in this thesis. As such, 
the higher the BU, the more likely firms are thought to choose a SI, MI or DU channels rather than 
a D-O channel and thus I expect a negative relationship between BU and channel integration. 
In the channel literature, most studies support the effect of BU on channel choice among all 
TCE factors. While the majority support a positive effect for BU on channel integration, some focus 
on the impact of BU relating to multiple channel choice with Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995) 
being the first. They test the influence of BU on DU channel choice using the example of sales 
agents and firms’ own sales personnel to find that firms use the direct channel (their own sales 
employees) to monitor the indirect channel (sales agents) to reduce their BU and possible lock-in 
problems. Lock-in problems might occur when a firm depends too much on their sales agents 
because firms have trained them to sell their products. Then, they are not easily replaceable without 
needing to train new such agents. In that case, sales agents might act opportunistically and demand 
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higher commissions from the firm (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995). Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and 
John (1995) find that, when facing higher BU of sales agents, firms are more likely to choose DU 
channels (i.e., their own employees and sales agents) as opposed to a sales agent alone. This finding 
is supported by Kabadayi (2011) who finds that, as BU increases, firms are more likely to choose 
DU channels than MI ones.  
One limitation of the study by Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John (1995) is that they did not 
incorporate the other channel options of D-O or MI channels. The question thus arises as to whether 
firms are also able to reduce their BU by employing MI channels instead of DU channels, thereby 
using a second indirect channel to monitor the first. This would be a more straightforward and 
possibly more cost effective in reducing BU (Heide, 2003). Firms could then ultimately move 
towards a D-O channel as BU further increases. To address these questions, I tested the impact of 
BU (of own sales employees) on choosing a SI, MI, DU or a D-O channel. The results show that 
firms are less likely to choose D-O channels and more likely to choose a SI channel as the BU of 
their own sales personnel increases. While, in contrast to previous studies, I found that BU does not 
explain DU channel choice, I could show that increasing BU at low levels increases the likelihood 
of firms to choose MI channels.  
6.4 Environmental uncertainty (EU): Volatility and diversity 
The majority of the literature has only investigated in general the influence of volatility on firms’ 
channel choices and organisational mode choices. Only some studies have treated EU as a multi-
dimensional construct consisting of volatility and diversity (e.g. Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990, 
McNaughton, 2002). Volatility refers to the extent to which the environment changes rapidly and 
allows firms to be caught by surprise (Leblebici & Salancik, 1981). In this thesis, volatility refers to 
unforeseeable changes in the market environment caused by customers, competitors and 
intermediaries. Diversity refers to the heterogeneity of a market, that is, a larger number of 
competitors, intermediaries and suppliers motivates more uncertainty in the environment (Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth, 1990). The different results for both constructs are discussed below.  
6.4.1 Volatility 
TCE argues that EU gives rise to information asymmetry which allows third parties such as 
independent sales agents or other intermediaries to behave opportunistically (Klein, Frazier, & 
Roth, 1990). Based on Williamson (1985), internalisation is the governance mechanism that allows 
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firms to counteract such external uncertainty. According to TCE, with increasing EU, the likelihood 
of integration becomes higher (Anderson, 1985, Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007) thus 
safeguarding firms against hazardous opportunistic behaviour by outside intermediaries (Shervani, 
Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). In volatile markets, firms need to adapt to them, which can be 
achieved internally so renegotiation costs are avoided. Failing to adapt may prevent a firm from 
finding a contract partner in the market who can fulfil its changing new requirements. Volatility 
makes it difficult for firms to anticipate the future (Williamson, 1981), because fast changing and 
complex markets prevent contracts from being written that prepare for every eventuality. Since 
volatility motivates information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour by third parties, firms face 
difficulty dealing with outside intermediaries (e.g., sales agents or distributors) and meeting the 
ensuing consequent high transaction costs (Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007).  
Previous findings on the relationship between EU (i.e., as it relates to volatility) and direct 
channel choice (i.e., moving towards the hierarchy option) are mixed (Shervani, Frazier, & 
Challagalla, 2007). For example, Anderson (1985) supports a positive association between volatility 
and the tendency for a firm to employ its own sales personnel. Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1995), 
Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994) finds EU (i.e., as it relates to technological uncertainty) 
positively affecting the degree of direct channel choice. On the other hand, Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, and Schilke (2011) find that technological uncertainty relates negatively to channel 
integration, but positively to market volume uncertainty. John and Weitz (1988) find a positive 
relationship for EU measured by market volatility and direct channel choice. However, Stapleton 
and Hanna (2002) find a negative relationship between volatility and using a direct sales force, as 
do Shervani, Frazier, and Challagalla (2007). Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) find a negative relationship 
between EU and the tendency to move towards more hierarchical channels when measured by 
country risk (i.e., uncertainty regarding country regulations such as tariffs or tax laws). However, 
the results by John and Weitz (1988), Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) and Aulakh and Kotabe 
(1997) need to be treated with caution as their data analysis are mostly limited to a coefficient 
interpretation of their multinomial logit model (MNLM). Overall, the current literature is 
inconclusive with many showing a contrasting, negative relationship between market volatility and 
channel integration.  
The findings of this thesis show that volatility is positively associated with DU channel 
choice and negatively associated with all other channel categories. That is, a statistically significant 
negative relationship exists with MI channels for mid-to-high level of volatility and a statistically 
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significant negative relationship exists with choosing a D-O channel for mid-to-high levels of 
volatility. Choosing a SI channel is also negatively related, but not statistically significant. As 
volatility increases, firms are more likely to choose DU channels significantly across all levels of 
volatility, from low to high (see Figure 14). 
Based on the predictions of TCE, one would expect a positive association between volatility 
and D-O channel choice. However, the predicted probability graph of volatility (see Figure 14) tells 
a different story. Firms are less likely to choose D-O channels with increasing volatility (i.e., 
significant for mean-to-high levels of volatility). My results show that firms seek to manage the 
high transaction costs in volatile markets by employing a DU channel system instead of fully 
integrating their channel system with a D-O channel choice. That is, there is a significant negative 
relationship between high volatility and D-O channels. The results of this study indicate that firms 
are less likely to move towards hierarchical integration (i.e., fully integrating with D-O channels), 
preferring to choose DU channels.  
Thus, one reason for the mixed findings in the literature might result because channel choice 
is treated as a percentage of direct sales in that some studies measure channel integration as such. 
This might indicate one of two things: that firms with a higher direct sales percentage might have 
increased their direct export percentage merely by adding a direct channel to their indirect channel; 
or that firms might have increased their direct export percentage within their DU channel system. 
However, this would not have been visible if channel choice is treated as a percentage of direct 
sales. My research finds that firms do not strive to increase their direct export percentage in order to 
fully integrate their channels. That is not the case for high levels of volatility where the negative 
relationship is significant even though integration should be the highest based on TCE’s 
predictions. Therefore, treating channel choice merely as a percentage of direct sales might be 
misleading because it ignores the variety of channel choices that exists within firms’ channel 
systems.  
My results indicate that firms increasingly employ a DU channel system in more volatile 
markets. This may be because using DU channels allows firms the needed flexibility (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978, Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007) in volatile markets, while also requiring 
them to commit fewer resources than to a D-O channel system. When firms combine a direct 
channel with an indirect one, they need not build and expand their direct channel as much as when 
they would use only the direct channel. As only a part of their sales is going through the direct 
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channel they need not put as many resources into building this channel as they would when using 
only a direct one. Combining a direct channel with more indirect channels might safeguard firms 
against potential opportunistic behaviour and allows them to prepare for unexpected eventualities. 
Thus, it seems firms safeguard themselves in volatile markets by choosing DU channels. This 
strategy would also be in line with portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1991, Rubinstein, 2002) which 
suggests diversification as a means to safeguards against market volatility. 
Moreover, firms in my research sample are less likely to choose MI channels for mid to high 
levels of volatility because using several indirect channels is no way for them to secure themselves 
in a volatile market. They seem to add either a direct or an indirect channel when they face 
volatility as a second pillar, direct or indirect, to fall back on. This result is in line with Kabadayi 
(2011) who finds that, when choosing multiple channels, firms tend to adopt DU channels instead 
of MI channels in volatile markets. Table 50 shows that the same result for the choice between MI 
and DU channels can also be found in the model I use. Models B (0.409, p < 0.05) and C (0.446, p 
< 0.05) depict that firms prefer DU over MI channels with increasing market volatility. However, 
this is not the case for the choice between DU and a D-O channel. Here, the negative relationship 
with increasing market volatility is significant for both Models B (-0.304, p < 0.05) and C (- 0.294, 
p < 0.05). This unexpectedly shows that, with increasing market volatility, firms do not advance to 
a D-O channel, preferring to use a DU channel during all levels of market volatility. 
6.4.2 Diversity 
Only a few studies have previously investigated the effect of a diverse market environment on 
channel choice (e.g. Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990, McNaughton, 2002). Klein, Frazier, and Roth 
(1990) report mixed findings in that, where diversity is negatively related to using a firm’s own 
domestic sales staff (as predicted), no association is found for the choice of a sales subsidiary. 
Furthermore, McNaughton (2002) finds that, with increasing levels of diversity, firms are more 
likely to choose DU channels instead of a D-O channel. Coelho and Easingwood (2005) also find 
mixed effects depending on how they measure diversity. They suggest that customer heterogeneity 
is positively associated with choosing multiple channels rather than a SI channel, intermediary 
heterogeneity (e.g. among distributors) associates negatively with choosing multiple channels, and 
competitor heterogeneity has no effect on channel choice. 
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As anticipated in this thesis, I find that firms are less likely to choose a D-O channel as 
diversity increases. This is significant across the whole range of diversity (see Figure 22). Firms are 
also more likely to choose DU channels for low- to mid-levels of diversity while diversity does not 
influence choosing neither a SI nor MI channels. As well, as diversity increases, early-on firms 
strive to add another channel category, direct or indirect, to help them deal with a more diverse 
market. A larger number of market players (i.e., end-users, competitors and intermediaries) is better 
catered for with a DU channel system. However, this is significant only for low- to mid-levels of 
high diversity firms. One reason might be that, when diversity becomes too high, firms steer into 
other product categories or decide to focus on a niche within their market to reduce the diversity 
they have to deal with.  
Moreover, comparing the results of diversity and volatility, firms seem to be influenced 
more strongly by a volatile market than by a diverse market when choosing DU channels, which is 
contrary to my expectations. Therefore, the uncertainty caused by a volatile market influences the 
choice of DU channels more strongly than the complexity introduced by a diverse market. Thus, 
firms seem to want to ‘hedge’ their risk in a volatile, unpredictable market more strongly than in a 
complex, diverse market. Because diversity does not influence DU channel choice as strongly as 
volatility, DU channels do not serve mainly as a means to supply a more diverse market with more 
market players. Rather, they assist firms to prepare themselves for future, unpredictable market 
changes caused by volatility. Thus firms seem to be able to manage diversity more easily than 
unpredictable volatility. 
It is also notable that MI channels do not seem an alternative choice to DU channels when 
firms face increasing volatility or diversity. Even though a positive relationship exists between 
diversity and MI channel choice, its effect is small and non-significant. For volatility, the 
relationship is negative and significant for mid to high-levels, which shows that MI channels are not 
a fitting means to deal with a volatile market. Firms do not use several indirect channels (e.g., sales 
agents and intermediaries) to deal with unforeseeable changes in the market environment. This 
result accords with McNaughton (2002) who finds that diversity is positively associated with 
choosing multiple channels. Yet, McNaughton (2002) does not distinguish between different types 
of multiple channels preferring to use D-O channels as the base category, which is contrary to 
TCE’s assumption of an indirect channel (i.e., the market mode) as the default option. Nevertheless, 
McNaughton (2002) indicates the positive influence of diversity on multiple channel choice, from 
which we can discern that this positive association is valid only for DU, but not MI, channels.  
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 Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) is one of the few studies that looks at the impact of diversity 
on channel choice, distinguishing between three categories (indirect, hybrid and direct). However, 
these results do not induce certainty about the true relationships in their study as their analysis used 
only a pairwise comparison of coefficients, which is equivalent to Table 50 in this thesis. This 
comparison finds that firms are less likely to export from home as diversity increases, which agrees 
with the significant negative relationship between diversity and D-O channel choice in this thesis.  
6.5 Market orientation (MO) 
MO refers to the generation, dissemination and responsiveness to market intelligence (Kohli & 
Jaworski, 1990). The generation of market intelligence encompasses activities such as doing in-
house research, dissemination of market intelligence can be comprised by tasks such as discussing 
market trends within the firm and responsiveness to market intelligence contains decisions such as 
reacting to competitor price changes (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993, Kohli & Jaworski, 1990, Morgan, 
Vorhies, & Mason, 2009). 
The predominance of TCE in both channel choice research and mode choice research in 
general has led to calls for studies that alternatively (i.e., complementary or competing) explains 
those choices such as the RBT (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). He, Brouthers, and 
Filatotchev (2013) offer one of the few alternative explanations of channel integration and one of 
the first to add the value creation side of exporting. They specifically study the impact of MO on the 
choice between hierarchical and hybrid export channels. As a learning capability, MO might be 
especially important to exporting as it allows firms to gather information about their new market 
(He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013). In their study of Chinese exporters, they find that MO is 
positively associated with choosing hierarchical export channels (i.e., wholly-owned subsidiaries or 
exporting from home) instead of hybrid channels (i.e., joint ventures or sales agents). Because they 
note that several firms use multiple channels, He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) call for 
research that investigates resource-based capabilities relating to multiple channel choice. They also 
call for research into other resource-based advantages that a firm might possess. To address this gap 
in the literature and previous calls for a joint test of TCE and RBT theories (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, Brouthers, 2013, Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013), this thesis 
investigates the impact of MO and MCs on multiple channel choice.  
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The results of my research show that MO is positively related to choosing MI channels, 
except when high levels of MO are involved. In contrast, I also find both that MO is associated 
negatively with choosing DU and SI channels for higher levels of MO; and that firms are 
increasingly likely to choose MI channels as their level of MO increases. Yet, at high levels of MO, 
this effect becomes insignificant. Considering that a significant negative relationship exists between 
a high level of MO and DU channel choice, firms are not likely to switch from a MI channel system 
to a DU channel system at high levels of MO. For high levels of MO, firms are significantly less 
likely to choose a SI channel and less likely to employ DU channels. As firms are less likely to 
choose a SI channel and DU channels at high levels of MO, they either continue to choose MI 
channels or employ a D-O channel. However, neither one of these effects is significant in this 
thesis.  
From a resource-based view, firms with a high level of MO will choose a D-O channel 
rather than MI channels because this structure allows firms to make better use of their capabilities 
and retain their tacit market knowledge. This is difficult to transfer to other organisations or 
intermediaries. Similar to the results of AS, the research of this study shows important differences 
that were not visible in previous studies. Table 50 [Model C, (5)] shows that firms in this sample 
prefer MI channels over D-O channels with increasing levels of MO. However, Figure 23 clarifies 
that this is true only for low to mid-levels of MO, but not for high levels of MO where this effect 
becomes insignificant.  
Notably, the results of my research cannot support the results by He, Brouthers, and 
Filatotchev (2013) where they find a significant positive relationship between MO and choosing 
hierarchical channels (i.e., wholly-owned subsidiaries and exporting from home). One of the 
reasons for the differing results might be the divergent strategies followed by firms from emerging 
compared to industrialised countries. German firms might rely more on other resource-based 
advantages like technological know-how, product quality or brand image and do not predominantly 
adopt a market-oriented approach like Chinese exporters (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, 
Murray, Gao, Kotabe, & Zhou, 2007). In that case German firms would align their channels with 
other resources and capabilities even when they have a higher MO.  
 178 
 
6.6 Marketing capabilities (MCs) 
MCs refer to skills and knowledge that fulfil the market-related needs of a firm. In this study, MCs 
are comprised of pricing, product, marketing communication, selling, marketing planning and 
marketing implementation capabilities (Morgan, Vorhies, & Mason, 2009, Vorhies & Morgan, 
2005) 
Compared to MO, MCs do not influence firms’ channel choices as strongly to the extent that 
the binary choice comparison in Table 50 shows none of the effects for MCs to be significant. 
However, Figure 24 does display how some effects become significant at very low and very high 
levels of MCs in that, for very low levels, firms are less likely to choose a SI channel. In contrast, 
for very high levels of MCs, firms are more likely to choose a D-O channel. Both of these effects 
agrees with RBT in that firms can better use their capabilities when they internalise them in their 
export channel structure. Thus by employing direct channels, they can capitalise on their MCs when 
exporting.  
Because the effect of MCs only becomes significant at the extreme (i.e., very low and very 
high) poles, it indicates a different effect of MCs and MO on channel choice. While the effects of 
MCs are in line with RBT, this is not so for MO in that firms are more likely to opt for MI channels 
with increasing levels of MO.  
6.7 Performance  
TCE’s strengths lies in its normative claim (Williamson, 1975): firms that align their mode choices 
with transaction cost considerations will outperform firms that do not. This is because efficiency is 
enhanced and transaction costs minimised when the chosen governance arrangement aligns with the 
transaction cost factors of the exchange. Although research into the performance implications of 
channel choices are scarce (Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, & Schilke, 2011), testing the performance 
outcome of these choices is imperative to understand the impact of TCE tenets so that it relates 
more to managerial practice. 
Previous findings on the performance impact of mode choices (e.g., foreign entry mode 
choices) have been mixed. Whereas some studies mostly support the normative strengths of TCE 
(e.g. Brouthers & Nakos, 2004, He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013), others differed (David & Han, 
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2004, Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). The few studies on the performance implications of 
channel choice produced mixed results. While Kabadayi (2011) finds that firms with a better fit 
between their multiple channel choice system and transaction cost factors perform better, the studies 
by Brettel, Engelen, and Müller (2010) and Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and Schilke (2011) are more 
varied. While both support aligning channels with the level of AS, the results for EU differ with 
both not supporting the performance effect of BU. However, both studies tested each variable 
separately instead of the full model at once. 
The results of my research show mixed support for TCE’s normative claims. The findings 
strongly support the role of aligning channel choices to the level of AS. Firms that do so show a 
significant higher performance than firms that do not. In addition, the results somewhat support the 
need to align channel choices to the level of diversity in the export market. My findings suggest that 
AS is the most important factor influencing a high performance outcome when choosing export 
channels. This accords both with Williamson’s (1985) assertion that AS is the most important factor 
influencing governance decisions; and Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and Schilke (2011) explanation of 
the performance impact of TCE. They say that AS most strongly affects performance in the context 
of new entrepreneurial ventures’ channel choices. My research shows that AS not only plays a 
major role for the channel choice performance of new firms, but also for well-established ones.    
In contrast, firms that align their channel choices with their resources, MO and MCs, do not 
perform highly. These results contrast with He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) who find that 
firms choosing hierarchical export channels when MO is high, and hybrid export channels when 
MO is low significantly outperform firms who do not align their choices in this way. 
Based on this analysis, AS is most important in contributing to higher performance. Firms 
should give AS prior consideration when deciding which export channels they should use. This is in 
line with the finding by Chang, Chung, and Moon (2013) who find that wholly-owned subsidiaries 
outperform joint ventures with local partners in industries with high levels of intangible assets. 
In this analysis, I have followed current guidelines in the literature (e.g. Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, & Schilke, 2011, Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2008, He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 
2013) to pay attention to endogeneity when analysing the performance effect of mode choices. 
However, there exist newer guidelines for management research to attend to this issue (Certo, 
Busenbark, Woo, & Semadeni, 2016). Yet, this praxis has not been adapted in the current literature 
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as it is difficult to implement (Martin, 2013)15. The difficulties are for instance caused by the need 
to find an instrument and the current lack of information in the entry mode and channel choice 
literature of a description or definition what a good instrument is. Future research endeavours are 
needed to provide a definition and example of how to find such an instrument for entry mode and 
channel choice research that can be implemented in the analysis.  
                                                 
15 I thankfully acknowledge this reviewer comment to directing me to this issue. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This chapter provides a conclusion of the key findings of this study. This research recognises the 
variety of firms’ channel choices today and provides a refined understanding of strategic channel 
choice decisions in export markets. It also discusses managerial implications as well as limitations 
and suggestions for further research.  
7.1 Why do firms choose different export channel configurations in the same market? 
The main goal of this study was to understand the phenomenon of firms having more than one 
export channel in the same market for the same product or product line. To answer this research 
puzzle, three research questions were stated: 
7.1.1 RQ 1: How do transaction cost factors affect multiple export channel choice?  
Multiple channels are well represented among the sample firms, where over 60 per cent use more 
than one export channel. The results show that transaction cost factors have different effects on the 
preference of choosing some export channel configurations over others, depending on the level of 
the specific TCE variable.  
Asset specificity 
When multiple channel configurations are considered, AS has a positive impact on choosing a D-O 
channel (for low-to-mid levels of AS) and a negative impact on choosing MI channels (for mid-to-
high levels of AS). The level of AS does not affect the choice of DU channels or a SI channel.  
Behavioural uncertainty 
BU has a positive impact on choosing a SI channel (for low-to-mid levels of BU) and a negative 
impact on choosing a D-O channel (for lower to high levels of BU). BU does not impact the choice 
of MI or DU channels.  
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Volatility 
Environmental volatility has a positive impact on choosing DU channels (for all levels of VOL) and 
a negative impact on choosing MI channels (for mid-to-high levels of VOL) as well as a negative 
impact on choosing a D-O channel (for mid-to-high levels of VOL). 
Diversity 
In the case of environmental diversity, choosing a SI channel is negatively related to DIV (for all 
levels) and positively related to choosing DU channels (for low-to-mid levels of DIV). It does not 
affect the choice of a SI or MI channel.  
7.1.2 RQ 2: How do capability-based factors affect multiple export channel choice? 
Besides efficiency considerations, another key point of this study was to investigate the value 
creation potential of capabilities on multiple export channel choice.  
Market orientation 
MO has a positive impact on choosing MI channels (for low-to-mid levels of MO) and a negative 
impact on choosing DU channels (for mid-to-high levels of MO) and on a SI channel (for mid-to-
high levels of MO). MO does not affect the choice of a D-O channel. 
Marketing capabilities 
Marketing capabilities have a positive impact on choosing a D-O channel (for very high levels) and 
a negative impact on choosing a SI channel (for very low levels). They do not affect the choice of 
MI or DU channels.  
7.1.3 RQ 3: What are the performance implications of multiple export channel choice?  
The resource-structure-performance paradigm of the RBT (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen Jr, 2001, 
He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004) posits that firms should align 
their organisational structure with their resources and capabilities to achieve optimal performance. 
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The results indicate that firms who align their export channel choice with their level of AS generate 
higher performance than firms who do not align their channel structure with their level of AS. 
Similarly, diversity impacts the performance outcome of firms in that firms that face a low level of 
diversity are better off choosing a SI or a D-O channel whereas firms with a high level of diversity 
should choose either MI or DU channels to increase their performance. However, no performance 
effect was found for aligning the channel choice with the remaining TCE and RBT variables. 
Regarding the sensitivity analysis, AS is also significantly related to performance when the analysis 
is run as a binary logistic regression (direct vs. indirect channel choice) or as a multiple regression 
(degree of integration using direct export percentage). Diversity also has a significant impact on 
performance for the multiple regression analysis, with a negative relationship to the degree of 
integration. In case of the binary regression, no effect is found for diversity. However, BU has a 
significant negative performance effect for both of the sensitivity analyses, but not for the MNML 
regression.  
7.2 Relevance of TCE versus RBT for channel choice  
Overall, the findings indicate mixed support for TCE’s tenets on channel integration. Reflected in 
the findings is the tendency to prefer a D-O channel over MI channels as AS increases. Support for 
TCE’s predictions can also be found by the preference for a single or MI channel and lower 
preference for a D-O channel as the BU of firms’ own sales employees increases. Similarly, the 
relationships with diversity and channel choice behave as I predicted, to some extent. Firms prefer 
to choose a DU channel over a D-O channel in dealing with a diverse market environment. 
Surprising is the relationship between a volatile market environment and channel choice in that 
firms tend to prefer a DU channel throughout all levels of volatility and a negative tendency 
towards both MI and D-O channels. 
 Taking a resource-based theory perspective, we can further understand why firms choose 
these multiple channel configurations. In particular, MO capabilities contribute to explaining why 
firms choose a MI channel and avoid DU and SI channels for high levels of MO. Also aiding our 
understanding is the effect of MCs, which shows that firms with a high level prefer to choose a D-O 
channel and avoid having a SI channel as their level of MCs increases.  
 TCE remains the main determinant explaining firms’ channel choices and it also dominates 
in explaining multiple export channel choices. However, there is scope for further inquiry into TCE 
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determinants.  Research has only just begun to tap into the potential of theories other than TCE to 
explain the complexities of firms’ channel choices. Further studies are needed to understand which 
variables are important for the channel choices that are not influenced by transaction cost 
determinants.   
Overall, the findings suggest that TCE offers explanations when firms move towards a more 
direct channel choice. Based on the sensitivity analysis using direct export percentage as the 
dependent variable, three out of four TCE constructs (i.e., AS, BU and diversity) significantly 
predict when firms more directly choose export channels (see Section 5.22). Similarly, two out of 
four TCE constructs (i.e., AS and BU) significantly predict when firms choose direct versus indirect 
export channels (see Section 5.23). However, TCE does not predict export channel choices to the 
same extent when the interest is to explain firms’ channel choices in more detail, including multiple 
channel systems. Each TCE factor influences at least two of the four different channel categories, 
but only in a certain level of the particular TCE predictor. That is, AS influences choosing MI and 
D-O channels, BU influences choosing a SI and D-O channel, volatility has impact on the decision 
between a MI, DU and a D-O channel whereas diversity influences the choice of a DU and a D-O 
channel.  
In contrast, the resource-based constructs do not explain the level of direct export channel 
choice nor direct versus indirect export channel choice (see sensitivity analysis Section 5.22 and 
Section 5.23). Nevertheless, MO aids in explaining multiple export channel choices. The more 
market-oriented firms are, the more they are likely to choose MI export channels and less likely to 
choose DU export channels. In addition, high market-oriented firms are also less likely to choose 
only a SI channel. Overall, TCE factors are of greater importance to channel decisions than are RBT 
determinants.  
With regards to the performance implications of TCE, the importance of aligning export 
channel choices with the level of AS of firms is illustrated by the logistic regression results in Table 
92. This supports Williamson’s (1985) assertion that AS is the most important determinant for 
firms’ governance choices. Previously, TCE has been criticised for being inadequate to study 
multiple channel systems (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, & John, 1995). Considering that TCE factors do 
not explain all of the studied channel decisions, it has become clear that more research is needed 
that helps explain which other factors come into play when making those decisions.  
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The literature suggests that performance can not only be improved by efficiency 
considerations when choosing the right export channel structure, but also by effectively deploying 
resources and capabilities to generate greater rents (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). RBT may offer 
potential insights that enrich TCE considerations on mode choice (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & 
Aguinis, 2013) as both exchange hazards and the potential for value creation play a role for 
integration decisions (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013, Williamson, 1999). Li, He, and 
Sousa (2016) call for further research on combining cost-oriented with value creation approaches 
when studying channel choice and its performance outcomes. They specifically suggest to combine 
the already identified capabilities such as market orientation (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013) 
with other resources such as marketing capabilities to extend the RBV in export channel research. 
He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) found that Chinese exporters with a strong MO prefer 
hierarchical export channels whereas exporters with a weak MO prefer hybrid export channels and 
that firms that align their channel choice with their level of MO generate better performance results 
compared to those who do not align their channel structure to their MO level. Compared to these 
results, in my study I found that firms with a low-to-mid level of MO tend to choose MI channels 
whereas firms with a mid-to-high level of MO are averse to choosing a SI or DU channels. 
However, the results of my study do not provide insight about what kind of export channel 
configuration firms with a high level of MO prefer. In contrast to the study by He, Brouthers, and 
Filatotchev (2013), the level of MO does not have a performance effect in my analysis.  
One explanation for these contrary results could be the different types of sample used in 
both studies. While He, Brouthers, and Filatotchev (2013) used a sample from an emerging 
economy, Chinese exporting firms, my study was executed on a sample of well-developed German 
companies in a technologically advanced industry. A key competitive skill of German firms in this 
industry is their specific know-how and technological advantage as well as their high level of 
international experience which makes them the leading firms in this industry. In contrast, Chinese 
firms lack such advantages (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000) wherefore they need to 
rely much more strongly on other resources and capabilities, such as employing a high level of 
market orientation (He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Murray, Gao, Kotabe, & Zhou, 2007). 
Having a market-oriented approach to their export strategy might be of great importance for 
Chinese exporters, whereas German firms rely much more strongly on other resources and 
capabilities when exporting. Thus, MO might just not have the same level of importance for 
German exporters than for Chinese ones and hence MO does not influence their performance in the 
same way.  
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The differing resource structures between firms from emerging and developed countries 
would also provide some explanation for the preference of MI channels with an increasing level of 
MO (from low-to-mid levels) in this study. In contrast to firms from emerging markets who look for 
new skills in their international partners, developed market firms strive to leverage their existing 
resources through international partner selection which is why they emphasise local market 
knowledge and access. Hence, firms with an increasing level of MO are more likely to choose MI 
channels which allows them to have access and learn more about the market from their independent 
channel partners.  
Even though MO does not have a performance impact in this study, the level of MO does 
influence the choice of channel in the sample firms, especially the choice of MI channels. In 
contrast, marketing capabilities impact channel choice only at the extreme levels of very low/high 
marketing capabilities and also do not have an impact on performance. As the literature has called 
for further inquiry on other resources such as marketing capabilities (Li, He, & Sousa, 2016), it 
would be interesting whether they are of greater importance for firms from other industries or 
emerging countries. Since the application of RBT in channel choice research is just at the beginning 
(Li, He, & Sousa, 2016), these results should be used as a starting point for further inquiries.  
7.3 Theoretical contributions 
This research contributes theoretically and methodologically to the international business and 
strategy literature. It contributes to existing channel choice research by extending existing binary 
research inquiries to include more than two choice outcomes as well as multiple channel 
configurations. By doing so, this thesis extends existing transaction cost explanations to a broader 
and more varied choice set. In addition, this thesis extends resource-based explanations of channel 
choice to include multiple channel configurations and contrasts both theories in one research model. 
Further, by assessing the performance outcome of aligning channel choices with transaction cost 
and resource-based considerations, it contributes to the channel literature by assessing what 
contributes to superior export performance.  Following are contributions to theory. 
First, the thesis extends the ideas of transaction cost theory to the context of multiple 
channel choice in export markets. Hence, it addresses some limitations of previous research and 
responds to the calls in the literature for research into multiple export channels (e.g. He, Brouthers, 
& Filatotchev, 2013, Li, He, & Sousa, 2016). Most channel choice studies consider only binary 
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choice outcomes. Even those studies that investigate more than two choice sets have omitted 
important parts of their analysis and thus fall short of a complete analysis. Because they relate a 
choice outcome only to the base category or compare it to another category, they ignore that the 
choices are intricately linked (Wulff, 2015). These approaches have thus created ambiguity about 
previous findings, making it difficult to be robust. This research improves our understanding about 
the factors that determine these more complex channel decisions and how they can aid firms 
leverage their capabilities overseas. Specifically, this approach shows when each channel 
configuration is chosen at different levels of the predictors. Thus, it provides a more fine-grained 
analysis of the channel decisions firms face today. Therefore, this study offers a more refined 
understanding of the channel choice phenomenon than is currently available in the literature. 
 
Second, it provides a new theoretical perspective on multiple channel choice by using 
resource-based theory (RBT). This study also extends the literature by analysing two critical 
resources for value creation: market orientation (MO) and marketing capabilities (MCs), thus 
answering calls for investigating other resources and capabilities as they relate to export channel 
choice. In doing so, this thesis addresses a significant criticism of the RBT: that it lacks 
explanations of how firms can use their resources and capabilities to create value. Moreover, this 
thesis responds to the criticism that TCE overemphasises efficiency in governance decisions at the 
expense of value creation needs when exporting (Brettel, Engelen, & Müller, 2010, Brouthers, 
2013, He, Brouthers, & Filatotchev, 2013, Kozlenkova, Samaha, & Palmatier, 2014). 
 
Finally, this thesis analyses the performance implications of following transaction cost-
based efficiency recommendations compared to following resource-based value creation tenets. 
This answers the calls by Li, He, and Sousa (2016) to investigate the performance implications of 
export channel choice as well as the call by Brettel, Engelen, Mueller, and Schilke (2011) to test the 
performance implications of TCE factors concurrently in one model.  
 
This study offers a novel, more refined decision-making tool of channel choice than is 
provided by common regression analysis. In orthodox regression analysis, we identify a relationship 
between X and Y in the way that Y either de- or increases with increasing X. In contrast, my 
analysis enables a more nuanced view on how a relationship changes over a range of variables.  It 
allows us to gain theoretical insight by providing a more detailed picture on the range of influence 
of certain variables on channel choice. This helps managers to take a more nuanced decision 
making approach which might help them to improve their channel decisions and ultimately 
performance outcomes. Researchers should do more research in this manner as this way of analysis 
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provides greater insight compared to the usually applied zero-sum approach of binary or multiple 
regression analyses. This approach also pays heed to the multifaceted choice possibilities of firms 
when deciding about their export channel structure.  
 
For instance, when looking at the example of AS, regular regression analysis gives us much 
less information compared to an MNML approach. When employing a multiple regression analysis, 
as is done in the sensitivity analysis, we observe that AS has a significantly positive impact on 
degree of integration. Thus, we gain the information that with an increasing level of AS, firms are 
more likely to increase their level of direct export percentage. Similarly, in the case of a binary 
logistic regression, we see that firms are more likely to choose a direct export channel as opposed to 
an indirect one with increasing AS.  
 
The predicted probability graph of my study confirms that there is a positive relationship 
between AS and direct channel choice, but only for low-to-mid levels of AS. Moreover, this 
relationship exists only for a D-O channel, but not for DU channels. Further, we can see that there 
exists a negative relationship between AS and indirect channel choice, but only for MI channels, not 
for a SI channel and also this relationship holds only for mid-to-high levels of AS. As a result, we 
can detect that the level of AS and direct export channel choice is important only for firms with 
lower levels of AS. They seem to be more sensitive to their level of AS and strive to protect their 
specific assets against opportunistic actions by increasingly choosing a D-O channel. However, as 
the level of AS reaches a medium level, AS does not influence this choice anymore and other 
factors come into play.  Previously, it was assumed that this relationship holds for all levels of AS 
and we did not know how the choice of a D-O channel is related to the three remaining channel 
options at the same time.  
7.4 Methodological contributions 
The thesis provides a comprehensive methodological analysis of choosing between multiple 
channel options. It thereby addresses the limitations in the channel choice literature that have led to 
an incomplete analysis of models with more than two channel choices. In ordinary least squares 
(OLS) models, a directional hypothesis is tested by assessing the sign and statistical significance of 
an independent variable’s estimated coefficient (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). However, in limited 
dependent variable (LDV) models, the coefficient does not indicate the direction of the relationship 
of interest (Wulff, 2015). Nevertheless, research commonly uses only a single model coefficient of 
a variable to interpret their results, thus comparing the probability of one channel choice alternative 
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to another one. Such research is limited in proffering how a predictor is related to the probability of 
one channel choice relative to a base category (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009, Wulff, 2015), which is 
typically the market option (e.g. Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997, Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). Yet, a 
single coefficient indicates only how two channel categories are related. It does not signify how a 
predictor relates to a channel category overall (Wulff, 2015). Hence, a single predictor cannot be 
used to test hypotheses about the effect of a single predictor on the probability of a choice outcome 
(Wulff, 2015). This thesis rather allows statements to be made about how each channel category 
relates to one another by comparing all four channel categories at once and by fully analysing the 
multinomial logit model (MNLM) using predicted probabilities and marginal effects.  
 
The thesis contributes to the literature by illustrating the different marginal effects across the 
range of the predictors. This study demonstrates how the marginal effects vary for the range of a 
predictor. For each predictor variable, the marginal effects are significant for some values while 
being insignificant for others. Hence, it is crucial for further studies using multinomial logistic 
regression to analyse the full range of marginal effects for each predictor variable. Only then are 
conclusions about the test of a hypothesis possible.   
 
This study graphically interprets the predicted probabilities and marginal effects that are 
required to analyse the effects in discrete choice models with multiple outcomes completely (Wulff, 
2015).  A graphical interpretation has not been provided previously by other channel choice studies. 
These computations enable a determination of the relationship between an independent variable and 
multiple modes of channel choice for which the sign of a single estimated model coefficient is not 
sufficient.   
7.5 Implications for managers 
Besides the contributions mentioned so far in this chapter, this study contributes pragmatically to 
the work of managers in three specific ways. It provides an analytical basis for managers to assess 
and compare their multiple export channel configurations in export markets. Having the means to 
determine what makes certain export channels more or less successful than others is crucially 
important to sales managers and CEOs so they might understand how to improve them.  
It motivates managers to negotiate the complexity of multiple export channel structures and 
thus challenges them to improve their analytical skills for fine-grained decision-making related to 
their sales and distribution strategies. The research of this thesis specifically guides managers in 
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how to pay heed to the level of asset specificity (AS) when exporting abroad and the direct 
performance implications associated with it.  
It apprises managers on the diversity of the market so that when they face a diverse export 
market environment they are better off using a multiple export channel system, that is, either a dual 
(DU) or a multiple indirect (MI) channel configuration. Overall, adapting firms’ export channel 
systems with efficiency by considering transaction costs seems to more substantially affect 
performance than adjusting the channel structure to maximise capability use.  
The complexity of multiple channel configurations requires managers to have better 
decision making approaches that aid them in making the right choices and allow for a coordinated 
export approach. This study helps managers to understand more about the drivers of the different 
channel configurations and which choice sets are to be preferred in their specific situation.  
7.6 Limitations and further research  
There are also some limitations to the research of this thesis, which could be addressed in future 
studies.  This study focuses on a single country, Germany, which being a highly industrialised and 
advanced economy, provides a valuable site for this research particularly as it relates to multiple 
export channel choice. Although Germany’s mechanical engineering industry contains some of the 
most successful companies in the world with highly developed export channel systems, it has not 
drawn the attention from researchers in the channel choice literature. I acknowledge that focusing 
on a specific niche in one country might limit the influence of other confounding variables. 
However, future research could respond by targeting different countries and industries so as to 
generalise the results and even detect important nuances and variations that different cultures, 
values and norms in other countries would provide. 
 In addition, this study was executed using cross-sectional data. Future research could 
contribute to the literature by using longitudinal data to determine how multiple channel 
configurations develop and change over time. For example, it would be interesting both to see 
whether firms use different channel configurations only temporarily before advancing to other 
configurations or whether these choices remain stable. 
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 The questionnaire for primary data collection was completed by knowledgeable informants, 
typically a CEO or an executive sales manager. However, using only one principal informant limits 
the objectivity of this study. Therefore, future studies could enhance the validity of their results by 
using multiple informants or assembling additional secondary data. 
 While this study adds to our knowledge of two market-related capabilities, research on 
multiple channel choice from a resource-based perspective is in its infancy. Therefore, future 
research could contribute greatly to our knowledge if it were to investigate the value-creating 
potential and mechanisms of other resources that influence firms’ channel choices. Future research 
could achieve this by being more thorough in examining which capabilities are more important for 
determining channel choice in circumstances where the effects of MO and MCs were insignificantly 
related to export channel choice. 
Furthermore, there exists an alternative view in the strategic management literature (e.g. 
Argyres & Zenger, 2012, Mahoney & Qian, 2012). Rather than arguing for contrasting TCE and 
RBT as “opposite sides of the same coin” (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013), these 
authors argue for a combination of two or more theories based on a ‘market frictions’ (Mahoney & 
Qian, 2012) or a ‘govern to learn’ (Argyres, 2011) approach. Argyres and co-authors (e.g. Argyres, 
Felin, Foss, & Zenger, 2012, Argyres & Zenger, 2012) suggest a different combination of 
capabilities and transaction cost perspectives to explain how governance choices affect firms’ 
abilities to create capabilities. In contrast, Mahoney and Qian (2012) go further to advance a new 
research agenda that enables different theory combinations based on the lens of market frictions. 
That is, to dissect a research problem into the market frictions behind it, to allow new and different 
combinations of existing theories to advance theory development. 
 There likely exist other multiple channel configurations and strategies in other industries and 
countries as well as in service firms. Their determinants and roles for different firms have not yet 
been explored.  As research into multiple export channel selection is in its infancy, it provides a 
potentially promising field for further enquiry.  
Finally, the performance analysis of this study is limited by the potential bias stemming from 
undetected endogeneity issues, should endogeneity exist in the estimation. Even though, I have 
followed current guidelines to account for endogeneity in strategy research, newer approaches exist 
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(e.g. Certo, Busenbark, Woo, & Semadeni, 2016) that might be superior to the current praxis in the 
literature.  
7.7 Concluding remarks 
Despite the growing emergence of multiple channels used in exporting, this topic has long been 
overlooked in the literature. The aim of this study is to extend the channel choice literature by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of a multiple export channel choice, thereby offering managers 
a better analytic approach to identify their best channel structure. The results suggest different 
effects for each predictor on choosing the right channel structure, with AS and diversity having 
measureable performance outcomes.  
This study contributes to theory in extending the transaction cost lens to multiple channel 
choice. In addition, it employs a new theoretical perspective, resource-based theory, on multiple 
export channel decisions.  As such, it addresses an important gap in the resource-based literature, 
namely, research into how firms can leverage their resources and capabilities in organisational 
processes. In doing so, this study contributes to narrowing the “black box” of resource-based 
inquiry and addresses the criticism of the unilateral emphasis on efficiency considerations of 
transaction cost theory. By providing an analysis of the performance implications of multiple 
channel choice, this study addresses the limited knowledge about the performance effects of such 
choices. In sum, this thesis addresses the very current and dynamic research topic of multiple export 
channel choice and advances future research possibilities to build upon its findings. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A.1: Questionnaire of the study 
     
 
Export success factors  
— the export behaviour of German small and medium-sized firms  
 
Dear Madams and Sirs,  
We would greatly appreciate your participation in this study. The aim of this study is to examine the 
success factors and export behaviour of small and medium-sized firms. As regards contents, we are 
interested in your assessment regarding your sales management, the business environment in your 
most important export country as well as your marketing strengths and weaknesses.  
If you agree to participate, please answer ALL the questions in the questionnaire.  
 Please provide the answer you feel best suits your situation. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
 The survey will take approx. 15 minutes. 
 All your answers are strictly confidential. You are not asked to identify yourself on the 
questionnaire and there is no way that your answer can be linked to you. This study is part 
of a PhD dissertation project at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. 
 A summary of the results will be available to you upon completion of the study. 
 All survey participants will take part in a draw for three kits of premium Australian wine 
valued at 200 €. 
 Please answer the questionnaire until the 30th of April by: 
1) using the online link: ht tps : / /www.umf rageon l ine .com /s /Ver t r iebskana l , OR  
2) return the questionnaire to: n.eberhard@business.uq.edu.au 
Thank you in advance for your participation and support! 
Yours sincerely, 
Nicola Eberhard      Prof. Peter Liesch 
 
The University of Queensland    The University of Queensland 
UQ Business School      UQ Business School   
Fon: 07131 402069      Fon: +61 7 3346 8174 
Fax: 07131 904012      Fax: +61 7 3346 8166 
Email: n.eberhard@business.uq.edu.au   Email: p.liesch@business.uq.edu.au 
UQ Business School Website: www.business.uq.edu.au 
 
This study adheres to the guidelines of the ethical review process of The University of Queensland as well as the guidelines of the Australian National 
Health and Medical Research Council in human research. This ensures participant anonymity and protection of data privacy. Whilst you are free to 
discuss your participation in this study with project staff (contactable on the details above), if you would like to speak to an officer of the University 
not involved in the study, you may contact the Ethics Officer on +61 7 3365 3924. 
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Instructions for completing this questionnaire 
 
What do we want you to do? 
 Your responses to this questionnaire should be based on the distribution system of your 
current MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT LINE (the product line with the largest 
contribution to annual profit) in the EXPORT COUNTRY THAT IS MOST 
IMPORTANT FOR THIS PRODUCT LINE (the export country with the largest 
contribution to annual revenue). 
 
 In case your company has several business units, please provide your answers with respect to 
the business unit that is responsible for your current most important product line.  
 
1. Is your current most important product a 
standardised product or non-standardised?         
Standardised: ☐       non-standardised: ☐ 
2. Which country is the current most important 
export country for this product?    Country:_______ 
3. In which year did you start to export to this 
country?   Year:___________ 
 
****************************************************************************** 
Section 1: Company 
a. General information 
1. 
Is your company to a majority (>50%) 
family-owned? 
 Yes ☐ No ☐  
2. 
Do you have a managing family 
member? 
 Yes ☐  No ☐  
3. 
How many employees (full-time) does 
your company have? 
  < 50 ☐   51-100 ☐  101-250 ☐   251-500 ☐ 
501-1000 ☐   > 1000 ☐ 
4. 
To how many countries do you 
export? < 10 ☐   10-20 ☐  20-40 ☐    >40 ☐  
5. 
In which year was your company 
founded? 
                                        
Year: 
6. In which industry do you operate? 
                                        
Industry: 
7. 
What is the annual revenue of your 
company? 
< 50 Mio. ☐   50-100 Mio. ☐  100-250 Mio. ☐    
250-500 Mio. ☐ > 500 Mio. ☐ 
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b. Your Export Channels 
Which channels do you use to sell your most important product in for this product most 
important export country? (Most important product: The product with the largest contribution 
to profit.) 
Please check ALL the distribution channels that you use. 
Please estimate the % of sales generated by the different distribution channels for this product in this 
country. 
 
 We use this 
sales channel 
Sales 
percentage in 
this country 
approx. X % 
1. We sell directly from headquarter to the end-user. ☐ 
 
 
_________ 
2. We sell via a sales subsidiary to the end-user. ☐ 
 
 
_________ 
3. We sell via distributors in this export country. ☐  _________ 
4. We use sales agents to sell to end-users. ☐  _________ 
4.a We use sales agents to sell to distributors.  ☐  _________ 
4.b We use sales agents to sell to secondary producers. ☐ 
 
 
_________ 
5. 
We sell directly to secondary producers in this export 
country. ☐ 
 
_________ 
6. We sell to competitors in this export country. ☐ 
 
_________ 
 
   ∑ Total = 100 % 
 
Other sales channels that are not listed: 
  
7. _______________________________________________   
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Section 2: Channel Performance 
a. Please rate the performance of your channel system you use to sell and distribute your most 
important product line in the export country that is most important for this product line. The 
system includes the channels owned and operated by yourself as well as independent entities (e.g., 
distributors, sales agents, value-added resellers). 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1 means you completely 
disagree, 7 means you completely agree and 2,3,4,5 and 6 represent intermediate levels. 
In the last 3 years our channel system has been successful 
in the following areas... 
Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. ... high market penetration......v1........................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. ... meeting sales targets.............v2........................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. ... revenue growth......................v3........................................ ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. ... expanding your business...........v4..................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. ... contribution to profit................v5...................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. ... contribution to revenue by your entire channel system v6 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
The expenses for our channel system...  Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. ... are too high....v7 (reversed)................................................. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. ... have resulted in inadequate profit v8 (rev)………………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
11.  How do you rate your channel   
system on the whole? 
Poor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Outstanding 
  ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
V11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the whole our channel system...  Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. 
... leaves a lot to be desired from an overall performance 
standpoint…v9 (rev)……………………………………………………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. ... have exceeded your expectations...v10............................. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Specialised Sales Activities  
a. How much time and effort is necessary for a salesperson to be able to sell your current 
most important product line in for this product line most important export country? 
(Whether your own salesperson, a sales agent, distributors’ salesperson or a salesperson of 
other distribution partners). 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. 
A specialised sales effort is needed to market this product 
line……v12………………………………………………………………………… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. 
It is difficult for a new salesperson to learn our ways of doing 
things……v13……………………………………………………… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
It takes a long time for a salesperson… 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
  
Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. … to learn about our products thoroughly…v14………………. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. ... to get to know our customers……v15…………………………… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5.  … to get to know our competitors and their products....v16. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Difficulty to Evaluate the Performance of Salespeople in a Distribution Channel 
b. How difficult is it for you to evaluate the performance of individual salespeople of your 
most important product line in for this product line most important export country? 
(Whether your own salespeople, a sales agent, distributors’ salespeople or salespeople of other 
distribution partners).  
An easy evaluation is possible based on… 
Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. …sales and cost figures   v17 (rev)………………………………. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. …accurate activity reports for each salesperson…v18 (rev) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
     Strongly    
agree 
 It is difficult... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. ... to monitor the performance of sales personnel v19……….. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. ... to evaluate how much effort an individual in our 
distribution channels really puts into his job…v20…… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
         
 
        On the whole… 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
5. It is easy to assess how well each salesperson is 
doing………v21 (rev) ………………………………………………………. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. There are several salespeople are involved in a 
sale....v22……… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Section 3: Business Environment in the Export Country 
This section relates to the business environment in your most important export country for your 
current most important product line, for example,  customers, competitors and environmental 
conditions that your company faces in this country.  
 
a. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
We are often surprised by the actions of... 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. ... our distributors and sales agents……v27…………. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. ... our competitors.....v28...................................................... ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. ... our customers……v29…………………………………………… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
In the most important export country for our most 
important product line... 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
4. ... there are many end-users……v23…………………….. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. ... there are many competitors........v24................................ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. ... there are many potential intermediaries…v25…… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. 
… users of this product have a limited source of suppliers 
v26 (rev) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. … it is easy to monitor trends……v30 (rev)…………………… ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. … market volume is stable…v31 (rev)……………………. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. …customer product needs are stable……v32 (rev)…….. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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b. Situation in the Export Country  
 
Is the situation in the most important export country for your most important product 
line better, worse or the same as the situation in Germany? 
             Worse         Same  Better 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. Enforceability of business laws........v33..................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. Intellectual property protection..........v34................................. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. 
Business freedom (e.g., burden of administrative regulations 
v35 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. Quality of sales staff training...v36............................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. Customer orientation........v37...................................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. Obligation by salespeople to provide quality work……v38 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. Quality of sales activities.....v39................................................. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. Trustworthiness of sales business partners......v40......................  ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. 
Companies’ ability to implement measures of efficient sales 
channel management………v41……………........................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. 
Professionals’ knowledge about channel management practice 
v42 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 Changed to a 1,2,3 scale 
How different is the situation in the most important export country for your most important 
product line to the situation in Germany? 
 
 
Not 
different at 
all 
 
Completely 
different 
  1 2 3 4 5  
1. Price negotiation practices....v43................................................ ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
2. Practices at business meetings........v44....................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
3. The role of the personal network in sales activities.....v45........... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
4. Labour market regulations (e.g., dismissal protection……v46… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  
5. 
Trade barriers (e.g., 
tariffs).......v47................................................ ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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The following questions refer to your company as a whole. 
Section 4: Market Orientation 
a. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At least once a year we…  
 Strongly 
disagree 
 Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. ... meet with customers to find out future product/service needs v48 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. ... poll end-users about our product quality……v49………………….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Moreover we... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. ... do intensive in-house market research……v50………………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. ... periodically review important market changes for customers v51 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5. 
... talk to people who can influence end-users (e.g., sales agents, 
distributors)…v52…………………………………………………………………………….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. 
... independently generate intelligence on competitors in every 
department……v53…………………………………………………………………….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Our company regularly... 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. ... has interdepartmental meetings to monitor trends…v54…….... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. ... distributes internally information about customers……v55........ ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. 
... distributes internally information about customer satisfaction at 
all levels (e.g., information about customer complaints)………v56..... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. … has meetings to discuss customers‘ future needs……v57… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. ...reviews products/services on meeting customer requirements v88 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We act quickly in the following areas: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. 
... implementing marketing 
plans......v59...............................................  ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. 
... responding to customer 
complaints...v60..........................................   ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. 
... responding to new customer product/service 
requirements…v61...  ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. 
... responding to competitor price 
changes...v62................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. ... campaigns launched by competitors targeting our customers v63 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
17. 
… spreading information about important incidents internally (e.g., 
about customers)……v58………………………………………....................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Marketing and Sales 
 
b. Please rate your company relative to your major competitors in the following are
 
  
 Much  
worse 
 Much  
better 
 Pricing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Using pricing to respond quickly to market changes…v64………….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2. Knowledge of competitors’ pricing tactics……v65……………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3. Doing an effective job of pricing products/services……v66…………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4. Monitoring competitors’ prices………v67………………………………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 Product 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Ability to develop new products/services……v68………………………….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
6. Developing new products/services to exploit R&D investment…v69 ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
7. Successfully launching new products/services………v70……………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
8. 
Ensuring that product/service development efforts are responsive 
to customer needs……v71……………………………………………………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 Marketing communication 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Developing advertising programs……v72……………………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
10. 
Public relations 
skills.......v73................................................................... ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
11. Brand image……v74…………………………………………………………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 Selling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Giving salespeople the training they need to be effective……v75…. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
13. Sales control systems……v76…………………………………………………..   ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
14. Selling skills of salespeople……v77…………………………………………..  ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
15. 
Sales management 
skills....v78................................................................. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
16. Providing effective sales support to the salesforce…v79……………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 Marketing planning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Marketing planning skills………v80…………………………………………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
18. Ability to effectively target markets………v81………………………….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
19. Developing creative marketing strategies……v82……………………. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
20. Thoroughness of marketing planning processes………v83…………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 Marketing implementation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Allocating marketing resources effectively………v84……………………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
22. Organising to deliver marketing programs effectively……v85……….. ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
23. Translating marketing strategies into action………v86………………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
24. Executing marketing strategies quickly………v87………………………… ☐     ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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Appendix A.2: Definition of key terms 
Table 97: Definition of key terms 
Variable Definition
Multiple channels
In this study, multiple distribution channels are defined as a “multichannel arrangement 
characterized by the sharing of various distribution tasks performed by a combination 
of distinct channels, indirect and/or direct” (Webb & Didow, 1997, p. 40). I refer to 
multiple channels when they are used to sell the same product or product line in the 
same country (Sa Vinhas & Anderson, 2008)
Small-to-medium 
sized enterprises 
(SMEs)
Firms with less than 500 employees and less than 50 million EUR sales p.a. (Wolter & 
Hauser, 2001)
Transaction Costs
Transaction Cost Theory (TCE) considers firms and markets as two alternative 
mechanisms to organise an exchange of a good or service. When making an exchange, 
certain costs occur. There exist two categories of transaction costs: (1) Direct costs: 
Costs of crafting safeguards, communication, negotiation and coordination costs, 
screening and selection costs (ex ante). (2) Opportunity costs: Failure to invest in 
productive assets, failure to adapt, failure to identify appropriate partners (ex ante), 
productivity losses through adjustments (ex post) (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).
Resources
Are defined as “tangible and intangible assets [that] firms use to conceive of and 
implement its strategies” (J. B. Barney & Arikan, 2001, p. 138 as cited in Kozlenkova 
et al., 2014). They can be thought of  as “inputs into the production process” (Grant, 
1991, p. 118) or “stock of available factors that are owned or controlled by the firm” 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 35). Resources can be further refined into physical 
resources (e.g. tangible things, plant, equipment) and human resources (e.g. technical, 
managerial staff) (Penrose, 1959) or categorized into natural resources, capital, labor 
and technological, managerial and entrepreneurial skills (Fayerweather, 1978). 
Capabilities
Are a subset of a firm’s resources and refer to the tangible or intangible processes 
within a firm (Kozlenkova et al., 2014). Those processes enable firms to use other 
resources more efficiently and to improve the productivity of those resources 
(Makadok, 2001). As such, capabilities are a special form of resources. 
Dynamic capabilties
This term was introduced by Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) and emphasizes a 
firm’s ability to renew its resources and capabilities. Dynamic capabilities enable firms 
to employ innovative responses in a fast-changing, turbulent market environment. 
These are important when there is a high rate of technological change and the future of 
market determinants and competition is difficult to foresee (Teece et al., 1997). As 
capabilities, dynamic capabilities are a form of resources that are used to utilize a 
firm’s other resources. Dynamic capabilities are for example resource allocation 
routines, knowledge creation processes or new product development routines 
(Kozlenkova et al., 2014). In line with recent scholarship (e.g. Kozlenkova et al., 2014; 
Peteraf & Barney, 2003), This study views dynamic capabilities as consistent with 
RBT that can be studied within the traditional RBT framework. 
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Variable Definition
Dual channels: 
Refers to the case when a manufacturer sells its products directly to the enduser and 
concurrently uses one or more indirect channels to sell the same product in the same 
country market. 
Dual distribution 
and multiple 
channels: 
Some authors have distinguished dual distribution from multiple channels (e.g. Sa Vinhas, 
2002). Multiple channels are thereby defined as the use of more than one distribution 
channel to sell the same product line to the same target market. In this case, the emphasis 
is on the different channel types used to perform distribution functions and reaching the 
customer, independently of the entity that controls those channels. In contrast, the concept 
of dual distribution emphasises the ownership of channels rather than the types of channels 
used (Sa Vinhas, 2002). The focus lies on whether a channel (regardless of the type of 
channel) should be owned by the manufacturer or an independent entity
Concurrent 
Channels: 
Another term for dual distribution (Vinhas & Anderson, 2005)
Direct distribution 
channels: 
Another term for integrated or hierarchical channels. I.e. the case when a product is sold 
directly from the manufacturer to the enduser without a third party in between.
Hierarchical 
channels: 
Another term for integrated distribution channels. Governance of the channel is executed 
within the firm (hierarchy).
Independent 
distribution 
channels: 
Channels that are owned and controlled by an independent entity, e.g. distributors or sales 
agents.
Indirect distribution 
channels: 
Another term for independent channels. I.e. the case when a third party is between the 
manufacturer and the enduser, e.g. a distributor.
Integrated 
distribution 
channels: 
Channels that are owned or controlled by the manufacturer. For instance sales 
subsidiaries, own sales personnel.
Multiple indirect 
channels: 
Refers to the case when two or more indirect channels are used concurrently to sell a 
product.
Single indirect 
channel: 
Refers to one of several possible indirect channel types, e.g. distributors, sales agents, 
selling to competitors.
Single direct 
channel:
Refers to the case when the manufacturing firm sells directly from headquarter or sales 
subsidiary to the enduser.
Hybrid channels: 
Are intermediate forms between firm owned channels and channels owned by a third party. 
For instance, long-term contracting, franchising, reciprocal trading, joint ventures 
(Williamson, 1991).
Composite 
channels: 
Describes the case when multiple channels are used to perform different distribution 
functions (E. Anderson, Day, & Rangan, 1997). In that case the conflict between the 
multiple channels is minimized as each performs a different function in selling the product 
and they do not compete against each other but rather cooperate. For instance when one 
channel performs negotiating functions and another one distribution functions (Sa Vinhas, 
2002). This study focuses only on multiple channels when they are concurrently used to 
perform the selling function within the firm.
Other channel types that are not included in this study:
Table 97: Definition of key terms (continued) 
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Table 98: Measurement items and references 
Market intelligence 
generation 
1. In this business unit we meet with customers at least once a year to find out what 
products/services they will need in the future.  (v48)
2. In this business unit, we do a lot of in-house market research. (v50)
3. We poll end-users at least once a year to assess the quality of our products/services. (v49)
4. We often talk with or survey those who can influence our end-users’ purchases (e.g. 
retailers or distributors). (v52)
5. In this business unit, intelligence in our competitors is generated independently by several 
departments. (v53)
6. We periodically review the likely effects of changes in our business environment (e.g. 
regulations) on customers. (v51)
Market intelligence 
dissemination 
1. We have interdepartmental meetings at least once a quarter to discuss market trends and 
developments. (v54)
2. Marketing personnel in our business unit spend time discussing customers’ future needs 
with other functional departments. (v57)
3. Our business unit periodically circulates documents (e.g. reports, newsletters) that provide 
information on our customers. (v55)
4. When something important happens to a major customer or market, the whole business unit 
knows about it in a short time. (v58)
5. Data on customer satisfaction are disseminated at all levels in this business unit on a regular 
basis. (v56)
Responsiveness to 
market intelligence 
1. It takes us forever to decide how to respond to competitor price changes. (Reversed) (v62)
2. For various reasons, we tend to ignore changes in our customers’ product/service needs. 
(Reversed) (v61)
3. We periodically review our product/service development efforts to ensure that they are in 
line with what customers want. (v88)
4. If a major competitor were to launch an intensive campaign targeted at our customers, we 
would implement an immediate response. (v63)
5. Customer complaints fall on deaf ears in this business unit. (Reversed) (v60)
6. Even if we came up with a great marketing plan, we probably would not be able to 
implement it in a timely fashion. (Reversed) (v59)
Reference: Jaworski & Kohli (1993); Kohli & Jaworski (1990); Morgan, Vorhies & Mason (2009)
Market orientation
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Seven-point scale with 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale anchors. 
Asset specificity
Seven-point scale with 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale anchors.
1. A specialized sales effort is needed to market this product line. (v12) (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990; Shervani, Frazier, 
& Challagalla, 2007).
2. It is difficult for a new salesperson to learn our ways of doing things. (v13) (Anderson, 1985; Brettel, Engelen, 
Mueller, & Schilke, 2011; Klein et al., 1990).
3. It takes a long time for a salesperson to learn about our products thoroughly. (v14) (Anderson, 1985; Klein et al., 
1990; Shervani et al., 2007).
4. It takes a long time for a salesperson to get to know our customers. (v15) (Anderson, 1985; Klein et al., 1990; 
Shervani et al., 2007).
5. It takes a long time for a salesperson to get to know our competitors and their products. (v16). (Shervani et al., 2007).
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Volatiltiy
Refers to the extent to which the 
environment changes rapidly and 
allows a firm to be caught by 
surprise (Leblebici & Salancik, 
1981; Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990).
1. We are often surprised by the actions of our distributors and sales 
agents. (v27)
2. We are often surprised by the actions of our competitors. (v28)
3. We are often surprised by the actions of our customers. (v29)
4. It is easy to monitor trends. (v30rev)
5. There is a stable market volume. (v31rev)
6. Customer product needs are stable. (v32rev)
Reference:
Seven point scale with 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale anchors.
Diversity
Reflects the extent to which there 
are multiple sources of uncertainty 
in the environment (i.e. highly 
heterogeneous). A foreign market 
with high diversity would contain 
many customers, final users and 
many competitors for the firm's 
products.
1. There are many end-users of this product in this market. (v23)
2. There are many competitors for this product in this market. (v24)
3. There are many potential intermediaries. (v25)
4. Users of this product have a limited source of suppliers. (v26rev)
Reference:
Reference:
Listed below are a number of alternative ways a firm can distribute products to its customer. Please put X  next to all 
1. Company – direct export to enduser
2. Company – foreign sales office - enduser
3. Company – sales agent – enduser
4. Company – distributor – enduser
5. Company – value added reseller – enduser
6. Company – competitor – enduser
7. Company – sales agent – distributor – enduser
8. Company – sales agent – value added reseller - enduser
9. Other
Kabadayi et al. (2007), Kabadayi (2011)
Environmental uncertainty
(i) Seven-point scale with 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale anchors. (ii) Seven-point scale with 1 (very 
Klein, Frazier & Roth (1990), McNaugthon (2002), SaVinhas (2002), Anderson (1985), John & Weitz (1988)
Klein, Frazier & Roth (1990), McNaugthon (2002), Bello & Lohtia (1995)
Channel choice
Behavioral uncertainty
Seven-point scale with 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale anchors.
1. It is always easy to assess how well each salesperson is doing (Reversed). (v17rev) (John & Weitz, 1988; Shervani, 
Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007).
2. We have accurate activity reports for each salesperson. (Reversed) (v18rev) (John & Weitz, 1988).
3. It is difficult to evaluate the performance of sales personnel. (v19) (John & Weitz, 1988; Shervani et al., 2007).
4. It is difficult to evaluate how much effort an individual in our distribution channels really puts into his job. (v20) (Brettel, 
Engelen, Mueller, & Schilke, 2011; John & Weitz, 1988).
5. On the whole it is easy to assess how well each salesperson is doing. (v21rev) (Brettel et al., 2011; John & Weitz, 1988).
6. On the whole there are several salespeople involved in a sale. (v22).(Anderson, 1985).
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Pricing capabilities
"The ability to extract the optimal 
revenue from the firm's customers 
(Vorhies & Morgan, 2005, p.82)"
1. Using pricing skills and systems to respond quickly to market 
changes. (v64)
2. Knowledge of competitors’ pricing tactics. (v65)
3. Doing an effective job of pricing products/services. (v66)
4. Monitoring competitors’ prices and price changes. (v67)
Product capabilities
"The process by which firms develop 
and manage product and service 
offerings (Vorhies & Morgan, 2005, 
p.82)"
1. Ability to develop new products/services. (v68)
2. Developing new products/services to exploit R&D investment. 
(v69)
3. Successfully launching new products/services. (v70)
4. Ensuring that product/service development efforts are responsive 
to customer needs. (v71)
Marketing 
communication 
capabilities
"The firm's ability to manage customer 
value perceptions (Vorhies & Morgan, 
2005, p. 82)"
1. Developing and executing advertising programs. (v72)
2. Public relations skills. (v73)
3. Brand image management skills and processes. (v74)
Selling capabilities
"The process by which the firm 
acquires customer orders (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Giving salespeople the training they need to be effective. (v75)
2. Sales management planning and control systems. (v76)
3. Selling skills of salespeople. (v77)
4. Sales management skills. (v78)
5. Providing effective sales support to the salesforce. (v79)
Marketing planning 
capabilities
"The firm's ability to conceive 
marketing strategies that iptimize the 
match between the firm's resources 
and its marketplace (Vorhies & 
Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Marketing planning skills. (v80)
2. Ability to effectively segment and target market. (v81)
3. Developing creative marketing strategies. (v82)
4. Thoroughness of marketing planning processes. (v83)
Marketing 
implementation 
capabilities
"The process by which intended 
marketing strategy is transformed into 
realized resource deployments 
(Vorhies & Morgan, 2005, p. 82)"
1. Allocating marketing resources effectively. (v84)
2. Organizing to deliver marketing programs effectively. (v85)
3. Translating marketing strategies into action. (v86)
4. Executing marketing strategies quickly. (v87)
Reference:
Please rate your business unit, relative  to your major competitors in terms of its marketing capabilities in terms of its marketing 
capabilities in the following areas. Seven-point scale with -3 (much worse than competitors) to +3 (much better than competitors) 
scale anchors.
Morgan, Zhou, Vorhies & Katsikeas (2003), Vorhies & Morgan (2005), Morgan, Vorhies & Mason (2009)
Marketing capabilities
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Table 98: Measurement items and references (continued) 
Sales Channel contribution to sales 
1. Over the past three years, your channel system has generated high 
sales revenues. (v6)
2. Over the past three years, your channel system has enabled the 
company to achieve high level of market penetration. (v1)
3. Over the past three years, your channel system has met the sales 
target you had set for it. (v2)
Profit Channel contribution to profit 
1. Your company’s cost of servicing your channel system is 
unreasonable.(Reversed) (v7rev)
2. The channel system’s demands for support have resulted in 
inadequate profits for your company. (Reversed) (v8rev)
3. Your company has made adequate profits from your channel system. 
(v5)
Growth Channel contribution to growth 
1. In the past three years, your current channel system has contributed 
enormously to your company’s revenue growth. (v3)
2. In the past three years, your current channel system has been very 
successful in expanding your business. (v4)
Global 
channel
Global channel performance 
1. Your channel system leaves a lot to be desired from an overall 
performance standpoint. (Reversed) (v9rev)
2. Overall, the results of your relationship with your channel have 
exceeded your expectations. (v10)
3. Taking all the different factors into account, your channel’s 
performance has been..? (v11), a
Reference:
Performance
a Seven-point scale with 1 (poor) to 7 (outstanding), all other items: Seven-point scale with 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
Kumar, Stern & Achrol (1992), Kabadayi, Eyuboglu & Thomas (2007)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
 
Appendix B.1: CFA for each individual market orientation dimension 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis — market intelligence generation 
First, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to establish the dimensionality of this construct. All 
variables used to measure this construct were included in this factor analysis. EFA using maximum 
likelihood procedure with promax rotation revealed one factor with all items loading on this factor. 
Eigenvalues and scree plots were used to determine the number of factors. Two items were dropped 
out of originally six items used to measure this construct due to low communalities16 (Brown, 
2015). This construct demonstrates high reliability as indicated by a Cronbach’s alpha (α) value of 
0.79. Based on the results of the EFA, a CFA of the individual construct with the four remaining 
items was conducted. Structural equation modeling (AMOS 23.0) was used for the CFA. The 
conceptual model is shown below. 
 
Figure 19: Conceptual model MI-generation 
Convergent validity —all factor loadings are statistically significant at p<0.05 and all loadings 
exceed 0.5, suggesting practical significance. All but one item had squared multiple correlations 
above 0.5, however the Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.79 signifies adequate reliability. The RMSEA 
value suggests a poor model fit, with a value above 0.10. However, the SRMR of 0.03 < 0.09, CFI 
and TLI values above 0.90 and 0.95 suggest an acceptable model fit (Brown, 2015).  
 
                                                 
16 V48 (communality: .22), V49 (c: .29) 
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Table 99: CFA results MI generation 
Item
Market Intelligence 
Generation
SE**
v50a .81 .00
v51 .80 .09
v52 .58 .08
v53 .57 .08
Coefficient alpha .79
Highest item SMC .66
Lowest item SMC .32
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: 
Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was fixed 
to the value of 1.0 during the estimation 
Model Fit: χ2  = 9.72 df(p)=2 (.01), χ2/df=4.86, 
RMSEA=.123 [0.05;0.21] , SRMR=.0334, GFI=.983, 
AGFI=.913, NFI=.968, CFI=.974, TLI=.923, IFI=.975
 
Confirmatory factor analysis — market intelligence dissemination 
 Based on the EFA results, one item out of five was dropped due to low communalities17. 
The remaining items were used in the CFA.  
 
Figure 20: Conceptual model MI dissemination 
All factor loadings are significant at p<0.05, all factor loadings exceed a value of 0.50 and all 
squared multiple correlations are larger than 0.50 except one with a value marginally less than 0.50, 
suggesting item reliability. In addition, a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.79 indicates adequate 
reliability. Again, the RMSEA value suggests a poor model fit, however the remaining fit indices 
such as SRMR, GFI and CFI indicate an acceptable model fit.  
                                                 
V62 (.10), v63 (.14).17 V58: Communality: .33. In addition overall variance extracted was below 50% with all five 
items. 
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Table 100: CFA results MI dissemination 
Item
Market Intelligence 
Dissemination
SE**
v54a .68 .00
v55 .70 .09
v56 .76 .11
v57 .69 .09
Coefficient alpha .79
Highest item SMC .58
Lowest item SMC .46
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: 
Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was 
fixed to the value of 1.0 during the estimation 
process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 15.07 df(p)=2 (.00), χ2/df=7.54, 
RMSEA=.160 [0.09;0.24] , SRMR=.0387, 
GFI=.971, AGFI=.855, NFI=.952, CFI=.958, 
TLI=.874, IFI=.958
 
Confirmatory factor analysis — responsiveness to market intelligence 
 During EFA, two items out of six were dropped due to low communalities18.  
 
Figure 21: Conceptual model responsiveness 
All items are statistically significant at p<0.05, squared multiple correlations are quite low for three 
of the four items. However, the Coefficient alpha of 0.74 > 0.70 suggest acceptable reliability.  
                                                 
18 V62 (communality: .16), v63 (c.:.24) 
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Table 101: CFA results responsiveness 
Item
Responsiveness to 
Market Intelligence
SE**
v59a .54 .00
v60 .69 .16
v61 .76 .19
v88 .60 .16
Coefficient alpha .74
Highest item SMC .57
Lowest item SMC .29
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: 
Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was fixed to 
the value of 1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 8.05 df(p)=2 (.02), χ2/df=4.024 
RMSEA=.109 [0.04;0.19] , SRMR=.0351, GFI=.984, 
AGFI=.922, NFI=.964, CFI=.972, TLI=.917, IFI=.973
 
Similar to the previous two constructs, the RMSEA value of 0.109 suggests a poor model fit, 
however the remaining fit indices indicate an acceptable fit.  
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CFA for each individual marketing capabilities dimension 
Pricing 
 For this construct all of the four items were retained and one factor was extracted during 
EFA. 
 
Figure 22: Pricing — conceptual model 
 
Table 102: CFA results pricing 
Item Pricing SE**
v64a .63 .00
v65 .77 .13
v66 .77 .13
v67 .86 .14
Coefficient alpha .85
Highest item SMC .75
Lowest item SMC .40
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap 
standard error, aThis loading was fixed to the value of 
1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 12.26 df(p)=2 (.00), χ2/df=6.13 
RMSEA=.14 [0.07;0.22] , SRMR=.0313, GFI=.978, 
AGFI=.888, NFI=.972, CFI=.977, TLI=.930, IFI=.930  
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Product 
For the construct Product all of the four items were retained and one factor was extracted during 
EFA. The conceptual model is shown below. 
 
Figure 23: Product — conceptual model 
Table 103: CFA results product 
Item Product SE**
v68a .89 .00
v69 .81 .06
v70 .71 .06
v71 .71 .06
Coefficient alpha .86
Highest item SMC .79
Lowest item SMC .50
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: 
Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was fixed 
to the value of 1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 20.56 df(p)=2 (.00), χ2/df=10.28 
RMSEA=.19 [0.12;0.27] , SRMR=.0350, GFI=.961, 
AGFI=.806, NFI=.958, CFI=.962, TLI=.886, IFI=.962  
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Communication 
As a three-item CFA is just-identified, the dimension Communication was correlated with the 
dimension Product in order to assess model fit. One factor was extracted and all three items 
retained.  
 
Figure 24: Communication — conceptual model 
 
Table 104: CFA results communication 
Item Communication SE** Product SE**
v72a .88 .00
v73 .83 .07
v74 .68 .07
v68a .87 .00
v69 .82 .06
v70 .73 .06
v71 .70 .06
Coefficient alpha .84 .86
Highest item SMC .78 .75
Lowest item SMC .47 .50
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap 
standard error, aThis loading was fixed to the value of 1.0 
during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 68.40 df(p)=13 (.00), χ2/df=5.262 RMSEA=.13 
[0.10;0.16] , SRMR=.0676, GFI=.926, AGFI=.841, NFI=.927, 
CFI=.939, TLI=.902, IFI=.940
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Selling 
All items for this construct were retained in the EFA and CFA and one factor was extracted.  
 
 
Figure 25: Selling — conceptual model 
 
Table 105: CFA results selling 
Item Selling SE**
v75a .73 .00
v76 .77 .07
v77 .88 .08
v78 .90 .08
v79 .83 .08
Coefficient alpha .91
Highest item SMC .81
Lowest item SMC .54
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap 
standard error, aThis loading was fixed to the value of 
1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 42.53 df(p)=5 (.00), χ2/df=8.51 
RMSEA=.17 [0.13;0.22] , SRMR=.0403, GFI=.938, 
AGFI=.815, NFI=.953, CFI=.958, TLI=.916, IFI=.958
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Marketing planning 
For Marketing Planning all items were retained and one factor was extracted.  
 
Figure 26: Conceptual model — marketing planning 
 
Table 106: CFA results marketing planning 
Item Marketing Planning SE**
v80a .71 .00
v81 .76 .09
v82 .81 .13
v83 .88 .13
Coefficient alpha .87
Highest item SMC .78
Lowest item SMC .50
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: 
Bootstrap standard error, aThis loading was fixed to 
the value of 1.0 during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 70.41 df(p)=2 (.00), χ2/df=35.21 
RMSEA=.37 [0.30;0.44] , SRMR=.0707, GFI=.874, 
AGFI=.371, NFI=.876, CFI=.879, TLI=.636, IFI=.879  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231 
 
Marketing implementation 
All items were retained and one factor was extracted.  
 
Figure 27: Conceptual model — marketing implementation 
Table 107: CFA results marketing implementation 
Item Marketing Implementation SE**
v84a .88 .00
v85 .92 .05
v86 .89 .05
v87 .80 .06
Coefficient alpha .93
Highest item SMC .85
Lowest item SMC .64
Standardized Estimates*
*all estimates are significant at p<0.01, **SE: Bootstrap 
standard error, aThis loading was fixed to the value of 1.0 
during the estimation process.
Model Fit: χ2  = 20.10 df(p)=2 (.00), χ2/df=10.05 
RMSEA=.19 [0.12;0.27] , SRMR=.0211, GFI=.964, AGFI=.818, 
NFI=.976, CFI=.978, TLI=.935, IFI=.979  
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Appendix B.2: Marginal effect graphs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal Effects: Asset Specificity 
•  Asset specificity and Single Indirect •  Asset specificity and Multiple Indirect 
•  Asset specificity and Dual •  Asset specificity and Direct-only 
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Marginal effects: Volatility 
•  Volatility and Single Indirect •  Volatility and Multiple Indirect 
•  Volatility and Dual •  Volatility and Direct-only 
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Marginal effects: Diversity 
•  Diversity and Single Indirect •  Diversity and Multiple Indirect 
•  Diversity and Dual •  Diversity and Direct-only 
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Marginal effects: Market orientation 
•  Market Orientation and Single Indirect •  Market Orientation and Multiple Indirect 
•  Market Orientation and Dual •  Market Orientation and Direct-only 
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Marginal effects: Marketing capabilities 
•  Marketing Capabilities and Single Indirect •  Marketing Capabilities and Multiple Indirect 
•  Marketing Capabilities and Dual •  Marketing Capabilities and Direct-only 
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Appendix B.3: Confidence interval graphs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidence intervals of predicted probabilities: Asset specificity 
•  Asset specificity and Single Indirect •  Asset specificity and Multiple Indirect 
•  Asset specificity and Dual •  Asset specificity and Direct-only 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
n
e
l 
c
h
o
ic
e
0 2 4 6 8
assetspec
Single Indirect 95% lower limit
95% upper limit
Multinomial logit model: other variables held at their means
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
n
e
l 
c
h
o
ic
e
0 2 4 6 8
assetspec
Multiple Indirect 95% lower limit
95% upper limit
Multinomial logit model: other variables held at their means
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
n
e
l 
c
h
o
ic
e
0 2 4 6 8
assetspec
Direct only 95% lower limit
95% upper limit
Multinomial logit model: other variables held at their means
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
n
e
l 
c
h
o
ic
e
0 2 4 6 8
assetspec
Dual 95% lower limit
95% upper limit
Multinomial logit model: other variables held at their means
 239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidence intervals of predicted probabilities: Behavioural 
uncertainty 
•  Behavioural Uncertainty and Single Indirect •  Behavioural Uncertainty and Multiple Indirect 
•  Behavioural Uncertainty and Dual •  Behavioural Uncertainty and Direct-only 
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Confidence intervals of predicted probabilities: Volatility 
•  Volatility and Single Indirect •  Volatility and Multiple Indirect 
•  Volatility and Dual •  Volatility and Direct-only 
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Confidence intervals of predicted probabilities: Diversity 
•  Diversity and Single Indirect •  Diversity and Multiple Indirect 
•  Diversity and Dual •  Diversity and Direct-only 
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Confidence intervals of predicted probabilities: Market orientation 
•  Market Orientation and Single Indirect •  Market Orientation and Multiple Indirect 
•  Market Orientation and Dual •  Market Orientation and Direct-only 
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Confidence intervals of predicted probabilities:  Marketing capabilities 
•  Marketing Capabilities and Single Indirect •  Marketing Capabilities and Multiple Indirect 
•  Marketing Capabilities and Dual •  Marketing Capabilities and Direct-only 
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Appendix B.4: Degrees of freedom in the multinomial logit model 
The dependent variable in my model has four channel configuration outcomes (SI, MI, DU and D-
O) and ten explanatory variables (four controls and six predictors). To estimate the model, the 
choice SI was selected as the base choice (which is in line with TCE where a SI channel is assumed 
to be the default choice), which is the restricted choice option and leaves three unrestricted choice 
options (MI, DU and D-O). 
 The overall significance of an MNML is determined with a LR test. The MNML has J 
equations and the resulting LR statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 
that are equal to the number of variables multiplied with the number of unrestricted choice 
equations J (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004). In my model, there are three unrestricted choice equations 
and ten variables which equals to 3 x 10 = 30 degrees of freedom for the Chi-square distribution to 
test the overall significance. For a more detailed explanation, see Bowen and Wiersema (2004, 
p.105ff.). 
 
